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B    3    137    3SE 


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PHILOSOPHY 


MORAL   FEELINGS. 

John  abercrombie,  m.  d.  f.r.s.e. 

AUTHOR   OF    "inquiries   CONCERNING   THE   TNTELLfiCTUAIt 
POWERS,"   &C. 

FROM     THE     SECOND     EDINBURGH     EITITIOIf. 
WITH   QUESTIONS    FOR   THE    EXAMINATION   OF    STtJDKNTS. 


NEW- YORK  : 


PUBLISHED    BY    HARPER    &    BROTHERS, 
NO.    82    CLIFF-STREET. 

1835. 


nO' 


^t 


Enterod,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1834, 

By  Harper  &  Brothers, 

In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  Southern  District  of  New-York. 


^S>UCATlON  DfiFi; 


PUBLISHER  S'     ADVERTISEMENT. 


In  issuing  a  few  months  since  a  new  edition  of 
Abercrombie  on  the  Intellectual  Powers,  accompa- 
nied with  Questions  for  the  use  of  Schools  and  Col- 
leges, the  publishers  announced  the  intention,  should 
the  plan  meet  with  sufficient  encouragement,  of  giv- 
ing to  the  public  the  work  on  the  Moral  Feelings, 
enriched  with  a  similar  appendage.  Their  object  in 
supplying  these  works  with  an  apparatus  of  this 
kind,  was  to  render  them  better  adapted  to  the  pur- 
poses of  academic  and  collegiate  study,  and  espe- 
cially to  afford  a  useful  aid  to  the  teacher  in  dis- 
charging the  duties  of  the  recitation-room.  This 
service,  they  have  every  reason  to  believe,  has  met 
with  general  approbation.  In  no  less  than  from 
twelve  to  fifteen  literary  institutions  of  the  first 
respectability,  has  it  already  been  adopted  as  a  text- 
book in  the  department  of  which  it  treats,  and  in 
several  others  they  learn  it  is  now  under  considera- 
tion with  a  view  to  its  adoption. 

How  far  the  furnishing  the  work  with  questions 
may  have  contributed,  in  addition  to  its  intrinsic 
merit,  to  the  almost  unprecedented  popularity  of  the 
Treatise  on  the  Intellectual  Powers,  it  may  not  be 
easy  to  say ;  but  the  publishers  consider  the  con- 
dition above  mentioned  to  have  been  so  amply  ful- 
filled, and  the  experiment  so  entirely  to  have  sue- 
A2 


5442G3 


*^^  AbVERTISEMENT. 

ceeded,  that  they  are  induced,  without  further  delay, 
to  redeem  the  pledge  given  to  the  public,  and  accord- 
ingly send  forth  the  present  work  endowed  like  its 
predecessor. 

From  the  fact  that  the  chairs  of  moral  philosophy 
in  a  number  of  seminaries  of  learning,  have  already 
adopted  it  as  a  manual  for  their  classes,  they  cannot 
doubt  that  a  reception  equally  favourable  awaits  it  at 
the  hands  of  those  for  whom  in  a  special  manner  it 
is  designed.  In  the  preparation  of  the  present  vol- 
ume, the  publishers  have  availed  themselves  of  the 
valuable  services  of  the  same  hand  to  which  they 
were  indebted  for  the  supplement  to  the  other ;  and 
under  the  strong  confidence  that  this  edition  has 
superior  claims  to  any  former  one  to  rank  as  a  per- 
manent classic  in  the  department  of  moral  science, 
they  cheerfully  consign  it  to  the  hands  of  its  readers. 


PREFACE. 


In  a  former  work,*  the  author  endeavoured 
to  delineate,  in  a  simple  and  popular  form, 
the  leading  facts  relating  to  the  Intellectual 
Powers,  and  to  trace  the  principles  which 
ought  to  guide  us  in  the  Investigation  of 
Truth.  The  volume  which  he  now  oflfers 
to  the  public  attention  is  intended  as  a  sequel 
to  these  Inquiries ;  and  his  object  in  it  is  to 
investigate,  in  the  same  unpretending  man- 
ner, the  Moral  Feelings  of  the  Human  Mind, 
and  the  principles  which  ought  to  regulate 
our  volitions  and  our  conduct  as  moral  and 
responsible  beings.  The  two  branches  of 
investigation  are,  in  many  respects,  closely 
connected ;  and,  on  this  account,  it  may  often 
happen  that,  in  the  present  work,  principles 
are  assumed  as  admitted  or  proved,  which  in 
the  former  were  stated  at  length,  with  the 
evidence  by  which  they  are  supported. 

[♦  No.  XXXVII  of  the  Family  Library.] 
A2 


CONTENTS. 

PRELIMINARY  OBSERVATIONS. 

SECTION  I. 

NATURE  AND  IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  SCIENCE 
OF  THE  MORAL  FEELINGS. 

Division  of  the  Mental  Powers  into  Intellectual  and 

Moral 15 

Harmony  which  ought  to  exist  between  these  classes  -  16 
Causes  by  which   this  harmony  is   interrupted, — and 

means  of  counteracting  them 17 

Interest  of  the  Science  of  the  Moral  Feelings  -  -  -  18 
Peculiar  sources  of  Knowledge  bearing  upon  it, — from 

the  light  of  Conscience, — and  Divine  Revelation      20 

SECTION  II. 

FIRST  TRUTHS  IN  THE  SCIENCE  OF  THE 
MORAL  FEELINGS. 

Analogy  between  First  Truths,  or  Intuitive  Principles 

of  Belief,  in  Intellectual  and  in  Moral  Science      -     22 
Classification  of  First  Truths  in  M  oral  Science      -    -    26 
1.  Impression  of  Future  Existence. 


via  CONTENTS. 

2.  Belief  in  the   existence  and  attributes  of  a 

Great  First  Cause,  and  Moral  Governor. 

3.  Conviction   of   duties  which  a  man  owes  to 

other  men. 

4.  Impression  of  Moral  ResponsibiHty. 
Importance  of  these  convictions,  as  intuitive 

articles  of  belief  ---------28 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE 
MORAL  FEELINGS. 


Analysis  of  Man  as  a  Moral  Being 35 

I.  The  Desires — The  Affections — and  Self- 

love. 

II.  The  Will. 

III.  The  Moral  Principle,  or  Conscience. 

IV.  The  Moral   Relation  of  Man  towards 

the  Deity, 


PART  I. 


THE    DESIRES — THE    AFFECTIONS — AND 
SELF-LOVE. 


SECTION  I. 

THE  DESIRES 48 

1.  Desire  of  the  Animal  Propensities  -    -     -    -  44 

JJ.  Desire  of  Wealth — Avarice 44 


CONTENTS.  IX 

Page 

3.  Desire  of  Power — Ambition 45 

4.  Desire  of  Superiority — Emulation  -    -    -     -    46 
6.  Desire  of  Society 47 

6.  Desire  of  Esteem  or  Approbation    -    -     -     -     47 

7.  Desire  of  Knowledge 50 

8.  Desire  of  Moral  Improvement    -----     51 
—  Desire  of  Action     ---------62 

Importance  of  a  due  Regulation  of  the  Desires    53 


SECTION  II. 

THE  AFFECTIONS      -    ...  56 

I.  Justice 57 

1.  Justice  to  the  Interests  of  others — Integrity  -  60 

2.  Justice  to  the  Freedom  of  Action  of  others      -  60 

3.  Justice  to  the  Reputation  of  others  -     -     -     -  60 

4.  Justice  in  estimating  the  Conduct  and  Char- 

acter of  others     ---------61 

5.  Justice  to  the  Opinions  of  others — Candour  -  62 

6.  Justice  to  the  Feelings  of  others      -     -     -     -  63 

7.  Justice  to  the  Moral  Condition  of  others  -     -  64 

II.  Compassion  and  Benevolence    -----  65 

1.  Benevolence  towards  the  Distresses  of  others  67 

2.  Benevolence  towards  the  Reputation  of  others  68 

3.  Benevolence  towards  the  Character  and  Con- 

duct of  others, — ^including  Forgiveness  of 
Injuries     -----------68 

4.  Benevolence  towards  the  Feelings  of  others   -  69 

5.  Benevolence  towards    improving   the   Moral 

Condition  of  others  --------70 

III.  Veracity -----  70 

1.  The  Love  of  Truth — in  the  reception  of  it    -  71 


3f  CONTENTS. 

2.  Veracity  in  delivering  statements, — ^including 

Sincerity 73 

3.  Truth  of  Purpose,  or   correct  Fulfilment  of 

Promises 76 

IV.  Friendship,  Love,  and  Gratitude  -     -    -    -     76 

V.  Patriotism -----77 

VI.  The  Domestic  Affections    ------    78 


The  Defensive   Affections,  Angee,  Jealousy, 

Resentment     ----------81 

Important  Influence  produced  upon  the  Exercise  of  the 
Affections, 

By  Attention 83 

By  Habit 86 

Feeling  of  Moral  Approbation  attached  to  the  Exercise 
of  the  Affections       -----------89 

Happiness  arising  from  a  due  Exercise  of  the  Affec- 
tions— Influence  of  Temper   --------92 


SECTION  III. 
SELF-LOVE 96 

Sense  in  which  the  term  is  employed  ------     96 

Tendency  of  a  True  and  Rational  Self-love  -     -     -     -     97 

Morbid  Exercise  of  it, — Selfishness      ------  100 

disinterested  Conduct  and  Self-denial      -    ...    -  101 


CONTENTS  XI 

PART  11. 

Page 

OF  THE  WILL 103 

Simple  Volition, — ^its  Origin  from  one  of  the  Desires, 
or  Affections  -------------  103 

Operation  of  Moral  Causes  on  the  Will  -----  104 
Nature  of  these  Causes,  and  Source  of  the  Diversity 

of  their  Operation  in  different  Individuals  -  -  -  -  108 
Circumstances   required  for  the  Uniformity  of  their 

Operation : — 

1.  Knowledge 109 

Truths  of  Natural  and  Revealed  Religion. 

2.  Attention -     -     -  112 

Its  Influence  on  Moral  Decisions. 

3.  Moral  Habits 116 

Origin  and  Progress   of   Derangemeat   of 

Moral  Harmony. 
Influence  of  Habits  upon  Character  -     -     -  118 
Means  of  correcting  Injurious  Moral  Habits  120 
Practical  Conclusions  from  these  Principles.  Important 

Influence  of  Moral  Habits  - -    -     -121 

Necessity  and  Probability  of  Divine  Aid  in  correcting 

Moral  Derangement -125 

Influence  of  the  Mental  Operation  called  Faith  -    -    -  126 


PART  III. 

OF  THE  MORAL  PRINCIPLE,  OR  CON- 
SCIENCE      129 

Proofs  of  the  Existence  of  Conscience  as  a  distinct 

Principle  of  the  Mind 129 

Natuie  of  its  Operation  as  the  regulating  Principle   -  13^ 


Kli  CONTENTS. 

Analogy  between  it  and  Reason 131 

Its  Influence  in  conveying  an  Impression  of  the  Moral 
Attributes  of  the  Deity      ---------134 

Knowledge  derived  from  this  Source    ------  135 

Comparison  of  the  Divine  Attributes  with  the  Actual 
State  of  Man 137 

Difficulties  arising  from  this  Comparison  removed  only 
by  the  Christian  Revelation ---139 

Mental  Process  by  which  the  Regulating  Power  of 
Conscience  is  impaired  or  lost    -------  141 

Influence  of  this  Condition  upon  the  Judgment  in  re- 
gard to  Moral  Truth     144 

Influence  of  Attention  in  Moral  Decisions     -    -    -    -  14& 


APPENDIX  TO  PART  III. 

^I. — Of  the  Origin  and  Immutability  op  Moral 
Distinctions  ;  and  Theories  of  Morals     -    -    -  140 

Origin  of  our  Idea  of  Virtue  and  Vice     -    -  151 
System  of  Mandeville  -     -------153? 

of  Clarke  and  Wollaston    -    -    -    -  154 

System  of  Utility 154 

Selfish  System 155 

System  of  Paley v--  157 

Defect  of  these  Systems,  in  not  acknowledg- 
ing the  Supreme  Authority  of  Conscience    160 
System  of  Dr.  Smith,  or  Theory  of  Sympathy  162 
Province  of  Reason  in  Moral  Decisions   -        1 63 

^  11, — Of  the  Harmony  op  the  Moral  Fbelinos         167 

Consistency  of  Character  arising  from  this 
Harmony, — ^and  Defects  of  Ctt£^iacter  to 
which  it  is  opposed  - 171 


CONTENTS.  Xm 


PART  IV. 

OF  THE  MORAL  RELATION  OF  MAN      ^^ 
TOWARDS  THE  DEITY  -    ...  175 

View  of  the  Divine  Character  in  reference  to  this  Re- 
lation     175 

Regulation  of  Moral  Feelings  which  ought  to  arise  out 
of  it:— -  176 

1.  Habitual  Effort  to  cultivate  a  sense  of  the  Di- 

vine Presence,  and  to  regulate  the  Moral 
Feelings  and  Character  by  it  -     -     -     -     -  176 

2.  Submission  to  the  Appointments  of  Providence  181 

3.  Sense  of  Moral  Imperfection  and  Guilt,  and 

Supplication  for  Mercy,  with  Reliance  on 
Divine  Aid ISf; 

4.  Sense  of  Gratitude,  Affection,  and  Love    -     -  18J.' 
Conduct  and  Character  arising  out  of  this  Condition 

of  the  Moral  Feelings 184 

Means  of  cultivating  it 18S 

Nature  and  Operation  of  Faith  -     -                     -     -     -  IdO 
Province  of  Faith  in  the  Philosophy  of  tne  Moral  Feel- 
ings  190 

Truths  which  are  its  more  immediate  Object      -  197 
Its  Influence  on  the  Moral  Condition  -     -     -     -  199 

Province  of  Faith  in  the  Scheme  of  Christianity     -    -  203 
Certain  Errors  regarding  Faith  -     -  -     -     -     -  206 

Harmony  of  Christian  Truth  with  the  Philosophy  of 
the  Moral  Feelings -     ...  208 


PRELIMINARY  OBSERVATIONS. 


SECTION  I. 

NATURE    AND    IMPORTANCE    OF    THE    SCIENCE    OP 
THE    MORAL    FEELINGS. 

Man  is  to  be  contemplated  as  an  intellectual,  and 
as  a  moral  being.  By  his  intellectual  powers,  he 
acquires  the  knowledge  of  facts,  observes  their 
connexions,  and  traces  the  conclusions  which  arise 
out  of  them.  These  mental  operations,  however, 
even  in  a  high  state  of  cultivation,  may  be  directed 
entirely  to  truths  of  an  extrinsic  kind, — that  is,  to 
such  as  do  not  exert  any  influence  either  on  the 
moral  condition  of  the  individual,  or  on  his  relations 
to  other  sentient  beings.  They  may  exist  in  an 
eminent  degree  in  the  man  who  lives  only  for  him- 
self, and  feels  little  beyond  the  personal  wants  or 
the  selfish  enjoyments  of  the  hour  that  is  passing 
over  him. 

But  when  we  contemplate  man  as  a  moral  being, 
new  relations   open   on  our  view,  which   present 


i  0  PRELIMINARY    OBSERVATIONS. 

rcaslder&tiop.scif. mightier  import.  We  find  him 
occupying  a  place  in  a  great  system  of  moral  gov- 
ernment, in  which  he  has  an  important  station  to 
fill  and  high  duties  to  perform.  We  find  him  placed 
in  certain  relations  to  a  great  moral  Governor,  who 
presides  over  this  system  of  things,  and  to  a  future 
state  of  being,  for  which  the  present  scene  is  intended 
to  prepare  him.  We  find  him  possessed  of  powers 
which  qualify  him  to  feel  these  relations,  and  of 
principles  calculated  to  guide  him  through  the  solemn 
responsibilities  which  attend  his  state  of  moral  dis- 
cipline. 

These  two  parts  of  his  mental  constitution  we 
perceive  to  be  remarkably  distinct  from  each  other. 
The  former  may  be  in  vigorous  exercise  in  him 
who  has  little  feeling  of  his  moral  condition;  and 
the  latter  may  be  in  a  high  state  of  culture  in  the 
man  who,  in  point  of  intellectual  acquirement, 
knows  little  beyond  the  truths  which  it  most  con- 
cerns him  to  know, — those  great  but  simple  prin- 
ciples which  guide  his  conduct  as  a  responsible 
being. 

In  a  well-regulated  mind,  these  two  departments 
of  the  mental  economy  must  harmonize  and  co- 
operate with  each  other.  Knowledge,  received 
through  the  powers  of  sensation  and  simple  in- 
tellect, whether  relatmg  to  external  things  or  to 
mental  phenomena, — and  conclusions  derived  from 
these  through  the  powers  of  reasoning,  ought  all  to 
contribute  to  that  which  is  the  highest  state  of  man, — 
his  purity  as  a  moral  being.  They  ought  all  to  lend 
their  aid  towards  the  cultivation  of  those  principles 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    THE    MORAL    FEELINGS.         17 

of  his  nature  which  bind  him  to  his  fellow-men; 
Emd  those  higher  principles  still  which  raise  his 
feeble  powers  to  the  Eternal  Incomprehensible  One, 
the  first  great  cause  of  all  things,  and  the  moral 
governor  of  the  universe. 

A  slight  degree  of  observation  is  sufficient  to 
convince  us,  that  such  a  regulated  condition  of  the 
mental  constitution  does  not  exist  in  the  generality 
of  mankind.  It  is  not  my  present  purpose  to  in- 
quire into  the  causes  by  which  this  is  primarily 
deranged;  but  it  may  be  interesting  to  trace  some 
of  the  circumstances  which  bear  a  part  in  producing 
the  derangement.  In  our  present  state  of  being,  we 
are  surrounded  with  objects  of  sense ;  and  the  mind 
is  kept,  in  a  great  degree,  under  the  influence  of 
external  things.  In  this  manner  it  often  happens, 
that  facts  and  considerations  elude  our  attention,  and 
deeds  escape  from  our  memory,  in  a  manner  which 
would  not  occur,  were  the  mind  left  at  liberty  to  re- 
call its  own  associations,  and  to  feel  the  influence 
of  principles  which  are  really  part  of  the  mental  con- 
stitution. It  is  thus,  that,  amid  the  bustle  of  life, 
the  attention  is  apt  to  be  engrossed  by  considerations 
of  a  local  and  an  inferior  character;  while  facts 
and  motives  of  the  highest  moment  are  overlooked, 
and  deeds  of  our  own,  long  gone  by,  escape  from 
our  remembrance.  We  thus  lose  a  correct  sense 
of  our  moral  condition,  and  yield  to  the  agency  of 
present  and  external  things,  in  a  manner  dispropor- 
Uoned  to  their  real  value.  For  our  highest  concern 
as  moral  beings  is  with  things  future,  and  things 
unseen;  and  often  with  circumstances  in  our  own 
B3 


18  PRELIMINARY    OBSERVATIONS. 

moral  history  long  past,  and  perhaps  forgotten. 
Hence  the  benefit  of  retirement  and  calm  reflection, 
and  of  every  thing  that  tends  to  withdraw  us  from 
the  impression  of  sensible  objects,  and  that  leads  us 
to  feel  the  superiority  of  things  which  are  not  seen. 
Under  such  influence,  the  mind  displays  an  aston- 
ishing power  of  recalling  the  past  and  grasping  the 
future, — and  of  viewing  objects  in  their  true  rela- 
tions to  itself,  and  to  each  other.  The  first  of  these, 
indeed,  we  see  exemplified  in  many  affections,  in 
which  the  mind  is  cut  oflf,  in  a  greater  or  less  de- 
gree, from  its  intercourse  with  the  external  world, 
by  causes  acting  upon  the  bodily  organization.  In 
another  work  I  have  described  many  remarkable 
examples  of  the  mind,  in  this  condition,  recalling 
its  old  impressions  respecting  things  long  past  and 
entirely  forgotten  :  and  the  facts  there  stated  call  our 
attention  in  a  very  striking  manner  to  its  inherent 
powers  and  its  inde{>endent  existence. 

This  subject  is  one  of  intense  interest,  and  sug- 
gests reflections  of  the  most  important  kind,  re- 
specting the  powers  and  properties  of  the  thinking 
principle.  In  particular,  it  leads  us  to  a  period 
which  we  are  taught  to  anticipate  even  by  the  in- 
ductions of  intellectual  science,  when,  the  bodily 
frame  being  dissolved,  the  thinking  and  reasoning 
essence  shall  exercise  its  peculiar  faculties  in  a 
higher  state  of  being.  There  are  facts  in  the  mental 
phenomena  which  give  a  high  degree  of  probability 
to  the  conjecture,  that  the  whole  transactions  of  life, 
with  the  motives  and  moral  history  of  each  indi- 
vidual, may  be  recalled  by  a  process  of  the  mind 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    THE    MORAL    FEELINGS.        19 

itself,  and  placed,  as  at  a  single  glance,  distinctly 
before  him.  Were  we  to  realize  such  a  mental 
condition,  we  should  not  fail  to  contemplate  the 
impressions  so  recalled,  with  feelings  very  different 
from  those  by  which  we  are  .apt  to  be  misled  amid 
the  influence  of  present  and  external  things.  The 
tumult  of  life  is  over;  pursuits,  principles,  and 
l^otives,  which  once  bore  an  aspect  of  importance, 
are  viewed  with  feelings  more  adapted  to  their  true 
value.  The  moral  principle  recovers  that  authority, 
which,  amid  the  contests  of  passion,  had  been  ob- 
scured or  lost ;  each  act  and  each  emotion  is  seen 
in  its  relations  to  the  great  dictates  of  truth,  and  each 
pursuit  of  life  in  its  real  bearing  on  the  great  con- 
cerns of  a  moral  being  ;  and  the  whole  assumes  a 
character  of  new  and  wondrous  import,  when  viewed 
in  relation  to  that  Incomprehensible  One,  who  is 
then  disclosed  in  all  his  attributes  as  a  moral  gov- 
ernor. Time  past  is  contracted  into  a  point,  and 
that  the  infancy  of  being ; — time  to  come  is  seen 
expanding  into  eternal  existence. 

Such  are  the  views  which  open  on  him  who 
would  inquire  into  the  essence  by  which  man  is 
distinguished  as  a  rational  and  moral  being.  Com- 
pared with  it,  what  are  all  the  phenomena  of  nature, 
— -what  is  all  the  history  of  the  world, — the  rise  and 
fall  of  empires, — or  the  fate  of  those  who  rule  them. 
These  derive  their  interest  from  local  and  transient 
relations, — but  this  is  to  exist  for  ever.  That  sci- 
ence, therefore,  must  be  considered  as  the  highest 
of  all  human  pursuits  which  contemplates  man  in 


20  "preliminary  observations. 

his  relation  to  eternal  things.  With  its  importance, 
we  must  feel  its  difficulties ;  and,  did  we  confine 
the  investigation  to  the  mere  principles  of  natural 
science,  we  should  feel  these  difficulties  to  be  insur- 
mountable. But,  in  this  great  inquiry,  we  have 
two  sources  of  knowledge,  to  which  nothing  analo- 
gous is  to  be  found  in  the  history  of  phy^ical  science, 
and  which  will  prove  infallible  guides,  if  we  resign 
ourselves  to  their  direction  with  sincere  desire  to 
discover  the  truth.  These  are — the  light  of  con- 
science, and  the  light  of  divine  revelation.  In 
making  this  statement,  I  am  aware  that  I  tread  on 
delicate  ground, — and  that  some  will  consider  an 
appeal  to  the  sacred  writings  as  a  departure  from  the 
strict  course  of  philosophical  inquiry.  This  opinion, 
I  am  satisfied,  is  entirely  at  variance  with  truth ; 
and,  in  every  moral  investigation,  if  we  take  the  in- 
ductions of  sound  philosophy,  along  with  the  dictates 
of  conscience  and  the  light  of  revealed  truth,  we 
shall  find  them  to  constitute  one  uniform  and  harmo- 
nious whole,  the  various  parts  of  which  tend,  in  a 
remarkable  manner,  to  establish  and  illustrate  each 
other.  If,  indeed,  in  any  investigation  in  moral 
science,  we  disregard  the  light  which  is  furnished 
by  the  sacred  writings,  we  resemble  an  astronomer 
who  should  rely  entirely  on  his  unaided  sight,  and 
reject  those  optical  inventions  which  extend  so  re- 
markably the  field  of  his  vision,  as  to  be  to  him  the 
revelation  of  things  not  seen.  Could  we  suppose  a 
person  thus  entertaining  doubts  respecting  the  know- 
ledge suppHed  by  the  telescope,  yet  proceeding  in  a 
candid  manner  to  investigate  its  truth,  he  would 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MORAL  FEELINGS.    2. 

perceive  in  the  telescopic  observations  themselves 
principles  developed  which  are  calculated  to  remove 
his  suspicions.  For,  in  the  limited  knowledge 
which  is  furnished  by  vision  alone,  he  finds  difficulties 
which  he  cannot  explain,  apparent  inconsistencies 
which  he  cannot  reconcile,  and  insulated  facts  which 
he  cannot  refer  to  any  known  principle.  But,  in 
the  more  extended  knowledge  which  the  telescope 
yields,  these  difficulties  disappear;  facts  are  brought 
together  which  seemed  unconnected  or  discordant ; 
and  the  universe  appears  one  beautiful  system  of 
order  and  consistency.  It  is  the  same  in  the  expe- 
rience of  the  moral  inquirer,  when  he  extends  his 
views  beyond  the  inductions  of  reason,  and  corrects 
his  conclusions  by  the  testimony  of  God.  liis- 
cordant  principles  are  brought  together  ;  doubts  and 
difficulties  disappear ;  and  beauty,  order,  and  har- 
mony are  seen  to  pervade  the  government  of  the 
Deity.  In  this  manner  there  also  arises  a  species 
of  evidence  for  the  doctrines  of  revelation,  which 
is  entirely  independent  of  the  external  proofs  of  its 
divine  origin ;  and  which,  to  the  candid  mind,  invests 
it  with  all  the  characters  of  authenticity  and  truth. 

From  these  combined  sources  of  knowledge,  thus 
illustrating  and  confirming  each  other,  we  are  en- 
abled to  attain,  in  moral  inquiries,  a  degree  of  cer- 
tainty adapted  to  their  high  importance.  We  do  so 
when,  with  sincere  desire  to  discover  the  truth,  we 
resign  ourselves  to  the  guidance  of  the  light  which  is 
within,  aided  as  it  is  by  that  hght  from  heaven  which 
shines  upon  the  path  of  the  humble  inquirer.  Cul- 
tivated on  these  principles,  the  science  is  fitted  to 


22  PRELIMINARY    OBSERVATIONS. 

engage  the  most  powerful  mind,  while  it  will  impart 
strength  to  the  most  common  understanding.  It 
terminates  in  no  barren  speculations,  but  tends 
directly  to  promote  peace  on  earth,  and  good-will 
among  men.  It  is  calculated  both  to  enlarge  the 
understanding,  and  to  elevate  and  purify  the  feel- 
ings, and  thus  to  cultivate  the  moral  being  for  the 
life  which  is  to  come.  It  spreads  forth  to  the  view 
as  a  course  which  becomes  smoother  and  brighter 
the  farther  it  is  pursued ;  and  the  rays  which  illumi- 
nate the  path  converge  in  the  throne  of  Him  who  is 
eternal. 


SECTION  II. 

OP  FIRST  TRUTHS   IN   THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE 
MORAL  FEELINGS. 

The  knowledge  which  we  receive  through  our 
intellectual  powers  is  referable  to  two  classes. 
These  may  be  distinguished  by  the  names  of  ac- 
quired knowledge,  and  intuitive  or  fundamental 
articles  of  belief.  The  former  is  procured  by  the 
active  use  of  our  mental  powers,  in  collecting  facts, 
tracing  their  relations,  and  obsei-ving  the  deductions 
\vhich  arise  out  of  particular  combinations  of  them. 
These  constitute  the  operations  which  I  have  referred 
to  in  another  work,  under  the  heads  of  processes  of 
investigation,  and   processes   of  reasoning.      The 


FIRST    TRUTHS    IN   MORAL    SCIENCE.  23 

full  exercise  of  them  requires  a  certain  culture  of  the 
mental  faculties,  and  consequently  is  confined  to  a 
comparatively  small  number  of  men.  We  perceive, 
however,  that  such  culture  is  not  essential  to  every 
individual, — ^for  many  are  very  deficient  in  it  who 
yet  are  considered  as  persons  of  sound  mind,  and 
capable  of  discharging  their  duties  in  various  situa- 
tions of  life  in  a  creditable  and  useful  manner. 

But  the  knowledge  which  we  derive  from  the 
other  source  is  of  immediate  and  essential  importance 
to  men  of  every  degree ;  and,  without  it,  no  indi- 
vidual could  engage,  with  confidence,  in  any  of  the 
common  transactions  of  life,  or  make  any  provision 
for  his  protection  or  comfort,  or  even  for  the  con- 
tinuance of  his  existence.  These  are  the  principles 
also  treated  of,  in  a  former  work,  under  the  name 
of  First  Truths.  They  are  not,  like  our  knowledge 
of  the  other  kind,  the  result  of  any  process  either  of 
investigation  or  of  reasoning ;  and  for  the  posses- 
sion of  them  no  man  either  depends  upon  his  own 
observation  or  has  recourse  to  that  of  other  men. 
They  are  a  part  of  his  mental  constitution,  arising, 
with  a  feeling  of  absolute  certainty,  in  every  sound 
mind ;  and,  while  they  admit  of  no  proof  by  pro- 
f  cesses  of  reasoning,  sophistical  objections  brought 
against  them  can  be  combated  only  by  an  appeal  to 
the  consciousness  of  every  man,  and  to  the  absolute 
conviction  which  forces  itself  upon  the  whole  mass 
of  mankind. 

If  the  Creator  has  thus  implanted  in  the  mind  of 
man  principles  to  guide  him  in  his  intellectual  and 


24  PRELIMINARY   OBSERVATIONS. 

physical  relations,   independently  of  any  acquired 
knowledge,  we  might  naturally  expect  to  find  him 
endowed,  in  the  same  manner,  with  principles  adapted 
to  his  more  important  relations  as  a  moral  being. 
We  might  naturally  expect,  that,  in  these  high  con- 
cerns, he  would  not  be  left  to  the  chance  of  know- 
ledge which  he  might  casually  receive  either  through 
his  own  powers  of  investigation  or  reasoning,  oi 
through  instruction  received  from  other  men.     Im- 
pressions adapted  to  this  important  end  we  accord- 
ingly find  developed  in  a  remarkable  manner, — -and 
they  are  referable  to  that  part  of  our  constitution 
which  holds  so  important  a  place  in  the  philosophy 
of  the  mind,  by  which  we  perceive  differences  in  the 
moral  aspect  of  actions,  and  approve  or  disapprove 
of  them  as  right  or  wrong.     The  convictions  de- 
rived from  this  source  seem  to  occupy  the  same 
place  in  the  moral  system,  that  first  truths,  or  intui- 
tive articles  of  belief,  do  in  the  intellectual.     Like 
them,  also,  they  admit  of  no  direct  proofs  by  pro- 
cesses of  reasoning ;  and  when  sophistical  argu- 
ments are  brought  against  them,  the  only  true  answer 
consists  in  an  appeal  to  the  conscience  of  every  un- 
contaminated  mind.     This  is  a  consideration  of  the 
utmost  practical  importance ;  and  it  will  probably 
appear  that  many  well  intended  arguments,  respect- 
ing the  first  principles  of  moral  truth,  have  been 
inconclusive,  in  the  same  manner  as  were  attempts 
to  establish  first  truths  by  processes  of  reasoning,— 
because  the  line  of  argument  adopted  in  regard  to 
them  was  one  of  which  they  are  not  susceptible. 
The  force  of  this  analogy  is  in  no  degree  weakened 


FIRST    TRUTHS   IN    MORAL   SCIENCE.  25 

by  the  fact,  that  there  is,  in  many  cases,  an  apparent 
difference  between  that  part  of  our  mental  constitu- 
tion on  which  is  founded  our  conviction  of   first 
truths,  and  that  principle  from  which  is  derived  our 
impression  of  moral  truth  :   for  the  former  continues 
die  same  in  every  mind  which  is  neither  obscured 
by  idiocy  nor  distorted  by  insanity ;  but  the  moral 
feelings  become  obscured  by  a  process  of  the  mind 
itself,  by  which  it  has  gradually  gone  astray  from 
rectitude.     Hence  the  difference  we  find  in  the  de- 
cisions  of  different  men   respecting    moral  truth, 
arising  from  pecuharities  in  their  own  mental  con- 
dition; and  hence  that  remarkable  obscuration  of 
mind  at  which  some  men  at  length  arrive,  by  which 
the  judgment  is  entirely  perverted  respecting  the 
first  great  principles  of  moral  purity.     When,  there- 
fore, we  appeal  to  certain  principles  in  the  mental 
constitution,  as  the  source  of  our  first  impressions 
of  moral  truth,  our  appeal  is  made  chiefly  to  a  mind 
which  is  neither  obscured  by  depravity  nor  bewil- 
dered by  the  refinements  of  a  faJse  philosophy  :  it 
is  made  to  a  mind  in  which  conscience  still  holds 
some  degree  of  its  rightful  authority,  and  in  which 
there  is  a  sincere  and  honest  desire  to  discover  tho 
^  truth.     These  two  elements  of  character  must  go 
together  in  every  sound  inquiry  in  moral  science ; 
and  to  a  man  in  an  opposite  condition  we  should 
no  more  appeal  in  regard  to  the  principles  of  moral 
truth,  than  we  should  take  from  the  fatuous  person 
or  the  maniac  our  test  of  those  first  principles  of  in- 
tellectual truth,  which  are  allowed  to  be  original 
elements  of  belief  in  every  sound  mind. 
C 


26  PRELIMINARY    OBSERVATIONS. 

To  remedy  the  evils  arising  from  this  diversity 
and  distortion  of  moral  perception,  is  one  of  the 
objects  of  divine  revelation.  By  means  of  it  there  is 
introduced  a  fixed  and  uniform  standard  of  moral 
truth ;  but  it  is  of  importance  to  remark,  that,  for 
the  authority  of  this,  an  appeal  is  made  to  principles 
in  the  mind  itself,  and  that  every  part  of  it  challenges 
the  assent  of  the  man  in  whom  conscience  has  not 
lost  its  power  in  the  mental  economy 

Keeping  in  view  the  distinction  which  has  now 
been  referred  to,  it  would  appear,  that  the  first  prin- 
ciples of  moral  truth,  which  are  impressed  upon  the 
mind  as  a  part  of  its  original  constitution,  or  arise  in 
it  by  the  most  simple  process  of  reflection,  are  chiefly 
the  following. 

I.  A  deep  impression  of  eontmued  existence, — 
or  of  a  state  of  being  beyond  the  present  life, — and 
of  that  as  a  state  of  moral  retribution. 

II.  A  conviction  of  the  existence  and  superin- 
tendence of  a  great  moral  Governor  of  the  universe, 
— a  being  of  infinite  perfection  and  infinite  purity. 
The  belief  in  this  Being,  as  the  great  first  cause, 
arises,  as  we  have  formerly  seen,  by  a  simple  step 
of  reasoning,  from  a  survey  of  the  works  of  nature, 
^en  in  connexion  with  the  First  Truth,  that  every 
event  must  have  an  adequate  cause.  Our  sense 
of  his  moral  attributes  is  fixed,  with  a  conviction  of 
equal  certainty,  upon  the  conscience  or  moral  feel- 
ings. The  impression,  indeed,  of  the  existence 
of  one  supreme  and  ruling  intelligence  is  found  in 
every  age  of  the  world,  and  among  every  class  c€ 


FIRST    TRUTHS   IN   MORAL   SCIENCE.  27 

mankind.  Of  the  "  summum  illud  atque  etemum" 
of  the  ancient  philosophy,  and  of  God  as  he  is 
revealed  in  the  oracles  of  truth,  certain  essential 
attributes  are  the  same, — infinite  power  and  wisdom, 
and  eternal  existence.  The  ancient  sages  rose  to 
sublime  conceptions  of  his  nature,  while  they  felt  the 
imperfection  of  their  knowledge,  and  longed  after  a 
light  which  might  guide  them  to  himself;  and  it  is 
striking  to  remark  a  similar  feeling  in  a  very  different 
state  of  society,  in  our  own  day.  "  I  believe,"  said 
an  African  chief  to  one  of  the  missionaries,  "  I  be- 
lieve there  is  a  God  who  made  all  things, — who  gives 
prosperity,  sickness,  and  death ;  but  I  do  not  know 
him." 

III.  A  conviction  of  certain  duties  of  justice,  ve- 
racity, and  benevolence,  which  every  man  owes  to 
his  fellow-men ;  and  an  intuitive  perception  of  the 
nature  and  quality  of  actions  as  right  or  wrong,  in- 
dependently of  all  the  consequences  resulting  from 
them  either  to  the  individual  himself  or  to  other  men. 
Every  man,  in  his  own  case,  again,  expects  the 
same  offices  from  others  ;  and  on  this  reciprocity 
of  feeling  is  founded  the  precept  which  is  felt  to  be 
one  of  universal  application, — to  do  to  others  as  we 
would  that  they  should  do  to  us. 

IV.  An  impression  of  moral  responsibility,  or 
a  conviction,  that,  for  the  due  performance  of  these 
offices,  man  is  responsible  to  the  moral  Governor 
of  the  universe  ;  and  further,  that  to  this  Being  he 
owes,  more  immediately,  a  certain  homage  of  the 
moral  feelings,  entirely  distinct  from  the  duties  of 
relative  morality  which  he  owes  to  his  fellow-men. 


28  PRELIMINARY    OBSERVATIONS. 

The  consideration  of  these  important  objects  of 
belief  will  afterward  occur  to  us  in  various  parts 
of  our  inquiry.  They  are  stated  here  in  reference 
to  the  place  which  they  hold  as  First  Truths,  or  in- 
tuitive articles  of  moral  belief,  lying  at  the  founda- 
tion of  those  principles  which  are  fixed  in  the 
conscience  of  the  mass  of  mankind.  For  the  truth 
of  them  we  appeal,  not  to  any  process  of  reasoning, 
but  to  the  conviction  which  forces  itself  upon  every 
regulated  mind.  Neither  do  we  go  abroad  among 
savage  nations  to  inquire  whether  the  impression 
of  them  be  universal-;  for  this  may  be  obscured  in 
communities,  as  it  is  in  individuals,  by  a  course  of 
moral  degradation.  We  appeal  to  the  casuist  him- 
self, whether,  in  the  calm  moment  of  reflection,  he 
can  divest  himself  of  their  power.  We  appeal  to 
the  feelings  of  the  man  who,  under  the  conscious- 
ness of  guilt,  shrinks  from  the  dread  of  a  present 
Deity,  and  the  anticipation  of  a  future  reckoning. 
But  chiefly  we  appeal  to  the  conviction  of  him  in 
whom  conscience  retains  its  rightful  supremacy,  and 
who  habitually  cherishes  these  momentous  truths, 
as  his  guides  in  this  life  in  its  relation  to  the  life  that 
is  to  come. 

It  appears  to  be  a  point  of  the  utmost  practical 
importance,  that  we  should  consider  these  articles 
of  belief  as  implanted  in  our  moral  constitution,  or 
as  arising  by  the  most  simple  step  of  reasoning  or 
reflection  out  of  principles  which  form  a  part  of  that 
constitution.  It  is  in  this  way  only  that  we  can 
consider  them  as  calculated  to  influence  the  mass 
of  mankind.     For,  if  we  do  not  believe  them  to 


FIRST    TRUTHS    IN    MORAL    SCIENCE.  29 

arise,  in  this  manner,  by  the  spontaneous  exercise 
of  every  incorrupted  mind,  there  are  only  two  me- 
thods by  which  we  can  suppose  them  to  originate ; 
the  one  is  a  direct  revelation  from  the  Deity, — 
the  other  is  a  process  of  reasoning  or  of  investiga- 
tion, properly  so  called,  analogous  to  that  by  which 
we  acquire  the  knowledge  of  any  principle  in  natural 
science.  We  cannot  believe  that  they  are  derived 
entirely  from  revelation,  because  we  find  the  belief 
existing  where  no  revelation  is  known,  and  because 
we  find  the  sacred  writers  appealing  to  them  as 
sources  of  conviction  existing  in  the  mental  consti- 
tution of  every  man.  There  is  an  obvious  absurd- 
ity, again,  in  supposing  that  principles,  which  are 
to  regulate  the  conduct  of  responsible  beings,  should 
be  left  to  the  chance  of  being  unfolded  by  processes 
of  reasoning,  in  which  different  m'^ds  may  arrive 
at  different  conclusions,  and  in  regard  to  which  many 
are  incapable  of  following  put  any  argument  at  all. 
What  is  called  the  argument  a  prio.  7  for  the  exist- 
ence and  attributes  of  the  Deity,  foi  mstance,  con- 
veys little  that  is  conclusive  to  most  minds,  and  to 
many  is  entirely  incomprehensible.  The  same  ob- 
servation may  be  applied  to  those  well-intended  and 
able  arguments,  by  which  the  probability  of  a  future 
state  is  shoNvn  from  analogy  and  from  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  mind.  These  are  founded  chiefly  on 
three  considerations, — the  tendency  of  virtue  to  pro- 
duce happiness,  and  of  vice  to  be  followed  by 
misery, — the  unequal  distribution  of  good  and  evil 
in  the  present  life,  and  the  adaptation  of  our  moral 
faculties  to  a  state  of  being  very  different  from  that 
C2 


30  PRELIMINARY    OBSERVATIONS. 

in  which  we  are  at  present  placed.  There  is  much 
in  these  arguments  calculated  to  elevate  our  con- 
ceptions of  our  condition  as  moral  beings,  and  of 
that  future  state  of  existence  for  which  we  are  des- 
tined ;  and  there  is  much  scope  for  the  highest 
powers  of  reasoning,  in  showing  the  accordance  of 
these  truths  with  the  soundest  inductions  of  true 
philosophy.  But,  notwithstanding  all  their  truth  and 
all  their  utility,  it  may  be  doubted  whether  they  are 
to  any  one  the  foundation  of  his  faith  in  another 
state  of  being.  It  must  be  admitted,  at  least,  that 
their  force  is  felt  by  those  only  whose  minds  have 
been  in  some  degree  trained  to  habits  of  reasoning, 
and  that  they  are  therefore  not  adapted  to  the  mass 
of  mankind.  But  the  truths  which  they  are  intended 
to  estabUsh  are  of  eternal  importance  to  men  of 
every  degree,  and  we  should  therefore  expect  them 
to  rest  upon  evidence  which  finds  its  way  with  un- 
erring aim  to  the  hearts  of  the  unlearned.  The 
unanswerable  reasonings  of  Butler  never  reached  the 
ear  of  the  gray-haired  pious  peasant ;  but  he  needs 
not  their  powerful  aid  to  establish  his  sure  and  certain 
hope  of  a  blessed  immortality.  It  is  no  induction  of 
logic  that  has  transfixed  the  heart  of  the  victim  of 
deep  remorse,  when  he  withers  beneath  an  influence 
unseen  by  human  eye,  and  shrinks  from  the  antici- 
pation of  a  reckoning  to  come.  In  both,  the  evi- 
dence is  within, — a  part  of  the  original  constitution 
of  every  rational  mind,  planted  tliere  by  Him  who 
framed  the  wondrous  fabric.  This  is  the  power  of 
conscience ;  with  an  authority  which  no  man  can 
put  away  from  him,  it  pleads  at  once  for  his  own 


FIRST    TRUTHS    IN    MORAL    SCIENCE.  31 

future  existence,  and  for  the  moral  attributes  of  an 
omnipotent  and  ever-present  Deity.  In  a  healthy 
state  of  the  mored  feelings,  the  man  recognises  its 
claim  to  supreme  dominion.  Amid  the  degradation 
of  guilt,  it  still  raises  its  voice,  and  asserts  its  right 
to  govern  the  whole  man ;  and,  though  its  warnings 
are  disregarded,  and  its  claims  disallowed,  it  proves 
within  his  inmost  soul  an  accuser  that  cannot  be 
stilled,  and  an  avenging  spirit  that  never  is  quenched. 
Similar  observations  apply  to  the  uniformity  of 
moral  distinctions,  or  the  conviction  of  a  certain  line 
of  conduct  which  man  owes  to  his  fellow-men. 
There  have  been  many  controversies  and  various 
contending  systems  in  reference  to  this  subject ;  but 
I  submit  that  the  question  may  be  disposed  of  in  the 
same  manner  as  the  one  now  mentioned.  Certain 
fixed  and  defined  principles  of  relative  duty  appear 
to  be  recognised  by  the  consent  of  mankind,  as  an 
essential  part  of  their  moral  constitution,  by  as  ab- 
solute a  conviction  as  that  by  which  are  recognised 
our  bodily  qualities.  The  hardened  criminal,  whose 
life  has  been  a  series  of  injustice  and  fraud,  when 
at  length  brought  into  circumstances  which  exposf» 
him  to  the  knowledge  or  the  retribution  of  his  fellow 
men,  expects  from  them  veracity  and  justice,  oi 
perhaps  even  throws  himself  upon  their  mercy.  He 
thus  recognises  such  principles  as  a  part  of  the 
moral  constitution,  just  as  the  blind  man,  when  he 
has  missed  his  way,  asks  direction  of  the  first  per- 
son he  meets, — presuming  upon  the  latter  possessing 
a  sense  which,  though  lost  to  him,  he  still  considers 
as  belonging  to  every  sound  man.     In  defending 


32  PRELIMINARY   OBSERVATIONS. 

himself,  also,  the  criminal  shows  the  same  recog- 
nition. For  his  object  is  to  disprove  the  alleged 
facts,  or  to  frame  excuses  for  his  conduct;  he 
never  attempts  to  question  those  universal  principles 
by  which  he  feels  that  his  actions  must  be  con- 
demned, if  the  facts  are  proved  against  him.  With- 
out such  principles,  indeed,  thus  universally  recog- 
nised, it  is  evident  that  the  whole  system  of  human 
things  would  go  into  confusion  and  ruin.  Human 
laws  may  restrain  or  punish  gross  acts  of  violence 
and  injustice  ;  but  they  can  never  provide  for  num- 
berless methods  by  which  a  man  may  injure  his 
neighbour,  or  promote  his  own  interest  at  the  ex- 
pense of  others.  There  are,  in  fact,  but  a  very 
few  cases  which  can  be  provided  for  by  any  human 
institution  ;  it  is  a  principle  within  that  regulates  the 
whole  moral  economy.  In  its  extent  and  import- 
ance, when  compared  with  all  the  devices  of  man, 
it  may  be  likened  to  those  great  principles  which 
guide  the  movements  of  the  universe,  contrasted 
with  the  contrivances  by  which  men  produce  parti- 
cular results  for  their  own  convenience  ;  and  one 
might  as  well  expect  to  move  a  planet  by  machinery, 
or  propel  a  comet  by  the  power  of  steam,  as  to 
preserve  the  semblance  of  order  in  the  moral  world, 
without  those  fundamental  principles  of  rectitude 
which  form  a  part  of  the  original  constitution  of 
every  rational  being. 

Further,  as  each  man  has  the  consciousness  ot 
these  principles  in  himself,  he  has  the  conviction 
that  similar  principles  exist  in  others.  Hence  arises 
the  impression,  that,  as  he  judges  of  their  conduct 


FIRST   TRUTHS    IN    MORAL    SCIENCE.  33 

by  his  own  moral  feelings,  so  will  they  judge  of  him 
by  corresponding  feelings  in  themselves.  In  this 
manner  is  produced  that  reciprocity  of  moral  im- 
pression by  which  a  man  feels  the  opinion  of  his 
fellow-men  to  be  either  a  reward  or  a  punishment ; 
and  hence  also  springs  that  great  rule  of  relative 
duty,  which  teaches  us  to  do  to  others  as  we  would 
that  they  should  do  to  us.  This  uniformity  of  moral 
feeling  and  affection  even  proves  a  check  upon 
those  who  have  subdued  the  influence  of  these  feel- 
ings in  themselves.  Thus,  a  man  who  has  thrown 
off  all  sense  of  justice,  compassion,  or  benevolence 
is  still  kept  under  a  certain  degree  of  control  by  the 
conviction  of  these  impressions  existing  in  those  by 
whom  he  is  surrounded.  There  are  indeed  men  in 
the  world,  as  has  been  remarked  by  Butler,  in 
whom  this  appears  to  be  the  only  restraint  to  which 
their  conduct  is  subjected. 

Upon  the  whole,  therefore,  there  seems  to  be 
ground  for  assuming,  that  the  au^ticles  of  belief, 
which  have  been  the  subject  of  the  preceding  ob- 
servations, are  primary  principles  of  our  moral 
constitution ;  and  that  they  correspond  with  those 
elements  in  our  intellectual  economy  which  are 
commonly  ceJled  First  Truths, — principles  which 
are  now  universally  admitted  to  require  no  other 
evidence  than  the  conviction  which  forces  itself  upon 
every  sound  understanding. 


PHILOSOPHY 

OF 

THE  MORAL  FEELINGS. 


When  we  analyze  the  principles  which  distin- 
guish man  as  a  moral  being,  our  attention  is  first 
directed  to  his  actions,  as  the  extemd  phenomena 
by  which  we  judge  of  his  internal  principles.  It  is 
famiUar  to  every  one,  however,  that  the  same 
action  may  proceed  from  very  different  motives, 
and  that,  when  we  have  the  means  of  estimating 
motives  oi  principles,  it  is  from  these  that  we  form 
our  judgment  respecting  the  moral  condition  of  the 
mdividual,  and  not  from  his  actions  alone.  When 
we  consider  separately  the  elements  which  enter 
^to  the  economy  of  an  intelligent  and  responsible 
agent,  they  seem  to  resolve  themselves  into  the 
following : — 

I.  His  actual  conduct,  or  actions. 

II.  In  determining  his  conduct,  the  immediate 
principle  is  his  will,  ot  simple  volition.     He  wills 


56  ANALYSIS    OF   THE    MORAL   FEELINGS. 

some  act, — and  the  act  follows  of  course,  unless  it 
be  prevented  by  restraint  from  without,  or  by  phy- 
sical inability  to  perform  it.  These  alone  can  inter- 
fere with  a  man  following  the  determination  of  his 
will,  or  simple  volition. 

III.  The  objects  of  will  or  simple  volition  are 
referable  to  two  classes — objects  to  be  obtained, 
and  actions  to  be  performed  to  others ;  and  these 
are  connected  with  two  distinct  mental  conditions, 
which  exist  previously  to  the  act  of  voUtion.  In 
regard  to  objects  to  be  obtained,  this  mental  condi- 
tion is  Desire,  In  regard  to  actions  towards  others, 
it  is  Jiffection,  The  desires  and  affections,  there- 
fore, hold  a  place  in  the  mind  previous  to  volition. 
From  one  of  them  originates  the  mental  state 
which,  under  certain  regulations,  leads  to  volition, 
or  to  our  willing  a  certain  act.  The  act,  which  is 
then  the  result  of  the  volition,  consists  either  in 
certain  efforts  towards  attaining  the  object  desired, 
or  in  certain  conduct  towards  other  men,  arising  out 
of  our  affections  or  mental  feelings  towards  them. 
The  desires  and  affections,  therefore,  may  be  con- 
sidered as  the  primary  or  moving  powers,  from 
which  our  actions  proceed.  In  connexion  with 
them  we  have  to  keep  in  view  another  principle, 
which  has  an  extensive  influence  on  our  conduct  in 
regard  to  both  these  classes  of  emotions.  This  is 
Self-love;  which  leads  us  to  seek  our  own  pro- 
tection, comfort,  and  advantage.  It  is  a  sound  and 
legitimate  principle  of  action  when  kept  in  its  proper 
place;  when  allowed  to  usurp  an  undue  influence, 


ANALYSIS    OF  THE   MORAL   FEELINGS.  37 

It  degenerates  into  selfishness  ;  and  it  then  interferes 
in  a  material  degree  with  the  exercise  of  the  affec- 
tions, or,  in  other  words,  with  our  duty  to  other  men. 

IV.  We  have  next  to  attend  to  the  fact,  that 
every  desire  is  not  followed  by  actual  voHtion  to- 
wards obtaining  the  object ;  and  that  every  affection 
does  not  lead  to  the  conduct  which  might  flow  from 
it.  Thus,  a  man  may  feel  a  desire  which,  afler 
consideration,  he  determines  not  to  gratify.  An- 
other may  experience  an  affection,  and  not  act  upon 
it  i  he  may  feel  benevolence  or  friendship,  and  yet 
act,  in  the  particular  case,  with  cold  selfishness ; 
or  he  may  feel  the  impulse  of  anger,  and  yet  con- 
duct himself  with  forbearance.  When,  therefore, 
we  go  another  step  backwards  in  the  chain  of  moral 
sequences,  our  attention  is  directed  to  certain  prin- 
ciples by  which  the  determination  is  actually  decided, 
either  according  to  the  desire  or  affection  which  is 
present  to  the  mind,  or  in  opposition  to  it.  This 
brings  us  to  a  subject  of  the  utmost  practical  im- 
portance ;  and  the  principles  which  thus  decide  the 
determination  of  the  mind  are  referable  to  two 
heads. 

(1.)  The  determination  or  decision  may  arise  out 
of  a  certain  state  of  arrangement  of  the  moving 
powers  themselves,  in  consequence  of  which  some 
one  of  them  has  acquired  a  predominating  influence 
in  the  moral  system.  This  usually  results  from 
habit,  or  frequent  indulgence,  as  we  shall  see  in  a 
subsequent  part  of  our  inquiry.  A  man,  for  ex- 
ample, may  desire  an  object,  but  perceive  that  the 
D 


38     ANALYSIS  OF  THE  MORAL  FEELINGS. 

attEimment  would  require  a  degree  of  exertion 
greater  than  he  is  disposed  to  devote  to  it :  this  is 
the  preponderating  love  of  ease,  a  branch  of  self- 
love.  Another  may  perceive  that  the  gratification 
would  impair  his  good  name,  or  the  estimation  in 
which  he  is  anxious  to  stand  in  the  eyes  of  other 
men :  this  is  the  predominating  love  of  approba- 
tion, or  regard  to  character.  In  the  same  manner, 
a  third  may  feel  that  it  would  interfere  with  his 
schemes  of  avarice  or  ambition ;  and  so  in  regard 
to  the  other  desires.  On  a  similar  principle,  a  man 
may  experience  a  strong  impulse  of  anger,  but  per- 
ceive that  .here  would  be  danger  in  gratifying  it,  or 
that  he  would  promote  his  reputation  or  his  interest 
by  not  acting  upon  it ;  he  may  experience  a  be- 
nevolent affection,  but  feel  that  the  exercise  would 
interfere  too  much  with  his  personal  interest  or 
comfort. 

(2.)  The  determination  may  arise  from  a  sense 
of  duty,  or  an  impression  of  moral  rectitude,  apart 
from  every  consideration  of  a  personal  nature.  This 
is  the  JVLoral  Principle,  or  Conscience  :  in  every 
mind  in  a  state  of  moral  health,  it  is  the  supreme 
and  regulating  principle,  preserving  among  the 
moving  powers  a  certain  harmony  to  each  other,  and 
to  the  principles  of  moral  rectitude.  It  often  excites 
to  conduct  which  requires  a  sacrifice  of  self-love, 
and  so  prevents  this  principle  from  interfering  with 
the  sound  exercise  of  the  affections.  It  regulates 
the  desires,  and  restrains  them  by  the  simple  rule  of 
purity :  it  directs  and  regulates  the  affections  in  th  v 
same  manner  by  the  high  sense  of  moral  response 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE  MORAL  FEELINGS.     39 

bilitj :  and  it  thus  maintains  order  and  harmony  in 

the  whole  moral  system. 

One  of  the  chief  diversities  of  human  character, 
indeed,  arises  from  the  circumstance  of  one  man 
being  habitually  influenced  by  the  simple  and 
straight-forward  principle  of  duty,  and  another 
merely  by  a  kind  of  contest  between  desires  and 
motives  of  a  very  inferior  or  selfish  nature.  Thus 
also  we  acquire  a  knowledge  of  the  moral  tempera- 
ment of  different  men,  and  learn  to  adapt  our 
measures  accordingly  in  our  transactions  with  them. 
In  endeavouring,  for  example,  to  excite  three  indi- 
viduals to  some  act  of  usefulness,  we  come  to 
know,  that  in  one  we  have  only  to  appeal  to  his 
sense  of  duty ;  in  another  to  his  vanity  or  love  of 
approbation  ;  while  we  have  no  hope  of  making 
any  impression  on  the  third,  unless  we  can  make  it 
appear  to  bear  upon  his  interest. 

V.  The  principles  referred  to  under  the  preceding 
heads  are  chiefly  those  which  regulate  the  con- 
nexion of  man  with  his  fellow-men.  But  there  is 
another  class  of  emotions,  in  their  nature  distinct 
from  these ;  though,  in  a  practical  point  of  view, 
they  are  much  connected.  These  are,  the  emotions 
which  arise  out  of  his  relation  to  the  Deity.  The 
regulation  of  the  moral  feelings,  in  reference  to  this 
relation,  will  therefore  come  to  be  considered  in  a 
department  of  the  inquiry  devoted  to  themselves, 
and  in  connexion  with  the  views  of  the  character  and 
attributes  of  God,  which  we  obtain  from  the  light  of 
reason  and  conscience. 


40     ANALYSIS  OF  THE  MORAL  FEELINGS. 

This  analysis  of  the  principles  which  constitute 
the  moral  feelings  indicates  the  further  division  of 
our  inquiry  in  the  following  manner : — 

I.  The  Desires, — the  Affections, — and  Self-love. 

II.  The  Will. 

III.  The  Moral  Principle,  or  Conscience. 

IV.  The   moral   relation   of  man   towards   the 

Deity. 

These  constitute  what  may  be  called  the  active 
principles  of  man,  or  those  which  are  calculated  to 
decide  his  conduct  as  a  moral  and  responsible 
being.  In  connexion  with  them,  there  is  another 
class  of  feelings,  which  may  be  called  passive  or 
connecting  emotions.  They  exert  a  considerable 
influence  of  a  secondary  kind ;  but,  in  an  Essay 
which  is  meant  to  be  essentially  practical,  it  perhaps 
will  not  be  necessary  to  do  more  than  enumerate 
them  in  such  a  manner  as  to  point  out  their  relation 
to  the  active  principles. 

When  an  object  presents  qualities  on  account  of 
which  we  wish  to  obtain  it,  we  feel  desire.  If  we 
have  reason  to  think  that  it  is  within  our  reach,  we 
experience  hope;  and  the  effect  of  this  is  to  encourage 
us  in  our  exertions.  If  we  arrive  at  such  a  convic- 
tion as  leaves  no  doubt  of  the  attainment,  this  is 
confidence,  one  of  the  forms  of  that  state  of  mind 
which  we  call  faith.  If  we  see  no  prospect  of 
attaining  it,  we  give  way  to  despair,  and  this  leads 
us  to  abandon  all  exertion  for  the  attainment. 
When  we  obtain  the  object,  we  experience  pleasure 
or  joy ;  if  we  are  disappointed,  we  feel  regret.  If 
again^  we  have  the  prospect  of  some  evil  which 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE  MORAL  FEELINGS.     41 

threatens  us,  we  experience  /ear,  and  are  thereby 
excited  to  exertions  for  averting  it.  If  we  succeed 
in  doing  so,  we  experience  joy ;  if  not,  we  feel 
sorrow.  If  the  evil  seem  unavoidable,  we  again 
give  way  to  despair^  and  are  thus  led  to  relinquish 
all  attempts  to  avert  it. — Similar  emotions  attend  on 
the  affections.  When  we  experience  an  affection, 
we  desire  to  be  able  to  act  upon  it.  When  we  see 
a  prospect  of  doing  so,  we  hope  ;  if  there  seem  to 
be  none,  we  despair  of  accompUshing  our  object. 
When  we  have  acted  upon  a  benevolent  affection,  or 
according  to  the  dictates  of  the  moral  principle,  we 
experience  self-approbation;  when  the  contrary, 
we  feel  remorse.  When  either  a  desire  or  an  affec- 
tion has  acquired  an  undue  influence,  so  as  to  carry 
us  forward  in  a  manner  disproportioned  to  its  real 
and  proper  tendencies,  it  becomes  a  passion, 
D2 


PART   L 


OF  THE  DESIRES,  THE  AFFECTIONS,  AND 
SELF-LOVE. 


SECTION  I. 

THE   DESIRES. 

Desire  is  the  immediate  movement  or  act  of  the 
mind  towards  an  object  which  presents  some  quality 
on  account  of  which  we  wish  to  obtain  it.  The 
objects  of  desire,  therefore,  embrace  all  those  attain- 
ments and  gratifications  which  mankind  consider 
worthy  of  being  sought  after.  The  object  pursued 
in  each  particular  case  is  determined  by  the  views, 
habits,  and  moral  dispositions  of  the  individual.  In 
this  manner,  one  person  may  regard  an  object  as 
above  every  other  worthy  being  sought  after,  which 
to  another  appears  insignificant  or  worthless.  The 
principles  which  regulate  these  diversities,  and  con- 
sequently form  one  of  the  great  differences  in  human 
character,  belong  to  a  subsequent  part  of  our  inquiry. 

In  forming  a  classification  of  the  desires,  we  must 
be  guided  simply  by  the  nature  of  the  various  objects 
which  are  desired.     Those  which  may  be  specified 


44  DESIRES. 

as  the  most  prevalent,  and  the  most  clearly  to  be  dis- 
tinguished as  separate,  may  be  referred  to  the  fol- 
lowing heads. 

I.  The  gratification  of  the  animal  propensities — 
commonly  called  the  Appetites.  These,  which  we 
possess  in  common  with  the  lower  animals,  are  im- 
planted in  us  for  important  purposes  ;  but  they  re- 
quire to  be  kept  under  the  most  rigid  control,  both 
of  reason  and  the  moral  principle.  When  they  are 
allowed  to  break  through  these  restraints,  and  be- 
come leading  principles  of  action,  they  form  a  char- 
acter the  lowest  in  the  scale,  whether  intellectual  oi 
moral;  and  it  is  impossible  to  contemplate  a  more 
degraded  condition  of  a  rational  and  moral  being. 
The  consequences  to  society  are  also  of  the  most 
baneful  nature.  Without  alluding  to  the  glutton  or 
to  the  drunkard,  what  accumulated  guilt,  degrada- 
tion, and  wretchedness  follow  the  course  of  the  liber- 
tine,— blasting  whatever  comes  within  the  reach  of 
his  influence,  and  extending  a  demoralizing  power 
alike  to  him  who  inflicts  and  to  those  who  suffer  the 
wrong.  Thus  is  constituted  a  class  of  evils,  of 
which  no  human  law  can  take  any  adequate  cogni- 
zance, and  which  therefore  raise  our  views,  in  a  spe- 
cial and  peculiar  manner,  to  a  Supreme  Moral  Gov- 
ernor. 

II.  The  desire  of  Wealth,  commonly  called  Ava- 
rice ;  though  avarice  is  perhaps  justly  to  be  regarded 
as  the  morbid  excess  or  abuse  of  the  propensity. 
This  is  properly  to  be  considered  as  originating  in 


ANIMAL    PROPENSITIES WEALTH — POWER.      45 

the  desii'e  to  possess  the  means  of  procuring  other 
gratifications.  But,  by  the  influence  of  habit,  the 
desire  is  transferred  to  the  thing  itself;  and  it  often 
becomes  a  kind  of  mania,  in  which  there  is  the  pure 
love  of  gain,  without  the  appUcation  of  it  to  any  other 
kind  of  enjoyment.  It  is  a  propensity  which  may, 
in  a  remarkable  manner,  engross  the  whole  charac- 
ter, acquiring  strength  by  continuance  ;  and  it  is  then 
generally  accompanied  by  a  contracted  selfishness, 
which  considers  nothing  as  mean  or  unworthy  that 
can  be  made  to  contribute  to  the  ruling  passion. 
This  may  be  the  case  even  when  the  propensity  is 
regulated  by  the  rules  of  justice  ;  if  it  break  through 
this  restraint,  it  leads  to  fraud,  extortion,  deceit,  and 
injustice, — and,  under  another  form,  to  theft  or  rob 
bery.  It  is  therefore  always  in  danger  of  being  op- 
posed to  the  exercise  of  the  benevolent  affections, 
leading  a  man  to  live  for  himself,  and  to  study  only 
the  means  calculated  to  promote  his  own  interest. 

III.  The  desire  of  Power,  or  Ambition.  This  is 
the  love  of  ruling, — of  giving  the  law  to  a  circle  whe- 
ther more  or  less  extensive.  When  it  becomes  the 
governing  propensity,  the  strongest  principles  of 
human  nature  give  way  before  it, — even  those  of  per- 
sonal comfort  and  safety.  This  we  see  in  the  con- 
queror, who  braves  every  danger,  difficulty,  and  priva- 
tion, for  the  attainment  of  power ;  and  in  the  states- 
man, who  sacrifices  for  it  every  personal  comfort, 
perhaps  health  and  peace.  The  principle,  however, 
assumes  another  form,  which,  according  to  its  direc- 
tion, may  aim  at  a  higher  object.    Such  is  the  desire 


46  DESIRES. 

of  exercising  power  over  the  minds  of  men ;  of  per- 
suading a  multitude,  by  arguments  or  eloquence,  to 
deeds  of  usefulness  ;  of  pleading  the  cause  of  the 
oppressed  ;  a  power  of  influencing  the  opinions  of 
others,  and  of  guiding  them  into  sound  sentiments 
and  virtuous  conduct.  This  is  a  species  of  power, 
the  most  gratifying  by  far  to  an  exalted  and  virtuous 
mind,  and  one  calculated  to  carry  benefit  to  others 
wherever  it  is  exerted. 

IV.  The  desire  of  Superiority,  or  Emulation. 
This  is  allied  to  the  former,  except  that  it  does  not 
include  any  direct  wish  to  rule,  but  aims  simply  at 
the  acquirement  of  superiority.  It  is  a  propensity 
of  extensive  influence,  and  not  easily  confined  within 
the  bounds  of  correct  principle.  It  is  apt  to  lead  to 
undue  means  for  the  accomplishment  of  its  object ; 
and  every  real  or  imagined  failure  tends  to  excite 
hatred  and  envy.  Hence  it  requires  the  most  care- 
ful regulation,  and,  when  much  encouraged  in  the 
young,  is  not  free  from  the  danger  of  generating  ma- 
lignant passions.  Its  influence  and  tendency,  as  in 
other  desires,  depend  in  a  great  measure  on  the  ob- 
jects to  which  it  is  directed.  It  may  be  seen  in  the 
man  who  seeks  to  excel  his  associates  in  the  gayety 
of  his  apparel,  the  splendour  of  his  equipage,  or  the 
luxury  of  his  table.  It  is  found  in  him  whose  proud 
distinction  is  to  be  the  most  fearless  rider  at  a  stee- 
ple-chase or  a  fox-hunt, — or  to  perform  some  other 
exploit,  the  only  claim  of  which  to  admiration  con- 
sists in  its  never  having  been  performed  before.  The 
same  principle,  directed  to  more  worthy  objects, 


SUPERIORITY SOCIETY ESTEEM.  47 

may  influence  him  who  seeks  to  be  distinguished  in 
some  high  pursuit,  calculated  to  confer  a  lasting 
benefit  upon  his  country  or  on  human  kind. 

V.  The  desire  of  Society.  This  has  been  con- 
sidered by  most  writers  on  the  subject  as  a  promi- 
nent principle  of  human  nature,  showing  itself  at  all 
periods  of  life,  and  in  all  conditions  of  civilization. 
In  persons  shut  up  from  intercourse  with  their  fellow- 
men,  it  has  manifested  itself  in  the  closest  attach- 
ment to  animals  ;  as  if  the  human  mind  could  not 
exist  without  some  object  on  which  to  exercise  the 
feelings  intended  to  bind  man  to  his  fellows.  It  is 
found  in  the  union  of  men  in  civil  society  and  social 
intercourse, — in  the  ties  of  friendship,  and  the  still 
closer  union  of  the  domestic  circle.  It  is  necessary 
for  the  exercise  of  all  the  affections ;  and  even  our 
weaknesses  require  the  presence  of  other  men. 
There  would  be  no  enjoyment  of  rank  or  wealth, 
if  there  were  none  to  admire  ;  and  even  the  misan- 
thrope requires  the  presence  of  another  to  whom  his 
spleen  may  be  uttered.  The  abuse  of  this  principle 
leads  to  the  contracted  spirit  of  party. 

r 

YI.  The   desire  of  Esteem   and  Approbation. 

This  is  a  principle  of  most  extensive  influence,  and 
is  in  many  instances  the  source  of  worthy  and  useful 
displays  of  human  character.  Though  inferior  to 
the  high  sense  of  moral  obligation,  it  may  yet  be  con- 
sidered a  laudable  principle, — as  when  a  man  seeks 
the  approbation  of  others  by  deeds  of  benevolence, 
public  spirit,  or  patriotism, — by  actions  calculated  to 


48  DESIRES. 

promote  the  advantage  or  the  comfort  either  of  com- 
munities or  individuals.  In  the  healthy  exercise  of 
it,  a  man  desires  the  approbation  of  the  good ;  in 
the  distorted  use  of  it,  he  seeks  merely  the  praise  of 
a  party, — perhaps,  by  deeds  of  a  frivolous  or  even 
vicious  character,  aims  at  the  applause  of  associates 
whose  praise  is  worthless.  According  to  the  object 
to  which  it  is  directed,  therefore,  the  desire  of  appro- 
bation may  be  the  attribute  either  of  a  virtuous  or  a 
perverted  mind.  But  it  is  a  principle  which,  in 
general,  we  expect  to  find  operating,  in  every  well 
regulated  mind,  under  certain  restrictions.  Thus,  a 
man  who  is  totally  regardless  of  character, — that  is, 
of  the  opinion  of  all  others  respecting  his  conduct, 
we  commonly  consider  as  a  person  lost  to  correct 
virtuous  feeling.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  there 
may  be  instances  in  which  it  is  the  quality  of  a  man 
of  the  greatest  mind  to  pursue  some  course  to  which, 
from  adequate  motives,  he  has  devoted  himself, 
regardless  alike  of  the  praise  or  the  disapprobation 
of  other  men.  The  character  in  which  the  love  of 
approbation  is  a  ruling  principle  is  therefore  modified 
by  the  direction  of  it.  To  desire  the  approbation 
of  the  virtuous  leads  to  conduct  of  a  corresponding 
kind,  and  to  steadiness  and  consistency  in  such  con- 
duct. To  seek  the  approbation  of  the  vicious,  leads, 
of  course,  to  an  opposite  character.  But  there  is 
a  third  modification,  presenting  a  subject  of  some 
interest,  in  which  the  prevailing  principle  of  the  man 
is  a  general  love  of  approbation,  without  any  discri- 
mination of  the  characters  of  those  whose  praise  is 
sought,  or  of  the  value  of  the  qualities  on  account 


ESTEEM    AND    APPROBATION.  49 

of  which  he  seeks  it.  This  is  vanity,  and  it  pro- 
duces a  conduct  wavering  and  inconsistent, — per- 
petually changing  with  the  circumstances  in  which 
the  individual  is  placed.  It  often  leads  him  to  aim 
at  admiration  for  distinctions  of  a  very  trivial  char- 
acter,— or  even  for  qualities  which  he  does  not  really 
possess.  It  thus  includes  the  love  of  flattery.  Pride, 
on  the  other  hand,  as  opposed  to  vanity,  seems  to 
consist  in  a  man  entertaining  a  high  opinion  of  him- 
self, while  he  is  indiflferent  to  the  opinion  of  others  ; 
thus  we  speak  of  a  man  who  is  too  proud  to  be 
vain. 

Our  regard  to  the  opinion  of  others  is  the  origin 
of  our  respect  to  character  in  matters  which  do  not 
come  under  the  higher  principle  of  morals  ;  and  is 
of  extensive  influence  in  promoting  the  harmonies, 
proprieties,  and  decencies  of  society.  It  is  thus  the 
foundation  of  good  breeding,  and  leads  to  kindness 
and  accommodation  in  little  matters  which  do  not 
belong  to  the  class  of  duties.  It  is  also  the  source 
of  what  we  usually  call  decorum  and  propriety,  which 
lead  a  man  to  conduct  himself  in  a  manner  becom- 
ing his  character  and  circumstances,  in  regard  to 
things  which  do  not  involve  any  higher  principle. 
For,  apart  entirely  from  any  consideration  either  of 
morality  or  benevolence,  there  is  a  certain  line  of 
conduct  which  is  unbecoming  in  all  men  ;  and  there 
is  conduct  wliich  is  unbecoming  in  some,  though  it 
might  not  be  in  other  men, — and  in  some  circum- 
st£uices,  though  it  might  not  be  so  in  others.  It  is  un- 
necessary to  add,  how  much  of  a  man's  respectability 
in  life  often  depends  upon  finding  his  way,  with  proper 
E 


50  DESIRES. 

discrimination,  through  the  relations  of  society  which 
are  referable  to  this  principle  ;  or,  by  how  many  ac- 
tions which  are  not  really  wrong  a  man  may  render 
himself  despised  and  ridiculous.  The  love  of  es- 
teem and  approbation  is  also  of  extensive  influence 
in  the  young, — both  in  the  conduct  of  education  and 
the  cultivation  of  general  character ;  and  it  is  not 
liable  to  the  objections,  formerly  referred  to,  which 
apply  to  the  principle  of  Emulation.  It  leads  also 
to  those  numerous  expedients  by  which  persons  of 
various  character  seek  for  themselves  notoriety  or  a 
name,  or  desire  to  leave  a  reputation  behind  them 
when  they  are  no  more.  This  is  the  love  of  posthu- 
mous fame,  a  subject  which  has  afforded  an  exten- 
sive theme  both  for  the  philosopher  and  the  hu- 
morist. 

VII.  The  desire  of  Knowledge,  or  of  Intellectual 
Acquirement, — including  the  principle  of  Curiosity. 
The  tendency  of  this  high  principle  must  depend,  as 
in  the  former  cases,  on  its  regulation,  and  the  ob- 
jects to  which  it  is  directed.  These  may  vary  from 
the  idle  tattle  of  the  day,  to  the  highest  attainments 
in  literature  or  science.  The  principle  may  be  ap- 
plied to  pursuits  of  a  frivolous  or  useless  kind,  and 
to  such  acquirements  as  lead  only  to  pedantry  or 
sophism ;  or  it  may  be  directed  to  a  desultory  ap- 
plication, which  leads  to  a  superficial  acquaintance 
with  a  variety  of  subjects,  without  a  correct  know- 
ledge of  any  of  them.  On  the  other  hand,  the  pur- 
suit of  knowledge  may  be  allowed  to  interfere  with 
important  duties  which  we  owe  to  others,  in  the  par- 


KNOWLEDGE — MORAL   IMPROVEMENT.  51 

ticular  situation  in  which  we  are  placed.  A  well- 
regulated  judgment  conducts  the  propensity  to  wor- 
thy objects  ;  and  directs  it  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
make  it  most  useful  to  others.  With  such  due 
regulations,  the  principle  ought  to  be  carefully  culti- 
vated in  the  young.  It  is  closely  connected  with 
that  activity  of  mind  which  seeks  for  knowledge  on 
every  subject  that  comes  within  its  reach,  and  which 
is  ever  on  the  watch  to  make  its  knowledge  more 
correct  and  more  extensive 

YIII.  The  desire  of  Moral  Improvement.  This 
leads  to  the  highest  state  of  man  ;  and  it  bears  this 
peculiar  character,  that  it  is  adapted  to  men  in  every 
scale  of  society,  and  tends  to  diffuse  a  beneficial  in- 
fluence around  the  circle  with  which  the  individual 
is  connected.  The  desire  of  power  may  exist  in 
many,  but  its  gratification  is  limited  to  a  few  :  he 
who  fails  may  become  a  discontented  misanthrope  ; 
and  he  who  succeeds  may  be  a  scourge  to  his  spe- 
cies. The  desire  of  superiority  or  of  praise  may 
be  misdirected  in  the  same  manner,  leading  to  inso- 
lent triumph  on  the  one  hand,  and  envy  on  the  other. 
Even  the  thirst  for  knowledge  may  be  abused,  and 
many  are  placed  in  circumstances  in  which  it  cannot 
be  gratified.  But  the  desire  of  moral  improvement 
commends  itself  to  every  class  of  society,  and  its 
object  is  attainable  by  all.  In  proportion  to  its  in- 
tensity and  its  steadiness,  it  tends  to  make  the  pos- 
sessor both  a  happier  and  a  better  man,  and  to  ren- 
der him  the  instrument  of  diffusing  happiness  and 
usefulness  to  all  who  come  within  the  reach  of  his 


52  DESIRES. 

influence.  If  he  be  in  a  superior  station,  these  re- 
sults will  be  felt  more  extensively  ;  if  he  be  in  an 
humble  sphere,  they  may  be  more  limited  ;  but  their 
nature  is  the  same,  and  their  tendency  is  equally  to 
elevate  the  character  of  man.  This  mental  con- 
dition consists,  as  we  shall  afterward  have  occasion 
to  show  more  particularly,  in  an  habitual  recognition 
of  the  supreme  authority  of  conscience  over  the 
whole  intellectual  and  moral  system,  and  in  an  ha- 
bitual effort  to  have  every  desire  and  every  affection 
regulated  by  the  moral  principle  and  by  a  sense 
of  the  Divine  will.  It  leads  to  a  uniformity  of  char- 
acter which  can  never  flow  from  any  lower  source, 
and  to  a  conduct  distinguished  by  the  anxious  dis- 
charge of  every  duty,  and  the  practice  of  the  most 
active  benevolence. 

The  Emotions  which  have  been  now  briefly  men- 
tioned seem  to  include  the  more  important  of  those 
which  are  referable  to  the  class  of  desires.  There 
is,  however,  another  principle  which  ought  to  be 
mentioned  as  a  leading  peculiarity  of  human  nature, 
though  it  may  be  somewhat  difficult  to  determine 
the  class  to  which  it  belongs.  This  is  the  Desire 
of  Action, — the  restless  activity  of  mind,  which  leads 
it  to  require  some  object  on  which  its  powers  must 
be  exercised,  and  without  which  it  preys  upon  itself, 
and  becomes  miserable.  On  this  principle  we  are 
to  explain  several  facts  which  are  of  frequent  obser- 
vation. A  person  accustomed  to  a  life  of  activity 
longs  for  ease  and  retirement,  and  when  he  has  ac- 
comphshed  his  purpose,  finds  himself  wretched. 


ACTION — REGULATION    OF   DESIRES.  53 

.  The  frivolous  engagements  of  the  unoccupied  are 
referable  to  the  same  principle.  They  arise,  not 
from  any  interest  which  such  occupations  really 
possess,  but  simply  from  the  desire  of  mental  excite- 
ment,— the  felicity  of  having  something  to  do.  The 
pleasure  of  relaxation,  indeed,  is  known  to  those 
only  who  have  regular  and  interesting  employment. 
Continued  relaxation  soon  becomes  a  weariness ; 
and,  on  this  ground,  we  may  safely  assert,  that  the 
greatest  degree  of  real  enjoyment  belongs,  not  to  the 
luxurious  man  of  wealth,  or  the  Hstless  votary  of 
fashion,  but  to  the  middle  classes  of  society,  who, 
along  with  the  comforts  of  life,  have  constant  and 
important  occupation. 

The  mental  condition  which  we  call  Desire  ap- 
pears to  lie  in  a  great  measure  at  the  foundation  of 
character ;  and,  for  a  sound  moral  condition,  it  is 
required  that  the  desires  be  directed  to  worthy  ob- 
jects ;  and  that  the  degree  or  strength  of  the  desire 
be  accommodated  to  the  true  and  relative  value  of 
each  of  these  objects.  If  the  desires  are  thus  di- 
rected, worthy  conduct  will  be  likely  to  follow  in  a 
steady  and  uniform  manner.  If  they  are  allowed  to 
break  from  these  restraints  of  reason  and  the  moral 
principle,  the  man  is  left  at  the  mercy  of  unhallowed 
passion,  and  is  hable  to  those  irregularities  which 
naturally  result  from  such  a  derangement  of  the 
moral  feelings.  If,  indeed,  we  would  see  the  evils  pro- 
duced by  desire,  when  not  thus  controlled,  we  have 
only  to  look  at  the  whole  history  of  humEmi  kind. 
What  accumulated  miseries  arise  from  the  want  of 
E2 


54  DESIRES. 

due  regulation  of  the  animal  propensities,  in  the 
various  forms  in  which  it  degrades  the  character  of 
rational  and  moral  beings.  What  evils  spring  from 
the  love  of  money,  and  from  the  desire  of  power ; 
from  the  contests  of  rivals,  and  the  tumults  of 
party, — what  envy,  hatred,  malignity  and  revenge. 
What  complicated  wretchedness  follows  the  train  of 
ambition, — contempt  of  human  suffering,  countries 
depopulated,  and  fields  deluged  with  blood.  Such 
are  the  results  of  desire,  when  not  directed  to  ob- 
jects worthy  of  a  moral  being,  and  not  kept  under 
the  rigid  control  of  conscience,  and  the  immutable 
laws  of  moral  rectitude.  When,  in  any  of  these 
forms,  a  sensual  or  selfish  propensity  is  allowed  to 
pass  the  due  boundary,  which  is  fixed  for  it  by  rea- 
son and  the  moral  principle,  the  mental  harmony  is 
destroyed,  and  even  the  judgment  itself  comes  to 
be  impaired  and  distorted  in  that  highest  of  all  in- 
quiries, the  search  after  moral  truth. 

The  desires,  indeed,  may  exist  in  an  ill-regulated 
state,  while  the  conduct  is  yet  restrained  by  various 
principles, — such  as  submission  to  human  laws,  a  re- 
gard to  character,  or  even  a  certain  feeling  of  what 
is  morally  right,  contending  with  the  vitiated  princi 
pie  within.  But  this  cannot  be  considered  as  the 
healthy  condition  of  a  moral  being.  It  is  only  when 
the  desire  itself  is  sound  that  we  can  say  the  man 
is  in  moral  health.  This,  accordingly,  is  the  great 
principle  so  often  and  so  strikingly  enforced  in  the 
sacred  writings,  "  Keep  thy  heart  v/ith  all  diligence, 
because  out  of  it  are  the  issues  of  life."  "  Blessed 
are  the  pure  in  heart,  for  they  shall  see  God."  Thus, 


REGULATION    OF    DESIRES.  55 

there  are  desires  which  are  folly,  and  there  are  de- 
sires which  are  vice,  even  though  they  should  not  be 
followed  by  indulgence  ;  and  there  are  desires  which 
tend  to  purify  and  elevate  the  moral  nature,  though 
their  objects  should  be  beyond  the  reach  of  our  full 
attainment  in  the  present  state  of  being.  Perfect 
moral  purity  is  not  the  lot  of  man  in  this  transient 
state,  and  is  not  to  be  attained  by  his  own  unaided 
efforts.  But,  subservient  to  it  is  that  warfare  within, 
that  earnest  and  habitual  desire  after  the  perfection 
of  a  moral  being,  which  is  felt  to  be  the  great  object 
of  life,  when  this  life  is  viewed  in  its  relation  to  that 
which  is  to  come.  For  this  attainment,  however, 
man  must  feel  his  total  inadequacy, — and  the  utmost 
efforts  of  human  reason  have  failed  in  unfolding  the 
requisite  aid.  The  conviction  is  thus  forced  upon 
us  that  a  higher  influence  is  necessary,  and  this  in- 
fluence is  fully  disclosed  by  the  light  of  revealed 
truth.  We  are  there  taught  to  look  for  a  power 
from  on  high,  capable  of  effecting  what  human 
efforts  cannot  accomplish, — the  purification  of  the 
heart. 


56  AFFECTIONS. 


SECTION  II. 


THE    AFFECTIONS. 


As  the  Desires  are  calculated  to  bring  some  gra- 
tification to  ourselves,  the  Affections  lead  us  to  our 
relations  to  other  men,  and  to  a  certain  line  of  con- 
duct which  arises  out  of  these  relations.  They  are 
to  be  viewed  as  original  principles  of  our  nature, 
planted  in  us  for  wise  purposes,  and  the  operation  of 
them  is  to  be  considered  as  distinct  both  from  that  of 
the  moral  principle  and  of  reason, — that  is,  from  any 
sense  of  duty  or  the  moral  rectitude  of  the  conduct 
to  which  they  lead,  and  from  any  calculation  of  its 
propriety  and  utility.  Thus,  when  the  mother  de- 
votes her  attention  by  day  and  night  to  her  infant,  if 
from  sickness  or  helplessness  in  want  of  her  special 
care,  and  perseveres  in  doing  so,  with  total  disregard 
to  her  own  ease,  health,  or  comfort,  she  is  not  influ- 
enced either  by  a  sense  of  duty,  or  by  any  feeling 
of  the  utility  of  her  conduct ;  she  acts  upon  an  im- 
pulse within,  which  she  feels  to  be  a  part  of  her  con- 
stitution, and  which  carries  her  forward  in  a  particu- 
lar course  of  anxious  and  protracted  exertion  by  the 
power  of  itself  alone.  This  distinction  appears  to 
be  of  the  utmost  practical  importance,  and  we  shsdl 
have  occasion  to  refer  to  it  more  particularly  in  the 
sequel. 


JUSTICE,  57 

An  Affection,  therefore,  may  be  considered  as  an 
original  feeling  or  emotion  existing  in  ourselves, 
which  leads  us  to  a  particular  conduct  towards  other 
men,  without  reference  to  any  principle  except  the 
intuitive  impulse  of  the  emotion  itself.  The  affec- 
tions have  been  divided  into  the  Benevolent  and 
Malevolent ;  but  these  titles  appear  to  be  incorrect, 
especially  the  latter, — as  the,  due  exercise  of  the 
emotions  to  which  it  refers  does  not  properly  include 
what  is  called  malevolence.  They  only  tend  to 
guard  us  against  certain  conduct  in  other  men; 
and  when  they  are  allowed  to  go  beyond  this,  that 
is,  to  actual  malevolence  or  revenge,  the  application 
is  morbid.  It  will  therefore  accord  better  with  the 
nature  of  these  emotions,  to  give  them  the  names  of 
Uniting  and  Defensive  Affections :  the  former  in- 
cluding justice,  benevolence,  veracity,  friendship, 
love,  gratitude,  patriotism,  and  the  domestic  affec- 
tions ;  the  latter,  jealousy,  disapprobation,  and 
anger. 

I.    JUSTICE. 

There  may  be  some  difference  of  opinion  in  re- 
gard to  the  propriety  of  including  justice  among  the 
affections ;  but  it  seems  to  be  more  nearly  allied  to 
them  than  to  any  of  the  other  classes  of  moral 
emotions  which  have  been  mentioned,  and  may, 
therefore,  as  a  mere  matter  of  arrangement,  be  con- 
veniently introduced  here.  Strictly  speaking,  it 
might  perhaps  be  considered  as  a  combined  opera- 


58  AFFECTIONS, 

tion  of  an  affection  and  the  moral  principle  ;  but  this 
is  matter  of  speculation  alone.  The  important  con- 
sideration relating  to  it  is,  that,  in  whatever  man- 
ner it  arises,  the  sense  of  justice  is  a  primary  and 
essential  part  of  our  moral  constitution,  conveying 
the  distinct  impression  of  certain  conduct  which  a 
man  owes  to  his  fellow-men,'  without  regard  to  any 
considerations  of  a  personal  nature,  and  apart  from 
all  positive  enactments  or  laws,  either  divine  or  hu- 
man. The  requirements  of  justice  embrace  certain 
points  in  which  every  man  has  an  absolute  right,  and 
in  regard  to  which  it  is  the  absolute  duty  of  every 
other  man  not  to  interfere  with  him.  These  rights 
have  usually  been  divided  into  three  classes  ;  what 
I  have  a  right  to  possess,  and  what  no  man  has  any 
right  to  take  from  me, — what  I  have  a  right  to  do, 
and  what  no  man  has  any  title  to  prevent  me  from 
doing, — what  I  have  a  right  to  expect  from  other 
men,  and  what  it  is  their  absolute  duty  to  perform. 
These  principles  form  the  basis  of  what  is  called 
Natural  Jurisprudence,  a  code  of  relative  duty  de- 
riving its  authority  from  impressions  which  are  found 
in  the  moral  feelings  of  all  mankind,  without  regard 
to  the  enactments  of  any  particular  civil  society.  In 
the  actual  arrangements  of  civil  communities,  these 
great  principles  of  justice  are  combined  with  others 
which  are  derived  merely  from  utility  or  expecftency, 
as  calculated  to  promote  the  peace  or  the  advantage 
of  the  community.  These  may  differ  in  different 
countries,  and  they  cease  to  be  binding  when  the 
enactments  on  which  they  rest  are  abrogated  or 


JUSTICE.  59 

changed.  But  no  difference  of  place  can  alter,  and 
no  laws  can  destroy,  the  essential  requirements  of 
justice. 

In  these  observations,  it  will  be  remarked,  the 
word  Justice  is  used  as  expressing  a  principle  of 
individual  character  ;  and  it  is  in  this  sense  that  it  is 
to  be  properly  classed  with  the  affections.  The  term 
is  employed  in  another  sense,  namely,  that  of  dis- 
tributive and  corrective  justice,  which  regulates  the 
claims  of  individuals  in  a  community,  requires  resti- 
tution or  compensation  for  any  deviation  from  such 
claims,  or  punishes  those  who  have  violated  them. 
It  is  in  the  former  sense  that  justice  is  properly  to 
be  considered  as  a  branch  of  the  philosophy  of  the 
moral  feelings ;  but  the  same  general  principles 
apply  to  both. 

The  sense  of  justice,  therefore,  consists  in  a  feel- 
ing experienced  by  every  man,  of  a  certain  line  of 
conduct  which  he  owes  to  other  men  in  given  cir- 
cumstances ;  and  this  seems  to  be  referable  to  the 
following  heads  : — attending  to  their  interest,— not 
interfering  with  their  freedom  of  action, — preserving 
their  reputation, — estimating  their  character  and  mo- 
tives,— judging  of  their  opinions, — consulting  their 
feelings, — and  preserving  or  improving  their  moral 
condition.  As  a  guide  for  his  conduct  in  parbtcular 
instances,  a  man  has  usually  a  distinct  impression  of 
what  he  thinks  due  by  other  men  towards  himself; 
justice  requires  that  he  rigidly  extend  to  others  the 
same  feelings  and  conduct  which,  in  similar  cii- 
cumstances,  he  expects  from  them. 


60  AFFECTIONS. 

(1.)  Justice  is  due  to  the  persons,  property,  and 
interests  of  others.  This  constitutes  Integrity  or 
Honesty.  It,  of  course,  implies  abstaining  from 
every  kind  of  injury,  and  preserving  a  conscientious 
regard  to  their  rights.  In  this  last  respect,  it  allows 
us  to  exercise  a  prudent  attention  to  our  own  inter- 
est, provided  the  means  be  fair  and  honourable,  and 
that  we  carefully  abstain  from  injuring  others  by  the 
measures  we  employ  for  this  purpose.  The  great 
rule  for  our  guidance  in  all  such  cases  is  found  in 
the  immutable  principles  of  moral  rectitude  ;  the  test 
of  our  conduct  in  regard  to  individual  instances  is, 
thai  it  be  such  as,  were  our  own  interest  concerned, 
we  should  think  fair  and  honourable  in  other  men. 

(2.)  Justice  requires  us  not  to  interfere  with  the 
freedom  of  action  of  others.  This  constitutes  per- 
sonal liberty ;  but  in  all  civil  communities  the  right 
is  liable  to  certain  restrictions :  as  when  a  man 
uses  his  freedom  of  action  to  the  danger  or  injury 
of  other  men.  The  principles  of  justice  may  also 
recognise  a  man's  surrendering,  to  a  certain  extent, 
his  personal  Uberty,  by  mutual  and  voluntary  com- 
pact, as  in  the  case  of  servants,  apprentices,  soldiers, 
&c. ;  but  they  are  opposed  to  slavery,  in  which  the 
individual  concerned  is  not  a  party  to  the  arrange- 
ment. 

(3.)  Justice  enjoins  a  regard  to  the  reputation  of 
others.  This  consists  in  avoiding  every  thing  that 
could  be  injurious  to  their  good  name,  either  by  di- 
rect evil-speaking,  or  such  insinuations  as  might  give 


JUSTICE.  61 

rise  to  suspicion  or  prejudice  against  them.  It  must 
extend  a/so  to  the  counteracting  of  such  insinuations 
when  we  hear  them  made  by  others,  especially  in  cir- 
cumstances in  which  the  individual  injured  has  no 
opportunity  of  defending  himself.  It  includes,  further, 
that  we  do  not  deny  to  others,  even  to  rivals,  any 
praise  or  credit  which  is  justly  due  to  them.  There 
is,  however,  one  modification,  equally  consistent  with 
justice,  to  which  the  former  of  these  rules  is  liable  ; 
namely,  that,  in  certain  cases,  we  may  be  required  to 
make  a  statement  prejudicial  to  an  individual,  when 
duty  to  a  third  party  or  to  the  public  makes  it  incum- 
bent on  us  to  do  so.  In  such  a  case,  a  person  guided 
by  the  rules  of  justice  will  go  no  farther  than  is  actu- 
ally required  by  the  circumstances ;  and  will  at  all 
times  beware  of  propagating  a  report  injurious  to 
another,  though  he  should  know  it  to  be  strictly  true, 
unless  he  is  called  upon  by  special  duty  to  commu- 
nicate it. 

(4.)  Justice  requires  us  not  only  to  avoid  injuring 
an  individual  in  the  estimation  of  other  men,  but  to 
exercise  the  same  fairness  in  forming  our  own  opinion 
of  his  character,  without  being  misled  or  biased  by 
passion  or  prejudice.  This  consists  in  estimating  his 
conduct  and  motives  with  calmness  and  impartiality ; 
in  regard  to  particular  instances,  making  full  allow- 
ance for  the  circumstances  in  which  he  was  placed, 
and  the  feelings  by  which  he  was,  or  might  be,  at  the 
time,  naturally  influenced.  When  an  action  admits 
of  being  referred  to  different  motives,  justice  consists 
in  taking  the  more  favourable  view,  if  we  can  do  so 


62  AFFECTIONS. 

with  strict  regard  to  truth,  instead  of  harshly  and 
hastily  gissigning  a  motive  which  is  unworthy.  Such 
justice  in  regard  to  character  and  motives  we  require 
to  exercise  with  peculiar  care,  when  the  conduct  re- 
ferred to  has  been  in  any  way  opposed  to  our  own 
self-love.  In  these  cases  we  must  be  especially  on 
our  guard  against  the  influence  of  the  selfish  princi- 
ple, which  might  lead  to  partial  and  distorted  views 
of  actions  and  motives,  less  favourable  to  others,  and 
more  favourable  to  ourselves,  than  justice  warrants. 
When  viewed  in  this  manner,  we  may  often  perceive, 
that  conduct  which  gave  rise  to  emotions  of  displea- 
sure, as  injurious  to  us,  was  fully  warranted  by  some 
conduct  on  our  own  part,  or  was  required  by  some 
higher  duty  which  the  individual  owed  to  another. 

(5.)  Justice  is  to  be  exercised  in  judging  of  the 
opinions  and  statements  of  others.  This  constitutes 
Candour.  It  consists  in  giving  a  fair  and  deliberate 
hearing  to  their  opinions,  statements,  and  arguments, 
and  weighing  fairly  and  honestly  their  tendency.  It 
is,  therefore,  opposed  to  prejudice,  blind  attachment 
to  preconceived  opinions,  and  that  narrow  disputa- 
tious spirit  which  delights  in  captious  criticism,  and 
will  hear  nothing  with  calmness  that  is  opposed  to  its 
own  views  ;  which  distorts  or  misrepresents  the  sen- 
timents of  its  opponents,  ascribing  them  to  unworthy 
motives,  or  deducing  from  them  conclusions  which 
they  do  not  warrant.  Candour,  accordingly,  may  be 
considered  as  a  compound  of  justice  and  the  love  of 
truth.  It  leads  us  to  give  due  attention  to  the  opin- 
ions and  statements  of  others, — in  all  cases  to  be 


JUSTICE.  6^ 

l;^  chiefly  solicitous  to  discover  truth,  and  in  statements 
of  a  mixed  character,  containing  perhaps  much  error 
and  fallacy,  anxiously  to  discover  and  separate  what 
is  true.  It  has  accordingly  been  remarked,  that  a 
turn  for  acute  disputation,  and  minute  and  rigid  criti- 
cism, is  often  the  characteristic  of  a  contracted  and 
prejudiced  mind  ;  and  that  the  most  enlarged  under- 
standings are  always  the  most  indulgent  to  the  state- 
ments of  others, — their  leading  object  being  to  dis- 
cover truth. 

(6.)  Justice  is  due  to  the  feelings  of  others  ;  and 
this  applies  to  many  circumstances  which  do  not  af- 
fect either  their  interest  or  their  reputation.  Without 
injuring  them  in  any  of  these  respects,  or  in  our  own 
good  opinion,  we  may  behave  to  them  in  such  a  man- 
ner as  to  wound  their  feelings.  There  are  minds 
of  an  extreme  delicacy,  which,  in  this  respect,  are 
peculiarly  sensitive;  towards  such,  a  person  of  cor- 
rect feelings  strives  to  conduct  himself  with  suitable 
tenderness.  We  may  find,  however,  persons  of 
honest  and  upright  minds,  who  would  shrink  from  the 
least  approach  to  real  injury,  but  yet  neglect  the  ne- 
cessary attention  to  the  feelings  ;  and  may  even  con- 
fer a  real  benefit  in  such  a  manner  as  to  wound  the 
individual  to  whom  they  intended  kindness.  The 
lower  degrees  of  this  principle  pertain  to  what  is  called 
mere  good-breeding,  which  has  been  defined  "be- 
nevolence, in  trifles ;"  but  the  higher  degrees  may 
restrain  from  conduct  which,  without  any  real  injury, 
inflicts  permanent  pain.  To  this  head  we  may  per- 
haps also  refer  a  due  regard  to  the  estimate  which  we 


64  AFFECTIONS. 

lead  a  man  to  form  of  himself.  This  is  opposed  to 
flattery  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  to  any  un- 
necessary depreciation  of  his  character.  Flattery 
indeed  is  also  to  be  considered  as  a  violation  of 
veracity. 

(7.)  While,  upon  the  principles  which  have  been 
referred  to,  we  abstain  from  injuring  the  interests,  the 
reputation,  or  the  feelings  of  others,  there  is  another 
class  of  injuries,  of  still  higher  magnitude,  which  the 
conscientious  mind  will  avoid  with  peculiar  anxiety, 
namely,  injuries  done  to  the  moral  principles  of  other 
men.  These  form  a  class  of  offences  of  which  no 
human  law  takes  any  adequate  cognizance  ;  but  we 
know  that  they  possess  a  character  of  the  deepest 
malignity.  Deep  guilt  attaches  to  the  man  who,  by 
persuasion  or  ridicule,  has  unhinged  the  moral  feel- 
ings of  another,  or  has  been  the  means  of  leading  him 
astray  from  the  paths  of  virtue.  Of  equal  or  even 
greater  malignity  is  the  aspect  of  the  wiiter  whose 
works  have  contributed  to  violate  the  principles  of 
truth  and  rectitude, — to  pollute  the  imagination,  or 
corrupt  the  heart.  Inferior  offenders  are  promptly 
seized  by  public  authority,  and  suffer  the  award  of 
public  justice  ;  but  the  destroyer  of  the  moral  being 
often  walks  securely  through  his  own  scene  of  moral 
discipline,  as  if  no  power  could  reach  the  measure 
of  his  guilt  but  the  hand  of  the  Eternal. 

To  the  same  head  we  are  to  assign  the  extensive 
and  important  influence  of  exEimple.  ^  There  are  few 
men  who  have  not  in  this  respect  some  power,  but  it 
belongs  more  particularly  to  persons  in  situations  of 


COMPASSION    AND    BENEVOLENCE.  65 

rank  and  public  eminence.  It  is  matter  of  deep 
regret  both  to  the  friend  of  virtue  and  the  friend  of  iiis 
country,  when  any  of  these  are  found  manifesting 
disregard  to  sacred  tilings,  or  giving  an  air  of  fashion 
to  what  is  calculated  to  corrupt  the  moral  principles 
of  the  unthinking  classes  of  society.  If  they  are 
restrained  by  no  higher  motive,  the  feelings  of  patriot- 
ism, and  even  of  personal  safety,  ought  to  produce  a 
solemn  caution  ;  and  it  becomes  them  seriously  to 
consider,  whether  they  may  not  thus  be  sowing  among 
the  ignorant  multitude  the  seeds  of  tumult,  revolution, 
and  anarchy. 

II.  COMPASSION  AND  BENEVOLENCE. 

Great  diversity  exists  in  the  condition  of  different 
individuals  in  the  present  state, — some  being  in  cir- 
cumstances of  ease,  wealth,  and  comfort, — others  of 
pain,  deprivation,  and  sorrow.  Such  diversities  we 
must  consider  as  an  arrangement  established  by  the 
great  Disposer  of  all  things,  and  calculated  to  pro- 
mote important  purposes  in  his  moral  government. 
Many  of  these  purposes  are  entirely  beyond  the  reach 
of  our  faculties  ;  but,  as  holding  a  prominent  place 
among  them,  we  may  safely  reckon  the  cultivation 
of  our  moral  feelings,  especially  the  affections  of 
compassion  and  benevolence.  The  due  exercise 
of  these  is,  therefore,  calculated  to  promote  a  double 
object,  namely,  the  alleviation  of  distress  in  others, — 
and  the  cultivation  in  ourselves  of  a  mental  condition 
peculiarly  adapted  to  a  state  of  moral  di?ci[)line.  By 
bringing  us  into  contact  with  individuals  in  various 
F2 


66  AFFECTIONS. 

forms  and  degrees  of  suffering,  they  tend  continually 
to  remind  us  that  the  present  scene  is  but  the  infancy 
of  our  existence,— that  the  beings  whom  we  thus  con- 
template are  the  children  of  the  same  Almighty 
Father  with  ourselves,  inheriting  the  same  nature, 
possessed  of  the  same  feelings,  and  soon  to  enter 
upon  another  state  of  existence,  when  all  the  distinc- 
tions which  are  to  be  found  in  this  world  shall  cease 
for  ever.  They  tend  thus  to  withdraw  us  from  the 
power  of  self-love,  and  the  deluding  influence  of 
present  things ;  and  habitually  to  raise  our  views  to 
that  future  life  for  which  the  present  is  intended  to  pre^ 
pare  us.  The  due  cultivation  of  the  benevolent  af- 
fections, therefore,  is  not  properly  to  be  considered 
as  a  source  of  moral  approbation,  but  rather  as  a  pro- 
cess of  moral  culture.  They  may  enable  us  in  some 
degree  to  benefit  others,  but  their  chief  benefit  is  to 
ourselves.  By  neglecting  them,  we  both  incur  much 
guilt,  and  deprive  ourselves  of  an  important  means  of 
improvement.  The  diligent  exercise  of  them,  be- 
sides being  a  source  of  moral  advantage,  is  accom- 
panied with  a  degree  of  mental  enjoyment  which 
carries  with  it  its  own  reward.  Such  appears  to  be 
the  correct  view  which  we  ought  to  take  of  the  ar- 
rangement established  by  the  Creator  in  this  part  of 
our  constitution.  It  is  calculated  to  correct  a  mis- 
conception of  an  important  kind,  which  considers  the 
exercise  of  the  benevolent  affections  as  possessing  a 
character  of  merit.  To  this  subject  we  shall  have 
occasion  to  refer  more  particularly  in  the  sequel. 

The  exercise  of  the  benevolent  affections  may  be 
briefly  treated  of,  under  nearly  the  same  heads  as 


COMPASSION    AND    BENEVOLENCE.  67 

those  referred  to  when  considering  the  principle  of 
justice  ;  keeping  in  mind  that  they  lead  to  greater 
exertion  for  the  benefit  of  others,  and  often  demand 
a  greater  sacrifice  of  self-love  than  is  included  under 
the  mere  requirements  of  justice.  On  the  other 
hand,  benevolence  is  not  to  be  exercised  at  the  ex- 
pense of  justice  ;  as  would  be  the  case  if  a  man 
were  found  relieving  distress  by  expedients  which 
involve  the  necessity  of  withholding  the  payment  of 
just  debts,  or  imply  the  neglect  or  infringement  of 
some  duty  which  he  owes  to  another. 

(1.)  Compassion  and  benevolent  exertion  are 
due  towards  alleviating  the  distresses  of  others. 
This  exercise  of  them,  in  many  instances,  calls  for 
a  decided  sacrifice  of  personal  interest,  and,  in 
others,  for  considerable  personal  exertion.  We 
feel  our  way  to  the  proper  measure  of  these  sacrifices, 
by  the  high  principle  of  moral  duty,  along  with  that 
mental  exercise  which  places  us  in  the  situation  of 
others,  and,  by  a  kind  of  reflected  self-love,  judges 
of  the  conduct  due  by  us  to  them  in  our  respective 
circumstances.  The  details  of  this  subject  would 
lead  us  into  a  field  too  extensive  for  our  present 
purpose.  Pecuniary  aid,  by  those  who  have  the 
means,  is  the  most  easy  form  in  which  benevolence 
can  be  gratified,  and  that  which  often  requires  the 
least,  if  any,  sacrifice  of  personal  comfort  or  self- 
love.  The  same  affection  may  be  exercised  in  a 
degree  much  higher  in  itself,  and  oflen  much  more 
useful  to  others,  by  personal  exertion  and  personal 
kindness.     The  former,  compared  with  the  means 


68  AFFECTIONS. 

of  the  individual,  may  present  a  mere  mockery  of 
mercy  ;  while  the  latter,  even  in  the  lowest  waiks 
of  life,  often  exhibit  the  brightest  displays  of  active 
usefulness  that  can  adorn  the  human  character. 
This  high  and  pure  benevolence  not  only  is  dis- 
pensed with  willingness,  when  occasions  present 
themselves ;  but  seeks  out  opportunities  for  itself, 
and  feels  in  want  of  its  natural  and  healthy  exer- 
cise when  deprived  of  an  object  on  which  it  may  be 
bestowed. 

(2.)  Benevolence  is  to  be  exercised  towards  the 
reputation  of  others.  This  consists,  not  only  in 
avoiding  any  injury  to  their  characters,  but  in  exer- 
tions to  protect  them  against  the  injustice  of  others, — 
to  correct  misrepresentations, — to  check  the  course 
of  slander, — and  to  obviate  the  efforts  of  those  who 
would  poison  the  confidence  of  friends,  or  disturb 
the  harmony  of  society.  To  this  department,  there- 
fore, belongs  the  high  character  of  the  peace- 
maker, whose  delight  it  is  to  allay  angry  feehngs 
even  when  he  is  in  no  degree  personally  interested, 
and  to  bring  together  as  friends  and  brethren  those 
who  have  assumed  the  attitude  of  hatred  and  re- 
venge* 

(3.)  Benevolence  is  to  be  exercised  towards  the 
character  and  conduct  of  others  ;  especially  when 
these  have  been  in  opposition  to  our  personal  interest 
or  self-love.  This  consists  in  viewing  their  con- 
duct with  indulgence  and  forbearance,  assigning  the 
jaoLQst  favourable  motives,  and  making  every  allow- 


COMPASSION    AND    BENEVOLENCE.  69 

ance  for  their  feelings,  and  the  circumstances  in 
which  they  were  placed.  It  leads  us  also  to  avoid 
all  suspicions  and  jealousies  which  are  not  clearly 
justified  by  fact ;  and  to  abstain  to  the  utmost  from 
taking  offence,  by  putting  upon  the  conduct  of 
others  the  best  construction  of  which  it  will  possibly 
admit.  It  extends  still  farther  to  the  actual  forgive- 
ness of  injuries,  and  the  repaying  of  evil  with  good, 
— a  conduct  represented  in  the  sacred  writings  as 
one  of  the  highest  attainments  the  humem  character 
can  reach,  in  so  far  as  regards  its  relation  to  other 
men. 

(4.)  Benevolence  is  to  be  exercised  towards  the 
feeUngs  of  others ;  and  this  applies  to  many  situa- 
tions in  which  neither  their  interest  nor  their  char- 
acter is  concerned.  It  includes  those  exercises  of 
the  kindly  affections  which  produce  so  powerful  an 
influence  in  all  the  relations  of  life,  but  which  it  is 
impossible  for  any  description  to  delineate.  It  com- 
prehends all  our  social  and  civil  connexions,  but 
seems  peculiarly  to  belong  to  our  intercourse  with 
inferiors  and  dependants.  Its  must  anxious  exer- 
cise may  often  relate  merely  to  trifles,  but  it  extends 
to  innumerable  circumstances  in  which  we  may  sur- 
render our  own  feelings  to  those  of  others,  and  our 
own  convenience  or  gratification  to  theirs.  It  im- 
plies solicitude  to  avoid  wounding  the  feelings  by 
pride,  selfishness,  or  fretfulness, — by  suspicions,  im- 
putations, and  jealousies, — or  by  allowing  insignifi- 
cant things  to  ruffle  the  temper,  and  derange  the 
social  comfort.    Many,  who  are  not  deficient  in  what 


70  AFFECTIONS. 

we  usually  call  deeds  of  benevolence,  are  too  apt  tc 
forget,  that  a  most  important  exercise  of  true  benevo- 
lence consists  n  the  habitual  cultivation  of  courtesy, 
gentleness,  and  kindness  ;  and  that  on  these  dispo- 
sitions often  depends  our  influence  upon  the  comfort 
and  happiness  of  others,  in  a  greater  degree  than  on 
any  deeds  of  actual  beneficence. 

(5.)  Benevolence  is  to  be  exercised  in  regard  to 
the  moral  degradation  of  others,  including  their 
ignorance  and  vice.  This  prevents  us  from  deriving 
satisfaction  from  moral  evil,  even  though  it  should 
contribute  to  our  advantage,  as  might  often  happen 
from  the  misconduct  of  rivals  or  enemies.  It  imphes 
also  that  highest  species  of  usefulness  which  aims  at 
raising  the  moral  condition  of  man, — by  instructing 
the  ignorant,  rescuing  the  unwary,  and  reclaiming  the 
vicious.  This  exalted  benevolence  will  therefore 
also  seek  to  extend  the  light  of  divine  truth  to  nations 
that  sit  in  moral  darkness;  and  looks  anxiously  for 
the  period  when  the  knowledge  of  Christianity  shall 
dispel  every  false  faith,  and  put  an  end  to  the  horrors 
of  superstition. 

III.  VERACITY. 

In  our  own  mental  impressions  relating  to  vera- 
city, we  have  a  striking  illustration  of  the  manner  in 
which  we  rely  on  this  class  of  moral  feelings,  as  in- 
stinctive in  the  constitution  of  the  mind.  On  a  cer- 
tain confidence  in  the  veracity  of  mankind  is  founded 
60  much  of  the  knowledge  on  which  we  constantly 


VERACITY.  71 

depend,  that,  without  it,  the  whole  system  of  human 
things  would  go  into  confusion.  It  relates  to  all  the 
intelligence  which  we  derive  from  any  other  source 
than  our  own  personal  observation:  for  example, 
to  all  that  we  receive  through  the  historian,  the  trav- 
eller, the  naturalist,  or  the  astronomer.  Even  in 
regard  to  the  most  common  events  of  a  single  day, 
we  often  proceed  on  a  confidence  in  the  veracity  of 
a  great  variety  of  individuals.  There  is,  indeed,  a 
natural  tendency  to  truth  in  all  men,  unless  when  this 
principle  is  overcome  by  some  strong  selfish  purpose 
to  be  answered  by  departing  from  it :  and  there  is 
an  equally  strong  tendency  to  rely  on  the  veracity 
of  others,  until  we  have  learned  certain  cautions  by 
our  actual  experience  of  mankind.  Hence,  chil- 
dren and  inexperienced  persons  are  easily  imposed 
upon  by  unfounded  statements  :  and  the  most  prac- 
tised liar  confides  in  the  credulity  of  those  whom  he 
attempts  to  deceive.  When  treating  of  the  intel- 
lectual powers  in  another  work,  I  considered  the 
principles  which  regulate  our  confidence  in  human 
testimony  ;  and  it  is  unnecessary  to  recur  to  them 
in  this  place.  Our  present  object  is  briefly  to  ana- 
lyze the  elements  which  are  essential  to  veracity, 
when  we  view  it  as  a  moral  emotion,  or  a  branch  of 
individual  character.  These  appear  to  be  three, — 
correctness  in  ascertaining  facts, — accuracy  in  re- 
lating them, — and  truth  of  purpose,  or  fidelity  in  the 
fulfilment  of  promises. 

(1.)  An  important  element  of  veracity  is  coiTcct- 
ness  in  ascertaining  facts.     This  is  essential  to  the 


72  AFFECTIONS. 

love  of  truth.  It  requires  us  to  exercise  the  most 
anxious  care  respecting  every  statement  which  we 
receive  as  true  ;  and  not  to  receive  it  as  such,  until 
we  are  satisfied  that  the  authority  on  which  it  is 
asserted  is  of  a  nature  on  which  we  can  fully  rely, 
and  that  the  statement  contains  all  the  facts  to  which 
our  attention  ought  to  be  directed.  It  consequently 
guards  us  against  those  limited  views  by  which 
party  spirit  or  a  love  of  favourite  dogmas  leads  a  man 
to  receive  the  facts  which  favour  a  particular  opinion, 
and  neglect  those  which  are  opposed  to  it.  The 
sound  exercise  of  judgment,  which  is  connected 
with  this  love  of  truth,  differs  therefore  from  the  art 
of  ingenious  disputation,  and  is  often  found  directly 
at  variance  with  it.  The  same  principle  is  appli- 
cable to  the  truths  which  are  derived  as  deductions 
from  processes  of  reasoning.  It  is  thus  opposed  to 
all  sophistical  arguments,  and  partial  or  distorted 
reasonings,  by  which  disputants  strive  to  establish 
particular  systems,  instead  of  engaging  in  an  honest 
and  simple  inquiry  after  truth.  The  love  of  truth, 
therefore,  is  of  equal  importance  in  the  reception  of 
facts,  and  in  the  formation  of  opinions ;  and  it 
includes  also  a  readiness  to  relinquish  our  own 
opinions,  when  new  facts  or  arguments  are  pre- 
sented to  us  which  are  calculated  to  overturn  them. 

In  the  reception  of  truth,  especially  on  the  evi- 
dence of  testimony,  we  acquire  by  experience  a 
degree  of  caution,  arising  from  having  been  some- 
times deceived.  In  minds  of  a  certain  description, 
this  may  be  allowed  to  produce  a  suspicion  with 
regard  to  all  evidence, — ^in  other  words,  skepticism. 


VERACITY.  73 

The  want  of  the  necessary  and  proper  caution, 
again,  leads  to  credulity.  It  is  the  part  of  a  well- 
regulated  mind  to  avoid  both  these  extremes,  by 
attentively  weighing  the  evidence  and  the  character 
of  the  witnesses,  and  giving  to  each  circumstance 
its  due  influence  in  the  conclusion. 

(2.)  Closely  connected  with  the  love  of  truth  in 
receiving,  is  the  exercise  of  veracity  in  the  state- 
ment of  facts,  whether  derived  from  our  personal 
observation,  or  received  by  testimony  from  others. 
It  consists,  not  only  in  the  most  scrupulous  accuracy 
of  relation,  but  also  in  giving  it  in  such  a  manner  as 
to  convey  a  correct  impression  to  the  hearer.  It  is 
consequently  opposed  to  all  those  methods  by  which 
either  a  false  statement  may  be  made  to  assume  the 
appearance  of  truth,  or  one  essentially  true  may  be 
so  related  as  to  convey  a  false  impression. 

Direct  fallacy  may  consist  in  the  alleged  facts 
being  absolutely  false,  or  in  some  of  them  being  so, 
— in  facts  being  wanting  or  kept  out  of  view  which 
would  give  a  different  import  to  the  whole  state- 
ment,— or  in  some  of  the  facts  being  disguised, 
distorted,  or  coloured,  so  as  to  alter  materially  the 
impression  conveyed  by  them.  But,  besides  such 
actual  fallacy,  there  are  various  methods  by  which  a 
statement  literally  true  may  be  so  related  as  to  con- 
vey an  erroneous  impression.  Facts  may  be  con- 
nected together  in  such  a  manner  as  to  give  the 
appeaiance  of  a  relation  of  cause  and  effect,  when 
they  are  in  truth  entirely  unconnected  ;  or  an 
event  may  be  represented  as  common  which  has 
G 


74  AFFECTIONS, 

occurred  only  in  one  or  two  instances.  The  char- 
acter of  an  individual  may  be  assumed  from  a  single 
act,  which,  if  the  truth  were  known,  might  be  seen 
to  be  opposed  to  his  real  disposition,  and  accounted 
for  by  the  circumstances  in  which  he  happened  at 
the  time  to  be  placed.  Events  may  be  connected 
together  which  were  entirely  disjoined,  and  con- 
clusions deduced  from  this  fictitious  connexion 
which  are,  of  course,  unfounded.  Several  of  these 
sources  of  fallacy  may  be  illustrated  by  a  ludicrous 
example. — A  traveller  from  the  Continent  has  rep- 
resented the  venality  of  the  British  House  of  Com- 
mons to  be  such,  that,  whenever  the  minister  of  the 
crown  enters  the  house,  there  is  a  general  cry  for 
"  places."  It  may  be  true  that  a  cry  of  "  places" 
has  gone  round  the  house  at  certain  times,  when 
business  was  about  to  commence,  or  to  be  resumed 
after  an  interval, — meaning,  of  course,  that  members 
were  to  take  their  seats.  It  is  very  probable,  that, 
on  some  occasion,  this  may  have  occurred  at  the 
moment  when  the  minister  entered, — so  that  the 
statement  of  the  traveller  might,  in  point  of  fact,  be 
strictly  true.  The  erroneous  impression  which  he 
endeavours  to  convey  by  it  arises  from  three  sources 
of  fallacy  which  the  anecdote  will  serve  to  illustrate  ; 
namely,  the  false  meaning  he  gives  to  the  word 
employed, — connecting  it  with  the  entrance  of  the 
minister  as  cause  and  effect, — and  representing  the 
connexion  as  uniform  which  happened  to  occur  in 
that  particular  instance.  In  the  same  manner  it 
will  appear,  that  a  false  impression  may  be  conveyed 
respecting  the  conduct  of  an  individual, — by  assign- 


VERACITY.  75 

ing  motives  which  are  entirely  imaginary, — by  con- 
necting things  together  which  have  no  relation, — by 
keeping  out  of  view  circumstances  which  would 
afford  an  explanation  or  palliation  of  his  conduct, — 
or  by  attacliing  to  his  words  a  different  meaning 
from  tliat  which  he  intended  to  convey  by  them. 
The  common  saying  that  there  are  two  ways  of 
telling  a  story  does  not  therefore  refer  to  what  is 
strictly  to  be  called  fabrication  or  falsehood ;  but 
to  those  distortions  or  colourings  of  circumstances 
which,  however  slight  in  themselves,  have  the  effect 
of  essentially  changing  the  impression  of  the  whole. 
To  veracity,  under  this  department,  we  are  also 
to  refer  the  rule — of  giving  to  others  an  honest  and 
fair  impression  of  our  views,  motives,  and  intentions. 
This  is  sincerity.  It  is  opposed  to  hypocrisy,  that 
unworthy  display  of  human  character  in  which  a 
man  disguises  his  real  sentiments,  and,  on  the  con- 
trary, professes  principles  which  he  neither  feels  nor 
values,  merely  for  the  purpose  of  promoting  his 
selfish  interests.  Such  a  character  exhibits  a  singu- 
lar combination  of  moral  delinquencies.  It  is 
founded  on  the  lowest  selfishness,  and  includes  a 
departure  from  veracity  and  honesty.  But  besides, 
it  implies  a  knowledge  of  virtuous  principles  and  of 
their  proper  tendencies,  while  there  is  a  practical 
denial  of  their  influence.  Sincerity  is  also  opposed 
to  flattery,  which  tends  to  give  a  man  a  false  im- 
pression of  our  opinion,  and  of  our  feelings  towards 
him,  and  likewise  leads  him  to  form  a  false  estimate 
of  his  own  character.  It  is  opposed  also  to  insin- 
cerity or  double-dealing,  by  which  a  man,  for  certain 


76  AFFECTIONS. 

purposes,  professes  sentiments  towards  another 
which  he  does  not  feel,  or  intentions  which  he  does 
not  entertain. 

(3.)  The  third  element  of  veracity  is  Truth  of 
Purpose,  or  fidelity  in  the  fulfilment  of  promises. 
This  is  opposed  to  actual  departure  from  what  was 
distinctly  promised ;  likewise  to  all  those  evasions 
by  which  one  may  convey  an  impression,  or  excite 
the  hope,  of  an  intention  which  he  does  not  mean  to 
fulfil, — or  avoid  the  performance  of  a  real  or  implied 
engagement  on  any  other  ground  tlian  inability  to 
perform  it.  By  this  straight-forward  integrity  of 
purpose,  an  individual  gives  a  clear  impression  of 
what  he  honestly  intends  to  perform  ;  and  performs 
it,  though  circumstances  may  have  occurred  to 
make  the  fulfilment  disagreeable  or  even  injurious  to 
himself : — "  he  sweareth  to  his  own  hurt,"  says  a 
sacred  writer,  "  and  changeth  not." 

IV.    FRIENDSHIP,  LOVE,  AND  GRATITUDE. 

These  aflTections  are  so  nearly  alHed,  that,  in  this 
slight  analysis,  they  may  be  taken  together.  They 
consist  in  a  personal  and  peculiar  attachment  to  an 
individual,  founded  either  upon  some  qualities  in 
himself,  or  some  benefits  he  has  conferred  on  us, 
or  on  some  one  in  whom  we  are  interested.  The 
feelings  and  conduct  to  which  they  give  rise  corres- 
pond with  those  referred  to  under  the  preceding 
affections,  with  this  difference,  that,  in  many  in- 
stances, they  lead  to  a  much  greater  sacrifice  of 


PATRIOTISM.  77 

personal  interest  and  comfort,  than  usually  proceeds 
either  from  justice  or  simple  benevolence.  The 
exertions  arising  out  of  them  are  directed,  according 
to  the  division  formerly  given, — to  promoting  the  in- 
terest or  comfort  of  the  object  of  our  regard, — pre- 
serving, defending,  or  advancing  his  reputation, — 
treating  his  feelings  with  peculiar  tenderness, — and 
his  failings  with  peculiar  indulgence, — receiving  his 
opinions  with  peculiar  favour, — and  anxiously  en- 
deavouring to  improve  his  intellectual  and  moral  con- 
dition. This  last  consideration  is  justly  reckoned 
the  highest  office  of  friendship  :  it  is  to  be  regretted 
that  its  operation  is  sometimes  impeded  by  another 
feeling,  which  leads  us  to  be  blind  to  the  faihngs 
and  deficiencies  of  those  whom  we  love.  In  ex- 
ercising simple  love  and  friendship,  we  rejoice  in  the 
advantage  and  happiness  of  the  object, — though  they 
should  be  accomplished  by  others, — but,  in  exercising 
gratitude,  we  are  not  satisfied  unless  they  be  efiected 
in  some  measure  by  ourselves. 

V.    PATRIOTISM. 

Patriotism  is,  perhaps,  not  properly  to  be  con- 
sidered as  a  distinct  principle  of  our  nature;  but 
rather  as  the  result  of  a  combination  of  the  other 
affections.  It  leads  us,  by  every  means  in  our 
power,  to  promote  the  peace  and  the  prosperity  of 
our  country, — and  to  discourage,  to  the  utmost  of 
our  ability,  whatever  tends  to  the  contrary.  Every 
member  of  the  community  has  something  in  his 
power  in  this  respect.  He  may  set  an  example,  in 
G2 


78  AFFECTIONS. 

his  own  person,  of  dutiful  and  loyal  respect  to  the 
first  authority,  of  strict  obedience  to  the  laws  and 
respectful  submission  to  the  institutions  of  his  coun- 
try. He  may  oppose  the  attempts  of  factious  indi- 
viduals to  sow  among  the  ignorant  the  seeds  of  dis- 
content, tumult,  or  discord.  He  may  oppose  and 
repress  attempts  to  injure  the  revenue  of  the  state ; 
may  aid  in  the  preservation  of  public  tranquillity, 
and  in  the  execution  of  public  justice.  Finally,  he 
may  zealously  exert  himself  in  increasing  the  know- 
ledge and  improving  the  moral  habits  of  the  people, 
— two  of  the  most  important  means  by  which  the 
conscientious  man,  in  any  rank  of  life,  may  aid  in 
conferring  a  high  and  permanent  benefit  on  his 
country. 

VI.    THE  DOMESTIC  AFFECTIONS. 

In  this  extensive  and  interesting  class  are  included, 
conjugal  affection, — the  parental  feelings — filial  rev- 
erence,— and  the  ties  of  brothers  and  sisters. — 
These  call  forth,  in  a  still  higher  degree,  the  feel- 
ings and  exertions  ah-eady  referred  to,  and  a  still 
greater  sacrifice  of  personal  ease,  advantage,  and 
comfort,  in  the  anxious  and  diligent  discharge  of  the 
duties  resulting  from  them.  In  the  conjugal  rela- 
tion, they  lead  us  to  the  tenderness,  the  confidence, 
the  mutual  forbearance,  the  united  exertions  of  those 
who  have  one  hope,  one  interest,  and  one  course  of 
duty.  The  parental  relation  implies  the  highest  pos- 
sible degree  of  that  feeling  which  studies  the  advan- 
tage of  the  object  of  our  care, — the  promotion  of  his 


THE    DOMESTIC   AFFECTIONS.  79 

happiness, — the  improvement  of  his  mind,  the  cul- 
ture of  his  affections, — the  formation  of  his  habits  ; 
in  short,  the  anxious  watching  over  the  develop- 
ment of  his  character,  both  as  an  intellectual  and 
a  moral  being.  The  filial  relation  requires,  in  an 
equal  degree,  respect,  affection,  submission,  and 
confidence, — a  deference  to  parental  opinion  and 
control ;  and  an  impression  that  those  parts  of  pa- 
rental management  which  may  often  be  disagree- 
able are  guided  by  a  sincere  desire  to  promote  the 
highest  interests  of  the  object  of  this  affectionate 
regard. 

Among  the  feelings  of  our  nature  "  which  have 
less  of  earth  in  them  than  heaven,"  are  those  which 
bind  together  the  domestic  circle  in  the  various  sym- 
pathies, affections,  and  duties  which  belong  to  this 
class  of  tender  relations.  It  is  beautiful  also  to  ob- 
serve how  these  affections  arise  out  of  each  other, 
and  how  the  right  exercise  of  them  tends  to  their 
mutual  cultivation.  The  father  ought  to  consider 
the  son  as,  of  all  earthly  concerns,  the  highest  object 
of  his  anxious  care  ;  and  should  watch  over  the  de- 
velopment of  his  intellectual  character,  and  the  cul- 
ture of  his  moral  feelings.  In  the  zealous  prosecu- 
tion of  this  great  purpose,  he  should  study  to  convey 
a  clear  impression  that  he  is  influenced  purely  by  a 
feeling  of  solemn  responsibility,  and  an  anxious  de- 
sire to  promote  the  highest  interests.  When  parental 
watchfulness  is  thus  mingled  with  confidence  and 
kindness,  the  son  will  naturally  learn  to  estimate  alike 
the  conduct  itself  and  the  principles  from  which  it 
sprang,  and  will  look  to  the  faithful  parent  as  his 


80  AFFECTIONS. 

safest  guide  and  counsellor,  and  most  valued  earthly 
friend.  If  we  extend  the  same  principles  to  the 
relation  between  the  m.other  and  the  daughter,  they 
apply  with  equal,  or  even  greater  force.  In  the 
arrangements  of  society,  these  are  thrown  more  con- 
stantly into  each  other's  company  ;  and  that  watch- 
ful superintendence  may  be  still  more  habitually 
exercised,  which,  along  with  the  great  concern  of 
cultivating  the  intellectual  and  moral  being,  neglects 
not  those  graces  and  delicacies  which  belong  pecu- 
liarly to  the  female  character.  It  is  not  by  direct 
instruction  alone  that,  in  such  a  domestic  circle,  the 
highest  principles  and  best  feelings  of  our  nature  are 
cultivated  in  the  minds  of  the  young.  It  is  by  the 
actual  exhibition  of  the  principles  themselves,  and  a 
uniform  recognition  of  their  supreme  importance ; 
it  is  by  a  parental  conduct,  steadily  manifesting  the 
conviction,  that,  with  every  proper  attention  to  their 
acquirements,  accomplishments,  and  the  comforts 
of  life,  the  chief  concern  of  moral  beings  relates  to 
the  life  which  is  to  come.  A  domestic  society 
•bound  together  by  these  principles  can  retire,  as  it 
were,  from  the  haunts  of  men,  and  retreat  within  a 
sanctuary  where  the  storms  of  the  world  cannot 
enter.  When  thus  met  together  in  the  interchange 
of  mutual  affection  and  mutual  confidence,  they  pre- 
sent the  anticipation  of  that  period  when,  after  the 
tumults  of  life  are  over,  they  shall  meet  again,  "  no 
wanderer  lost,  a  family  in  heaven.'- 


THE   DEFENSIVE  AFFECTIONS.  81 


THE    DEFENSIVE    AFFECTIONS. 

The  feelings  of  jealousy,  anger,  and  resentment 
are,  not  less  than  the  other  affections,  to  be  con- 
sidered as  part  of  our  moral  constitution ;  and  they 
are  calculated  to  answer  important  purposes,  pro- 
vided they  are  kept  under  the  strict  control  of  reason 
and  the  moral  principle.  Their  proper  object  is 
primarily  a  sense  of  blameable  conduct  in  others ; 
and  they  lead  us  to  use  proper  measures  for  protect- 
ing ourselves  against  such  conduct.  While  we  thus 
disapprove  of  the  character  and  conduct  of  man  in 
certain  circumstances,  we  are  led,  by  our  feelings 
of  justice  and  benevolence,  to  take  part  with  the 
injured  and  oppressed,  against  the  oppressors, — or 
to  protect  those  who  are  threatened  with  injuries,  by 
measures  for  defeating  the  schemes  of  their  enemies. 
A  still  more  refined  exercise  of  this  class  of  feelings 
leads  us  to  seek  the  reformation  of  the  offender,  and 
to  convert  him  from  an  enemy  into  a  friend. 

Resentment,  in  cases  which  concern  the  public 
peace,  naturally  leads  to  the  infliction  of  punishment ; 
the  object  of  which  is  to  prevent  similar  conduct  in 
others,  not  to  gratify  personal  vengeance.  Hence 
it  is  required  to  be  done  in  a  public  manner, — with 
proper  deliberation  and  coolness, — and  with  an  exact 
adaptation  of  the  penalty  to  the  offence,  and  to  the 
object  to  be  attained.  The  person  injured  is  not 
likely  to  do  this  with  the  requisite  impartiality  and 


82  AFFECTIONS, 

candour :  for  we  are  apt  to  feel  too  deeply  injuries 
offered  to  ourselves,  and  not  to  make  the  proper 
allowance  for  the  feelings  of  others,  and  the  circum- 
stances which  led  to  the  offence.  The  higher 
degrees,  indeed,  of  these  tendencies  usually  go 
together, — they  who  are  most  susceptible  of  ofl^ences, 
and  most  irritable  under  them,  being  generally  least 
inchned  to  make  allowances  for  others.  Hence,  in 
all  cases,  our  disapprobation  of  personal  vengeance, 
or  of  a  man  taking  the  law  into  his  own  hands  ;  and 
our  perfect  sympathy  with  the  protectors  of  the  public 
peace,  when  they  dispassionately  investigate  a  case 
of  injury,  and  calmly  adapt  their  measures  to  the  real 
object  to  be  attained  by  them, — the  protection  of  the 
public. 

The  defensive  affections  are  exercised  in  an  un- 
warranted manner  when  they  are  allowed  to  be 
excited  by  trifling  causes  ;  when  they  are,  in  degree, 
disproportioned  to  the  offence,  or  prolonged  in  a 
manner  which  it  did  not  require ;  and  when  they 
lead,  in  any  measure,  to  retaliation  or  revenge.  The 
sound  exercise  of  them,  therefore,  is  opposed  to  that 
irascibility  which  takes  fire  on  trivial  occasions,  or 
without  due  consideration  of  the  intentions  of  the 
agent,  or  the  circumstances  in  which  he  was  placed, 
— to  a  disposition  to  resentment  on  occasions  which 
do  not  warrant  it, — and,  on  all  occasions,  to  har- 
bouring the  feeling  after  the  offence  and  all  its  con- 
sequences  have  passed  over. 


INFLUENCE    OF   ATTENTION.  83 

Before  concluding  the  subject  of  the  affections, 
there  are  three  points  respecting  them  which  remain 
to  be  mentioned  as  briefly  as  possible, — the  influ- 
ence of  Attention,  combined  with  a  certain  act  of 
Imagination, — the  influence  of  Habit,^and  the  esti- 
mate of  the  feeliiig  of  Moral  Approbation  which  the 
exercise  of  the  affections  is  calculated  to  produce. 

I.  In  every  exercise  of  the  affections,  a  most 
important  influence  is  produced  by  Attention,  aided 
by  a  certain  act  of  imagination.  This  consists  in 
directing  the  mind  intensely  and  habitually  to  all  the 
considerations  which  ought  to  guide  us  in  the  par- 
ticular relation  to  which  the  affection  refers.  It  leads 
us  to  place  ourselves  in  the  situation  of  others,  and, 
with  a  kind  of  personal,  almost  selfish,  interest,  to 
enter  into  their  wants,  their  anxieties  and  their  feel- 
mgs  ;  and  thus,  in  their  place,  to  judge  of  the  emo- 
tions and  the  conduct  which  are  due  from  us  to  them. 
Such  is  the  exercise  of  one  who  wishes  to  follow  the 
great  rule  of  doing  to  others  as  he  would  that  they 
should  do  to  him.  He  is  not  satisfied  with  the 
merely  decent  discharge  of  the  duties  which  arise 
from  the  affections,  but  studies  intensely  the  require- 
ments which  attach  to  his  particular  situation, — 
searches  out  the  individuals  towards  whom  they  ought 
to  be  exercised,  and  enters  into  their  condition  and 
their  feelings  with  minute  and  tender  interest.  Many 
who  show  no  want  of  friendly  and  benevolent  affec- 
tion, when  an  individual  case  is  strongly  brought 
before  them,  are  deficient  in  the  kind  of  exercise 
which  would  lead  them,  in  this  manner,  to  find  their 


84  AFFECTIONS. 

way  to  that  correct  exercise  of  the  affections  which 
really  belongs  to  a  scene  of  moral  discipline.  Such 
an  exercise  is  adapted  to  every  situation  in  life,  and 
tends  to  guard  a  man,  in  his  various  relations,  against 
the  hinderances  which  indolence,  self-love,  and  pure 
inattention  are  apt  to  bring  in  the  way  of  his  peculiar 
duties, — and  of  his  discharging  them  with  due  regard 
to  the  feelings  of  others. 

This  mental  exercise  of  extensive  application  to 
the  benevolent  affections  constitutes  what  is  usually 
called  Sympathy.  It  is  composed  of  an  act  of  ima- 
gination and  self-love,  by  which  we  transfer  our- 
selves, as  it  were,  into  the  situation  of  other  men, 
and  thereby  regulate  our  conduct  towards  them.  It 
is  however  to  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  principle  of 
self-love,  thus  brought  into  action,  is  the  test,  not 
the  rule,  of  our  conduct.  This  is  a  point  on  which 
there  has  been  much  vague  and  useless  speculation  ; 
and,  from  not  attending  to  the  distinction,  some  have 
referred  our  ideas  of  benevolence  entirely  to  the 
principle  of  selfishness.  Such  discussions  are  equally 
unsound  and  unprofitable,  and  are  to  be  placed  on  a 
footing  with  the  speculations  of  the  scholastic  logic, 
which  we  now  look  back  upon  merely  as  matters  of 
historical  curiosity.  The  application  of  self-love  in 
the  manner  which  has  been  referred  to  is  chiefly 
useful  in  enabling  us  fully  to  appreciate  the  facts  of 
the  individual  case,  as  we  would  do  if  we  were  per- 
sonally interested.  The  rule  of  our  conduct  is  quite 
distinct  from  this,  and  rests  on  those  fundamental 
principles  of  justice  and  compassion  which  form  a 
part  of  our  moral  constitution.     In  the  practical 


INTLUENCE  OF   ATTENTION.  85 

application  of  them,  they  are  very  much  aided  by  the 
moral  principle  or  conscience. 

The  man  who  acts  habitually  under  the  influence 
of  these  rules  learns  to  question  himself  rigidly 
respecting  the  claims  and  duties  which  result  from 
his  moral  relations ;  and  the  feelings  and  circum- 
stances ofthose  with  whom  they  bring  him  into  con- 
tact. What  (he  asks  himself)  is  the  line  of  action 
which  belongs  to  me  in  regard  to  that  individual, — 
what  are  his  feelings  in  his  present  situation ;  what 
are  the  feelings  and  conduct  which  he  expects  from 
me, — and  what  are  those  which  I  would  expect  from 
him  were  I  in  his  circumstances  and  he  in  mine  1 
It  is  not  a  due  regulation  of  the  affections  alone  that 
arises  from  this  wholesome  state  of  mental  disci- 
pline. It  is  a  moral  culture  to  the  mind  itself, 
which  may  often  be  fraught  with  the  most  important 
results.  For  the  man  who  exercises  it  realizes  to 
himself  the  feelings  of  poverty, — the  agonies  of  be- 
reavement,— the  impressions  of  the  bed  of  death  ; 
and  thus,  without  the  pain  of  suffering,  he  may  reap 
a  portion  of  those  important  moral  benefits  which 
suffering  is  calculated  to  yield. 

There  is  another  view  still  to  be  taken  of  the 
advantages  derived  from  that  mental  discipline  which 
consists  in  attention  to  all  the  relations  included 
under  the  affections.  When  habitually  exercised,  it 
may  often  bring  before  the  mind  important  circum- 
stances in  our  moral  relations,  which  are  apt  to  make 
an  inadequate  impression  amid  the  distractions  of 
present  things.  T\Tien  the  parent,  for  example, 
looks  around  the  objects  of  his  tender  affection, 
H 


88  AFFECTIONS. 

what  a  new  impulse  is  communicated  by  the  thotight 
that  the  present  Ufe  is  but  the  infancy  of  their  being  ; 
and  that  his  chief  and  highest  concern  is  to  train 
them  for  immortaUty.  A  similar  impulse  must  be 
given  to  the  philanthropist,  when  he  considers  that 
the  individuals  who  share  his  benevolent  attentions 
are,  like  himself,  passing  through  a  scene  of  disci- 
pline, to  a  higher  state  of  existence,  where  they  will 
assume  a  place  corresponding  to  their  rank  in  the 
scale  of  moral  beings.  The  refined  philanthropy  thus 
arising,  while  it  neglects  no  proper  attention  to  the 
distresses  of  the  present  life,  will  seek  chiefly  to 
contend  with  those  greater  evils  which  degrade  the 
moral  nature,  and  sever  the  immortal  spirit  from  its 
God.  He  who  judges  upon  this  extended  princi- 
ple will  learn  to  form  a  new  estimate  of  the  condi- 
tion of  man.  Amid  the  pride  of  wealth  and  the 
splendour  of  power,  he  may  mourn  over  a  being  lost 
to  every  feeling  of  his  high  destiny;  and,  by  the 
death-bed  of  the  peasant,  amid  discomfort  and  suf- 
fering, he  may  contemplate  with  interest  a  purified 
spirit  rising  to  immortality. 

II.  Next  to  the  power  of  attention,  we  have  to 
notice  the  influence  produced  upon  the  affections  by 
Habit.  This  is  founded  upon  a  principle  of  our 
nature,  by  which  a  remarkable  relation  exists  be- 
tween the  affections  and  the  actions  which  arise  out 
of  them.  The  tendency  of  all  emotions  is  to  be- 
come weaker  by  repetition,  or  to  be  less  acutely  felt 
the  oftener  they  are  experienced.  The  tendency 
of  actions,  again,  as  I  have  shown  when  treating  of 


mFLUENCE    OF   HABIT.  87 

the  Intellectual  Powers,  is  to  become  easier  by  repe- 
tition,-— so  that  those  which  at  first  require  close  and 
continued  attention  come  to  be  performed  without 
effort,  and  almost  v/ithout  consciousness.  Now  an 
affection  properly  consists  of  an  emotion  leading  to 
an  action ;  and  the  natural  progress  of  the  mind,  in 
the  proper  exercise  of  the  affection,  is,  that  the  emo- 
tion becomes  less  acutely  felt  as  the  action  be- 
comes easier  and  more  familiar.  Thus,  a  scene  of 
wretchedness,  or  a  tale  of  sorrow,  will  produce  in  the 
inexperienced  an  intensity  of  emotion  not  felt  by  him 
whose  life  has  been  devoted  to  deeds  of  mercy ; 
and  a  superficial  observer  is  apt  to  consider  the 
condition  of  the  latter  as  one  of  insensibility,  pro- 
duced by  familiarity  with  scenes  of  distress.  It  is, 
on  the  contrary,  that  healtliy  and  natural  progress 
of  the  mind,  in  which  the  emotion  is  gradually  di- 
minished in  force  as  it  is  followed  by  its  proper 
actions, — that  is,  as  the  mere  intensity  of  feehng  is 
exchanged  for  the  habit  of  active  benevolence. 
But  that  this  may  take  place  in  the  sound  and 
healthy  manner,  the  emotion  must  be  steadily  fol- 
lowed by  the  action  which  belongs  to  it.  If  this  be 
neglected,  the  harmony  of  the  moral  process  is 
destroyed,  and,  as  the  emotion  becomes  weakened, 
it  is  succeeded  by  cold  insensibility  or  barren  selfish- 
ness. 

This  is  a  subject  of  much  importance, — and  there 
are  two  conclusions  which  arise  out  of  it  respecting 
the  cultivation  of  the  benevolent  affections.  The 
one  relates  to  the  bad  effects  of  fictitious  scenes  of 
sorrow,  as  represented  on  the  stage,  or  in  works  of 


88  AFFECTIONS  : 

fancy.  The  evil  arising  from  these  appears  to  be 
that  which  has  now  been  referred  to  ;  the  emotion 
is  produced  without  the  corresponding  action,  and 
the  consequence  is  hkely  to  be  a  cold  and  useless 
sentimentalism,  instead  of  a  sound  cultivation  of  the 
benevolent  affections.  The  second  is, — that,  in 
cultivating  the  benevolent  affections  in  the  young, 
we  should  be  careful  to  observe  the  process  so 
clearly  pointed  out  by  the  philosophy  of  the  moral 
feelings.  They  should  be  familiarized  with  actual 
scenes  of  suffering,  but  this  ought  to  be  accompa- 
nied by  deeds  of  minute  and  active  kindness,  so  as 
to  produce  a  full  and  lively  impression  of  the  wants 
and  feelings  of  the  sufferer.  On  this  ground,  also, 
I  think  we  should  at  first  even  abstain,  in  a  great 
measure,  from  giving  young  persons  the  cautions 
they  will  afterward  find  so  requisite  respecting  the 
characters  of  the  objects  of  their  benevolence,  and 
the  impositions  so  frequently  practised  by  the  poor. 
Suspicions  of  this  kind  might  tend  to  interfere  with 
the  important  moral  process  which  ought  to  be  our 
first  object, — the  necessary  cautions  will  afterward 
be  learned  with  little  difficulty. 

The  best  mode  of  contending  with  the  evils  of 
pauperism,  on  the  principles  of  political  economy,  is 
a  problem  on  which  I  presume  not  to  enter.  But, 
on  the  principles  of  moral  science,  a  consideration 
of  the  utmost  importance  should  never  be  forgotten, 
— the  great  end  to  be  answered  by  the  varieties  of 
human  condition  in  the  cultivation  of  the  benevolent 
affections.  Political  science  passes  its  proper  bound- 
ary when  it  is  permitted  in  any  degree  to  interfere 


MORAL  APPROBATION  DUE  TO  THEM.    89 

with  this  high  principle  ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  it 
is  not  to  be  denied  that  this  important  purpose  is  in 
a  great  measure  frustrated  by  many  of  those  institu- 
tions, which  cut  off  the  direct  intercourse  of  the 
prosperous  and  the  wealthy  with  those  whom  Pro- 
vidence has  committed  to  them,  in  this  scene  of 
moral  discipline,  as  the  objects  of  their  benevolent 


III.  The  third  point  which  remair>s  to  be  briefly 
mentioned  is  the  feeling  of  moral  approbation,  or 
rather  the  impression  of  merit,  which  is  frequently 
attached  to  the  exercise  of  the  affections.  This 
important  subject  has  been  already  referred  to.  When 
the  mother,  with  total  disregard  to  her  health  and  com- 
fort, devotes  herself  to  watching  over  her  child,  she 
is  not  influenced  by  any  sense  of  duty,  nor  do  we 
attach  to  her  conduct  the  feeling  of  moral  approba- 
tion. She  acts  simply  upon  an  impulse  within, 
which  she  perceives  to  be  a  part  of  her  constitution, 
and  which  carries  her  forward  with  unshrinking  firm- 
ness in  a  particular  course  of  laborious  and  anxious 
service.  She  may,  indeed,  be  sensible  that  the  vio- 
lation of  these  feelings  would  expose  her  to  the 
reprobation  of  her  kind ;  but  she  does  not  imagine 
that  the  zealous  fulfilment  of  them  entitles  her  to 
any  special  praise.  The  same  principle  applies  to 
all  the  aflfecfions.  They  are  a  part  of  our  moral 
constitution,  intended  to  bind  men  together  by  cer- 
tain ofiices  of  justice,  friendship,  and  compassion ; 
and  have  been  well  named  by  a  distinguished  writer, 
"  the  voice  of  God  within  us."  They  serve  a  pur- 
H  2 


90  AFFECTIONS  : 

pose  in  our  moral  economy  analogous  to  that  which 
the  appetites  answer  in  our  physical  system.  The 
appetite  of  hunger,  for  example,  ensures  a  regular 
supply  of  nourishment,  in  a  manner  which  could 
never  have  been  provided  for  by  any  process  of  rea- 
soning ;  though  an  exercise  of  reason  is  still  appli- 
cable to  preserving  over  it  a  certain  regulation  and 
control.  In  the  same  manner,  the  various  feelings 
of  our  moral  nature  have  each  a  defined  purpose  to 
answer,  both  in  respect  to  our  mental  economy  and 
our  relations  to  our  fellow-men ;  and  in  the  due 
exercise  of  them  they  ought  to  be  controlled  and 
regulated  by  the  moral  principle.  The  violation  of 
these  feelings,  therefore,  places  man  below  the  level 
of  a  moral  being ;  but  the  performance  of  them  does 
not  entitle  him  to  assume  the  claim  of  merit.  He 
is  merely  bearing  his  part  in  a  certain  arrangement, 
from  which  he  is  himself  to  derive  benefit,  as  a  being 
holding  a  place  in  that  system  of  things  which  these 
feelings  are  intended  to  keep  together  in  harmony 
and  order.  In  regard  to  the  great  principles  of 
veracity  and  justice,  every  otie  perceives  this  to  be 
true ;  but  it  applies  equally  to  the  affections  more 
strictly  benevolent.  The  man  who  lives  in  the  ha- 
bitual exercise  of  a  cold  and  barren  selfishness, 
which  seeks  only  his  own  gratification  or  interest, 
has  indeed,  in  some  sense,  his  punishment  in  the 
contempt  and  aversion  with  which  he  is  viewed  by 
his  fellow-men.  Much  more  than  this,  however, 
attaches  to  such  a  character ;  he  has  violated  the 
principles  given  him  for  his  guidance  in  the  social 
order  ;  he  has  fallen  from  his  sound  condition  as  a 


MORAL   APPROBATION   DUE    TO   THEM.  91 

moral  being  ;  and  incurs  actual  guilt  in  the  eye  of  a 
righteous  Governor,  whose  will  the  order  of  this 
lower  world  is  intended  to  obey.  But  it  by  no 
means  follows,  that  the  man  who  performs  in  a  cer- 
tain manner  the  relations  of  justice,  friendship,  and 
compassion  is  thereby  entitled  to  claim  merit  in  the 
view  of  the  Almighty  Governor  of  the  universe.  He 
merely  acts  his  part  in  the  present  system  of  moral 
economy,  for  which  he  has  been  adapted.  He  is 
so  constituted  as  to  derive  satisfaction  from  the  ex- 
ercise of  these  affections ;  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
he  receives  an  appropriate  reward  in  the  reciprocal 
exercise  of  similar  affections  by  other  men,  and  in 
the  general  harmony  of  society  which  results  from 
them.  An  extensive  culture  of  the  affections,  there- 
fore, may  go  on  without  the  recognition  of  the  moral 
principle,  or  that  state  of  mind  which  habitually  feels 
the  presence  of  the  Deity,  and  desires  to  have  the 
whole  character  in  subjection  to  his  will.  We  are 
not  entitled  to  acknowledge  the  operation  of  that 
great  principle,  unless  when  the  affections  are  exer- 
cised in  circumstances  which  imply  a  strong  and 
decided  sacrifice  of  self-love  to  the  authority  of  God. 
This  appears  to  correspond  with  the  distinction  so 
strikingly  stated  in  the  sacred  writings — "  If  ye  love 
them  which  love  you,  what  reward  have  ye  ?  do  not 
even  the  publicans  the  same  ?'  "  I  say  unto  you, 
love  your  enemies ;  bless  them  that  curse  you,  do 
good  to  them  that  hate  you,  pray  for  them  which 
despitefully  use  you  and  persecute  you." 

On  this  branch  of  the  subject  it  is  also  to  be  ob- 
se'  ved,  that  there  is  a  kind  of  compensating  power 


92  affections: 

among  the  affections  themselves,  by  which,  in  the 
intercourse  of  men,  they  act  as  checks  upon  each 
other.  Thus  resentment  acts  as  a  check  upon  injus- 
tice ;  and  the  dread  of  exciting  anger  in  others  has 
probably  an  influence,  in  preserving  the  peace  and 
harmonies  of  society,  which  we  often  ascribe  to  a 
higher  principle.  In  regard  to  the  affections  more 
strictly  benevolent,  these  are  also  influenced,  in  a 
similar  manner,  by  the  feeling  of  disapprobation 
which  attends  any  remarkable  departure  from  their 
requirements.  When  we  keep  in  mind,  along  with 
this  consideration,  the  manner  in  which  all  men  are 
influenced,  in  one  degree  or  another,  by  the  love  of 
approbation  or  regard  to  character,  we  perceive  in 
the  moral  system  a  beautiful  principle  of  compensa- 
tion, tending  to  promote  in  it  a  certain  degree  of 
harmony.  This  is  remarkably  illustrated,  for  ex- 
ample, in  the  general  feeling  of  disapprobation  which 
is  attached  to  ingratitude,  and  to  violation  of  filial 
affection  or  parental  duty,  and  even  to  any  marked 
neglect  of  the  common  calls  of  humanity.  On  the 
other  hand,  we  are  to  keep  in  mind,  that  a  man  is 
universally  considered  as  in  the  lowest  state  of  human 
nature  who,  in  these  respects,  has  become  regard- 
less of  character, — that  is,  of  the  estimation  with 
which  his  conduct  is  viewed  by  his  fellow-men. 

In  regard  to  both  the  affections  and  the  desires, 
we  are  further  to  remember  the  deep  and  extensive 
influence  upon  the  happiness  of  the  individual  him- 
self, which  results  from  a  due  regulation  of  these 
feelings  ;  the  pure  mental  enjoyment  of  him  whose 
affections  are  under  sound  regulation,  and  whose 


DUE    REGULATION    OF    THEM.  93 

desires  are  habitually  directed  to  those  objects  which 
are  in  the  highest  degree  worthy  of  being  sought 
after.  This  mental  tranquillity  is  also  represented 
to  us,  in  a  very  striking  manner,  by  the  influence  of 
those  dispositions  which  we  usually  refer  to  the  head 
of  Temper.  What  a  constant  source  of  pure  enjoy- 
ment is  a  meek  and  placid  spirit,  the  desires  of  which 
are  moderate,  and  under  due  regulation, — which  puts 
upon  every  thing  the  best  construction  it  will  admit 
\)f, — is  slow  to  take  offence, — seeks  no  distinction, — 
but  views  itself  with  humility,  and  others  with  can- 
dour, benevolence,  and  indulgence.  Such  a  dispo- 
sition makes  the  man  happy  in  himself,  and  a  source 
of  happiness  and  peace  to  all  around  him.  On  the 
other  hand,  what  an  unceasing  source  of  mental  dis- 
quiet and  turbulence  is  the  opposite  disposition, — 
jealous,  envious,  and  censorious, — ready  to  take 
offence  at  trifles,  and  often  to  construe  incidental 
occurrences  into  intended  and  premeditated  insults, 
' — prone  to  put  unfavourable  constructions  upon  the 
conduct  of  others,  and  thus  continually  to  surround 
itself  with  imaginary  enemies,  and  imaginary  neglects 
and  injuries.  Such  a  temper  is  a  continual  torment 
to  the  individual  himself,  and  the  cause  of  disputes 
and  jealousies  among  those  with  whom  he  is  con- 
nected. We  cannot  fail,  also,  to  perceive  that  the 
man  of  ill-regulated  passions  injures  his  own  true 
interest  and  happiness,  as  much  as  he  violates  his 
duty  to  others ;  and  that  his  course  of  life  is  oflen 
productive  of  degradation,  disease,  and  wretched- 
ness. In  all  this  we  see  a  beautiful  example  of  the 
wise  arrangements  of  the  Creator,  who,  in  the  strue- 


yi  AFFECTIONS : 

ture  of  our  moral  nature,  has  connected  our  own 
peace  and  happiness  with  a  state  of  feeUng  calculated 
to  promote  the  happiness  and  peace  of  all  around 
us.  We  cannot  be  at  a  loss  to  conclude  what  a 
different  scene  the  world  would  present  if  such  feel- 
ings were  universally  cultivated ;  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  we  must  observe  how  much  of  the  actual 
misery  that  exists  in  the  world  arises  from  derange- 
ment of  moral  feeling,  and  the  various  consequences 
that  result  from  it  both  to  uidividuals  and  communi- 
ties. We  find  also,  by  innumerable  examples,  the 
remarkable  influence  produced,  by  a  due  cultivation 
of  these  feelings,  in  alleviatmg,  both  in  ourselves 
and  others,  the  physical  evils  which  are  inseparable 
from  the  present  state.  It  is  further  to  be  remarked, 
as  a  fact  worthy  of  the  deepest  attention,  that  the 
only  distinct  information  conveyed  to  us  in  Scripture 
respecting  the  happiness  of  the  righteous  in  a  future 
state  is,  that  it  will  consist  chiefly  in  a  perfect 
knowledge  of  the  Divine  character,  and  a  conformity 
of  the  soul  to  the  moral  perfections  of  the  Deity. 
"  It  doth  not  yet  appear,"  says  the  sacred  writer, 
"  what  we  shall  be  ;  but  we  know  that  when  he  shall 
:;  appear,  we  shall  be  like  him,  for  we  shall  see  him 
as  he  is." 

In  concluding  the  whole  subject  of  the  affections, 
I  have  only  further  to  remark,  that  the  regulated 
state  of  the  moral  feelings,  which  has  been  the  sub- 
ject of  the  preceding  observations,  seems  to  corres- 
pond with  the  quality  so  emphatically  described  in 
the  sacred  writings  under  the  name  of  Charity.     It 


DVE    REGULATION    OF    THEM.  95 

is  there  uniformly  represented  as  the  great  test  of 
the  moral  condition ;  and  we  find  exposed  in  the 
most  striking  manner  the  worthlessness  of  all  en- 
dowments which  are  not  accompanied  by  this  regu- 
lation of  the  whole  character.  We  cannot,  there- 
fore, conclude  tliis  subject  in  a  more  appropriate 
manner  than  by  a  passage  in  which,  by  a  few  most 
powerful  expressions,  a  code  of  ethical  science  is 
laid  before  us  with  a  clearness  and  a  force  which 
put  to  naught  all  human  composition :  "  Though  I 
speak  with  the  tongues  of  men  and  of  angels,  and 
have  not  charity,  I  am  become  as  sounding  brass, 
or  a  tinkling  cymbal.  And  though  I  have  the  gift 
of  prophecy,  and  understand  all  mysteries,  and  all 
knowledge ;  and  though  I  have  all  faith,  so  that  I 
could  remove  mountains,  and  have  not  charity,  I  am 
nothing.  And  though  I  bestow  all  my  goods  to 
feed  the  poor,  and  though  I  give  my  body  to  be 
burned,  and  have  not  charity,  it  profiteth  me  nothing. 
Charity  sufFereth  long,  and  is  kind  ;  charity  envieth 
not ;  charity  vaunteth  not  itself,  is  not  puffed  up,  doth 
not  behave  itself  unseemly,  seeketh  not  her  own,  is 
not  easily  provoked,  thinketh  no  evil :  rejoiceth  not  in 
iniquity,  but  rejoiceth  in  the  truth ;  beareth  all  things, 
believeth  all  things,  hopeth  all  things,  endureth  all 
things.  Charity  never  faileth:  but  whether  there 
be  prophecies,  they  shall  fail ;  whether  there  be 
tongues,  they  shall  cease  ;  whether  there  be  know- 
ledge, it  shall  vanish  away.  For  we  know  in  part, 
and  we  prophesy  in  part.  But  when  that  which  is 
perfect  is  come,  then  that  which  is  in  part  shall  be 
done  away.     TMien  I  was  a  child,  I  spake  as  a 


96  SELF-LOVE. 

child,  I  understood  as  a  child,  I  thought  as  a  child : 
but  when  I  became  a  man  I  put  away  childish 
things.  For  now  we  see  through  a  glass,  darkly ; 
but  then  face  to  face  ;  now  I  know  in  part ;  but  then 
shall  I  know  even  as  also  I  am  known.  And  now 
abideth  faith,  hope,  charity,  these  three, — but  the 
greatest  of  these  is  charity." 


SECTION  III. 

SELF-LOVE. 


There  has  been  some  dispute  respecting  the 
term  Self-love,  both  as  to  its  general  propriety,  and 
as  to  the  mental  feelings  which  ought  to  be  referred 
to  it.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  there  is,  in  our 
constitution,  a  principle  or  propensity  which  leads  us 
to  study  our  own  interest,  gratification,  and  com- 
fort ;  and  that,  in  many  instances,  it  becomes  the 
ruUng  principle  of  the  character.  It  is  in  this  sense 
that  I  use  the  term  self-love,  without  entering  into 
any  discussion  regarding  the  strict  logical  propriety 
of  it.  Like  the  other  mental  feelings,  it  is  to  be 
considered  as  part  of  our  moral  constitution,  and  cal- 
culated to  answer  important  purposes,  provided  it  be 
kept  in  its  proper  place,  and  do  not  encroach  upon 
the  duties  and  affections  which  we  owe  to  other 
men.     When  thus  regulated,  it  constitutes  prudence. 


SELF-LOVE.  97 

or  a  just  regard  to  our  own  interest,  safety,  and 
happiness  ;  when  it  becomes  morbid  in  its  exercise, 
it  degenerates  into  selfishness. 

A  sound  and  rational  self-love  ought  to  lead  us  to 
seek  our  own  true  happiness,  and  should  prove  a 
check  upon  those  appetites  and  passions  which  inter- 
fere with  this  ;  for  many  of  them,  it  must  be  allowed, 
may  be  not  less  adverse  to  our  own  real  interest  and 
comfort  than  they  are  to  our  duty  to  other  men.  It 
should  lead  us,  therefore,  to  avoid  every  thing,  not 
only  that  is  opposed  to  our  interest,  but  that  is  cal- 
culated to  impair  our  peace  of  mind,  and  that  har- 
mony of  the  moral  feelings  without  which  there  can 
be  no  real  happiness.  This  includes  a  due  regula- 
tion of  the  desires,  and  a  due  exercise  of  the  affec- 
tions, as  a  moral  condition  which  promotes  our  own 
happiness  and  comfort.  Self-love,  viewed  in  this 
manner,  appears  to  be  placed  as  a  regulating  prin- 
ciple among  the  other  powers, — much  inferior  indeed 
to  the  great  principle  of  conscience,  so  far  as  regards 
the  moral  condition  of  the  individutl, — but  calculated 
to  answer  important  purposes  in  promoting  the  har- 
monies of  society.  The  impression  on  which  its 
influence  rests  appears  to  be  simply  the  comfort  and 
satisfaction  which  arise  to  ourselves  from  a  certain 
regulation  of  the  desires,  and  a  certain  exercise  of 
the  affections,  and  the  feelings  of  an  opposite  kind 
which  follow  a  different  conduct.  These  sources 
of  satisfaction  are  manifold.  We  may  reckon  among 
them  the  pleasure  attached  to  the  exercise  of  the 
affections  themselves,  a  feature  of  our  moral  consti 
I 


98  SELF-LOVE. 

tution  of  the  most  interesting  kind, — the  true  mental 
peace  and  enjoyment  which  spring  from  benevo- 
lence, friendship,  meekness,  forgiveness,  and  the 
whole  train  of  the  kindly  feelings, — the  gratitude  of 
those  who  have  experienced  the  effects  of  our  kind- 
ness,— the  respect  and  approbation  of  those  whose 
esteem  we  feel  to  be  valuable, — and  the  return  of 
similar  affections  and  good  offices  from  other  men. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  have  to  keep  in  mind  the 
mental  agony  and  distraction  which  arise  from  jea- 
lousy, envy,  hatred,  and  resentment, — the  sense  of 
shame  and  disgrace  which  follow  a  certain  line  of 
conduct, — and  the  distress  which  often  arises  purely 
from  the  contempt  and  disapprobation  of  our  fellow- 
men.  "  Disgrace,"  says  Butler,  "  is  as  much 
avoided  as  bodily  pain," — we  may  safely  say  that  it 
is  much  more  avoided,  and  that  it  inflicts  a  suffering 
of  a  much  more  severe  and  permanent  nature.  It 
must  likewise  accord  with  the  observation  of  every 
one,  that  among  the  circumstances  which  most  fre- 
quently injure  our  peace  and  impair  our  comfort  are 
those  which  ruffle  the  mind  by  mortifying  our  self- 
love.  There  is  also  a  feeling  of  dissatisfaction  and 
self-reproach  which  follows  any  neglect  of  a  due  ex- 
ercise of  the  affections,  and  which,  in  a  well-regu- 
lated mind,  disturbs  the  mental  tranquillity  fully  as 
much  as  the  disapprobation  of  other  men.  It  is  fur- 
ther evident,  that  the  man  of  ungovemed  passions 
and  ill-regulated  affections  impairs  his  own  peace 
and  happiness  as  much  as  he  violates  his  duties  to 
others, — for  his  course  of  life  is  productive,  not 


SELF-LOVE.  99 

only  of  degradation  in  the  eyes  of  his  fellow-men, 
but  often  of  mental  anguish,  misery,  disease,  and 
premature  death.  To  run  the  risk  of  such  con- 
sequences for  the  gratification  of  a  present  appetite 
or  passion,  is  clearly  opposed  to  the  dictates  of  a 
sound  self-love,  as  has  been  distinctly  shown  by 
Bishop  Butler ;  and  when,  in  such  a  case,  self-love 
prevails  over  an  appetite  or  passion,  we  perceive  it 
operating  as  a  regulating  principle  in  the  moral  sys- 
tem. It  does  so,  indeed,  merely  by  the  impression, 
that  a  certain  regulation' of  the  moral  feelings  is  con- 
ducive to  our  own  true  and  present  happiness  ;  and 
thus  shows  a  wonderful  power  of  compensation 
among  these  feelings,  referable  entirely  to  this 
source.  But  it  is  quite  distinct  from  the  great  prin- 
ciple of  conscience,  which  directs  us  to  a  certain 
line  of  conduct  on  the  pure  and  high  principle  of 
moral  duty,  apart  from  all  considerations  of  a  per- 
sonal nature — which  leads  a  man  to  act  upon  nobler 
motives  than  those  which  result  from  the  most  re- 
fined self-love,  and  calls  for  the  mortification  of  all 
personal  feeUngs,  when  these  interfere,  in  the  smallest 
degree,  with  the  requirements  of  duty.  This  dis- 
tinction I  conceive  to  be  of  the  utmost  practical  im- 
portance ;  as  it  shows  a  principle  of  regulation 
among  the  moral  feelings  themselves,  by  which  a 
certain  exercise  of  the  affections  is  carried  on  in  a 
manner  which  contributes  in  a  high  degree  to  the 
harmonies  of  society,  but  which  does  not  convey 
any  impression  of  moral  approbation  or  merit  that 
can  be  applied  to  the  agent. 


100  SELF-LOVE. 

Self-love,  then,  leads  us  to  consult  our  own  feel- 
ings, and  to  seek  directly  our  own  interest  and  hap- 
piness. The  affections  lead  us  to  allow  for  the 
feelings,  and  consider  the  advantage  and  comfort  of 
other  men ;  and  a  certain  balance  between  these 
principles  is  essential  to  the  healthy  state  of  the 
moral  being.  It  is  seldom  that  the  affections  are 
likely  to  acquire  an  undue  influence,  but  there  is 
great  danger  of  self-love  degenerating  into  selfish- 
ness, which  interferes  with  the  duties  we  owe  to 
others.  We  have  formerly  alluded  to  the  means, 
referable  to  the  due  exercise  of  the  affections,  and 
even  to  a  sound  and  rational  self-love,  by  which  this 
should  be  in  part  prevented.  When  these  are  not 
sufficient,  the  appeal  is  to  conscience ;  or  a  distinct 
reference  of  individual  cases  is  made  to  the  great 
principle  of  moral  rectitude.  We  find,  accordingly, 
this  principle  called  into  action  when  a  man  has 
become  sensible  of  important  defects  in  his  moral 
habits.  Thus,  we  may  see  a  man,  who  has  long 
given  way  to  a  peevish  or  irascible  disposition,  that 
is,  to  selfish  acting  upon  his  own  feelings,  without 
due  regard  to  the  feelings  of  others,  setting  himself 
to  contend  with  this  propensity  upon  the  score  of 
moral  duty ;  while  another,  of  a  placid  disposition, 
has  no  need  of  bringing  the  principle  into  action  for 
such  a  purpose.  In  the  same  manner,  a  person 
who  has  indulged  a  cold  contracted  selfishness  may, 
under  the  influence  of  the  same  great  principle,  per- 
form deeds  of  benevolence  and  kindness.  Thus  we 
perceive  that  the  moral  principle  or  sense  of  duty, 


SELF-LOVE.  101 

when  it  is  made  the  regulating  ^KiptiyQ  ol'  acitiori,  'i^^ 
calculated  to  control  self-love,  and  preserve  the 
proper  harmony  between  it  and  the  exercise  of  the 
aifections. 

When  the  principle  of  self-love  becomes  deranged 
in  its  exercise  and  objects,  it  leads  to  those  habits 
by  which  a  man  seeks  his  own  gratification  in  a  way 
which  interferes  with  his  duties  to  other  men.  This 
he  may  do  by  an  undue  pursuit  of  any  of  the  desires, 
— whether  avarice,  ambition,  love  of  eminence,  or 
love  of  fame  ;  and  the  desire  of  knowledge  itself 
may  be  so  indulged  as  to  assume  the  same  charac- 
ter. Even  deeds  of  benevolence  and  kindness  may 
be  performed  on  this  principle, — as  when  a  man,  by 
such  actions,  seeks  only  the  applause  of  the  public, 
or  the  approbation  of  certain  individuals,  from  whom, 
it  may  be,  he  expects  to  derive  advantage.  Hence 
the  value  we  attach,  in  the  exercise  of  all  the  affec- 
tions, to  what  we  call  disinterested  conduct, — to  him 
who  does  good  by  stealth,  or  who  performs  acts  of 
exalted  justice,  generosity,  or  forbearance,  under 
circumstances  which  exclude  every  idea  of  a  selfish 
motive, — or  when  self-interest  and  personal  feeling 
are  strongly  and  obviously  opposed  to  them.  Such 
conduct  commands  the  cordial  approbation  of  all 
classes  of  men ;  and  it  is  striking  to  remark  how,  in 
the  highest  conception  of  such  a  character  that  fancy 
can  delineate,  we  are  met  by  the  sublime  morality 
of  the  sacred  writings,  impressed  upon  us  by  the 
purest  of  all  motives,  the  imitation  of  him  who  is  the 
Giver  of  all  good ;  "  love  your  enemies, — bless 
12 


102  SELF-LOVE. 

tlie?ii.''th'At 'curse, you  ;« — do  good  to  them  that  hate 
you, — and  pray  for  them  which  despitefully  use  you 
and  persecute  you ;  that  ye  may  be  the  children  of 
your  Father  which  is  in  heaven ;  for  he  maketh  his 
sun  to  rise  on  the  evil  and  on  the  good,  and  sendeth 
rain  on  the  just  and  on  the  unjust."  "  If  any  man 
will  be  my  disciple,"  says  the  same  great  Author 
of  Christianity,  "  let  him  deny  himself," 


PART   11. 


OF  THE  WILL. 


Will,  or  Simple  Volition,  is  that  state  of  mind 
which  immediately  precedes  action :  we  will  a  cer- 
tain act ;  and  the  act  follows,  unless  it  be  prevented 
either  by  external  restraint  or  by  physical  inabiUty 
to  perform  it. 

The  actions  thus  produced  arise  out  of  the  mental 
emotions  formerly  treated  of, — the  desires  and  the 
affections.  We  desire  an  object,  or  we  experience 
one  of  the  affections  :  the  next  mental  act,  accord- 
ing to  the  regular  course  of  a  reflecting  mind,  is 
proposing  to  ourselves  the  question, — shall  we  gra- 
tify the  desire, — shall  we  exercise  the  affection] 
Then  follows  the  process  of  considering  or  deliber- 
ating. We  perceive,  perhaps,  a  variety  of  motives, 
considerations,  or  inducements, — some  of  which  are 
in  favour  of  gratifying  the  desire  or  exercising  the 
affection,  others  opposed  to  it.  We  therefore  pro- 
ceed to  weigh  the  relative  force  of  these  opposing 


104  THE    WILL. 

motives,  with  the  view  of  determining  which  of  them 
we  shall  allow  to  regulale  our  decision.  We  at 
length  make  up  our  mind  on  this,  and  resolve,  we 
shall  suppose,  to  do  the  act ;  this  is  followed  by  the 
mental  condition  of  willing  or  simple  volition. 

In  the  chain  of  mental  operations  which,  in  such 
a  case,  intervene  between  the  desire  and  the  voli- 
tion, a  class  of  agents  is  brought  into  view  which 
act  upon  the  mind  as  moral  causes  of  its  volitions ; 
these  are  usually  called  motives,  Or  principles  of 
action.  When  treating  of  this  subject  as  a  branch 
of  the  philosophy  of  the  intellectual  powers,  I  en- 
deavoured to  show  the  grounds  on  which  we  believe 
that  there  are  facts,  truths,  motives,  or  moral  causes 
which  have  a  tendency  thus  to  influence  the  deter- 
minations of  the  mind,  with  a  uniformity  similar  to 
that  which  we  observe  in  the  operation  of  physical 
causes.  For  the  due  operation  of  moral  causes, 
indeed,  certain  circumstances  are  required  in  the 
individual  on  whom  they  are  expected  to  operate, 
and  without  these  they  may  fail  in  their  operation. 
It  is  necessary  that  he  should  be  fully  informed  in 
regard  to  them  as  truths  addressed  to  his  under- 
standing,— that  he  direct  his  attention  to  them  with 
suitable  intensity,  and  exercise  his  reasoning  powers 
upon  their  tendencies, — and  that  he  be  himself  in  a 
certain  healthy  state  of  moral  feeling.  In  all  our 
intercourse  with  mankind,  accordingly,  we  proceed 
upon  an  absolute  confidence  in  the  uniformity  of  the 
operation  of  these  causes,  provided  we  are  ac- 
quainted with  the  moral  condition  of  the  individual. 
We  can  foretel,  for  example,  the  respective  effects 


UNIFORMITY    OF    MORAL    CAUSES.  105 

which  a  tale  of  distress  will  have  upon  a  cold- 
hearted  miser,  and  a  man  of  active  benevolence, 
with  tlie  same  confidence  with  which  we  can  predict 
the  different  actions  of  an  acid  upon  an  alkali  and 
upon  a  metal ;  and  there  are  individuals  in  regard 
to  whose  integrity  and  veracity,  in  any  situation  in 
which  they  can  be  placed,  we  have  a  confidence 
similar  to  that  with  wliich  we  rely  on  the  course  of 
nature.  In  this  manner  we  gradually  acquire,  by 
experience,  a  knowledge  of  mankind  ;  precisely  as, 
by  observation  or  experiment,  we  acquire  a  know- 
ledge of  the  operation  of  physical  agents.  We 
come  to  know,  for  example,  that  one  man  is  abso- 
lutely to  be  rehed  on  in  regard  to  a  particular  Hne 
of  conduct  in  given  circumstances  ;  and  that  another 
is  not  to  be  relied  on,  if  any  thing  should  come  in 
the  way  affecting  his  own  pleasure  or  interest.  In 
endeavouring  to  excite  various  individuals  to  the 
same  conduct  in  a  particular  case,  we  learn,  that  in 
one  we  have  to  appeal  only  to  his  sense  of  duty ; 
in  another  to  his  love  of  approbation ;  while  on  a 
third  nothing  will  make  any  impression  except  what 
bears  upon  his  interest  or  his  pleasure.  Again 
when  we  find  that,  in  a  particular  individual,  certain 
motives  or  truths  fail  of  the  effects  which  we  have 
observed  them  to  produce  in  others,  we  endeavour  to 
impress  them  upon  his  mind,  and  to  rouse  his  atten- 
tion to  their  bearings  and  tendencies ;  and  this  we 
do  from  the  conviction,-  that  these  truths  have  a 
certain  uniform  tendency  to  influence  the  volitions 
of  a  moral  being,  provided  he  can  be  induced 
seriously  to  attend  to  them,  and  provided  he  is  in 


106  THE    WILL  : 

that  moral  condition  which  is  required  for  their 
efficiency. 

In  all  such  cases,  which  are  familiar  to  every 
one,  we  recognise,  therefore,  a  uniform  relation 
between  certain  moral  causes  or  motives,  and  the 
determinations  of  the  human  mind  in  willing  certain 
acts.  It  is  no  objection  to  this  that  men  act  in 
very  different  ways  with  the  same  motives  before 
them  ;  for  this  depends  upon  their  own  moral  con- 
dition. When  treating  of  the  intellectual  powers,  I 
alluded  to  the  metaphysical  controversies  connected 
with  this  subject,  and  I  do  not  mean  to  recur  to 
them  here.  Our  present  object  is  entirely  of  a 
practical  nature, — namely,  to  investigate  the  circum- 
stances which  are  required  for  the  due  operation  of 
motives  or  moral  causes,  and  the  manner  in  which 
the  moral  feelings  may  be  so  deranged  that  these 
fail  of  producing  their  natural  or  proper  effects. 

Let  us,  then,  suppose  an  individual  deliberating 
in  regard  to  the  line  of  conduct  he  shall  pursue  in  a 
particular  case  ;  the  circumstances  or  impressions 
which  are  calculated  to  act  upon  him  as  moral 
causes  in  determining  his  volition, — that  is,  in 
deciding  his  conduct, — are  chiefly  the  following. 
(1.)  Self-love,  which  prompts  him  to  seek  his  own 
ease,  interest,  or. gratification.  (2.)  Certain  affec- 
tions which  lead  him  to  take  into  view  duties  which 
he  owes  to  other  men  ;  such  as  justice,  benevo- 
lence, &c.  (3.)  The  impression  of  moral  rectitude 
or  moral  responsibility.  This  is  derived  from  the 
great  principle  of  conscience,  aided  by  the  truths  of 


PRINCIPLES    WHICH    REGULATE    IT.  107 

religious  belief.  (4.)  We  ought  to  add  reason  or 
judgment,  which  leads  him  to  perceive  certain  tend- 
encies of  actions,  apart  from  their  moral  aspect. 
Now,  in  deciding  on  his  conduct  in  any  particular 
instance,  one  man  makes  every  thing  bend  to  his 
own  interest  or  pleasure,  with  little  regard  to  the 
interests  of  others ;  unless  in  so  far  as  the  absolute 
requirements  of  justice  are  concerned,  the  infringe- 
ment of  which  might  expose  him  to  loss  of  repu- 
tation, or  even  to  punishment.  Another  surrenders 
a  certain  portion  of  his  personal  gratification  to  the 
advantage  or  comfort  of  others,  purely  as  an  exer- 
cise of  feeling  from  which  he  experiences  satisfac- 
tion; influenced  also,  probably,  in  some  measure, 
by  a  regard  to  character,  or  the  love  of  approbation. 
In  such  a  man,  it  becomes,  in  individual  instances, 
a  matter  of  calculation,  what  degree  of  the  sacrifice 
of  personal  ease,  interest,  or  feeling  is  to  be  made 
to  this  principle  of  action.  A  third  contemplates 
the  case  purely  as  one  of  duty  or  moral  responsi- 
bility, and  acts  upon  this  principle,  though  it  may 
involve  a  degree  of  personal  exertion,  or  a  sacrifice 
of  personal  feeling,  in  itself  disagreeable  or  even 
injurious  to  him  ;  that  is,  though  the  strongest  per- 
sonal motives  would  lead  to  a  different  conduct. 
Let  the  case,  again,  refer  to  one  of  the  desires, 
bearing  no  immediate  relation  to  the  interests  of 
other  men.  One  man  goes  directly  into  the  grati- 
fication of  it,  without  any  consideration.  Another, 
who  feels  the  same  desire,  considers  the  influence 
which  the  indulgence  would  be  likely  to  have  on  his 
health,  interest,  or  reputation.     This  may  be  con- 


108  THE    WILL* 

sidered  as  simply  an  exercise  of  judgment,  com** 
bined  with  a  certain  operation  of  self-love.  A  third 
views  the  aspect  of  the  deed  purely  as  a  question  of 
moral  responsibility, — and,  if  he  sees  cause,  decides 
against  it  on  this  ground  alone :  though  he  should 
perceive  that  it  might  be  gratified  without  any  dan- 
ger to  his  health,  interest,  or  reputation,  or  even 
that  it  might  contribute  to  his  advantage. 

We  have  thus  presented  to  us  three  characters  ; 
one  who  acts  upon  the  high  and  pure  ground  of 
moral  principle  ;  one  who  acts  from  motives  of  a 
more  contracted  and  personal  nature,  though,  in 
certain  instances,  his  conduct  may  be  the  same ; 
and  one  who  goes  straight  forward  to  the  gratifica- 
tion of  a  ruling  desire  or  governing  propensity, 
without  attending  to  motives  of  either  class.  The 
first  is  a  uniform  character,  on  whose  conduct  we 
depend  in  any  given  circumstances,  with  a  con- 
fidence similar  to  that  with  which  we  rely  on  the 
operation  of  physical  agents.  For  we  know  the 
Uniform  tendencies  of  the  motives  or  moral  causes 
by  which  he  is  habitually  influenced,  and  we  know 
his  moral  temperament.  We  have  nearly  the  same 
kind  of  knowledge  respecting  him  which  we  have 
of  the  tendencies  of  chymical  agents  towards  each 
other,  and  which  enables  us  with  perfect  confidence* 
to  foretel  their  actions.  The  third  has  also  a  uni- 
formity of  conduct,  though  of  a  very  different  kind. 
We  know,  likewise,  his  moral  condition,  and,  to 
predict  his  conduct,  we  require  only  to  learn  the 
particular  inducements  or  temptations  to  which  he  is 
exposed  in  a  given  instance.     The  second  we  can- 


m^LUENCE    OF    KNOWLEDGE.  109 

not  rely  or  calculate  upon  ;  for  we  have  not  the 
means  of  tracing  the  conflicting  views  by  which  he 
may  be  influenced  in  a  particular  case,  or  the  prin- 
ciple on  which  he  may  ultimately  decide  between 
them.  They  involve  the  strength  of  the  inclina- 
tion, and  the  degree  of  power  exerted  over  it  by 
the  class  of  personal  or  selfish  motives  by  which  he 
is  influenced.  In  regard  to  various  instances  of 
ill-regulated  desire,  we  must  add  his  hope  of  evading 
detection,  as  on  this  depends  in  a  great  measure 
the  kind  of  evils  dreaded  by  him  in  reference  to  the 
indulgence.  These  taken  together  imply  a  com- 
plicated process  of  moral  calculation,  of  which  it  is 
impossible  for  another  man  to  trace  the  result. 

There  cannot  be  an  inquiry  of  more  intense  in- 
terest than  to  investigate  the  causes  in  which  ori- 
ginate the  diflTerences  among  these  three  characters  ; 
or,  in  other  words,  the  principles  on  which  we  can 
explain  the  fact,  that  the  will  of  individuals  may  be 
influenced  so  differently  with  the  same  motives 
before  them.  These  appear  to  be  referable  to 
three  heads, — Knowledge, — Attention, — and  Moml 
Habits. 

I.  A  primary  and  essential  element,  in  the  due 
regulation  of  the  will  is  a  correct  knowledge  of  the 
truths  and  motives  which  tend  to  influence  its  deter» 
minations.  The  highest  class  of  these  comprehends 
the  truths  of  religious  belief, — a  series  of  moral 
causes,  the  tendencies  of  which  are  of  the  most  im- 
portant kind,  and  calculated  to  exert  a  uniform  influ* 
tence  upon  every  man  who  surrenders  himself  to 
K 


110  THE    WILL. 

their  guidance.  For  this  purpose,  a  correct  know- 
ledge of  them  is  required ;  and  to  all  who  have  this 
knowledge  within  their  reach  the  careful  acquisition 
involves  a  point  of  the  deepest  moral  responsibility. 
The  sacred  writers  speak  in  the  strongest  terms  of 
the  guilt  attached  to  voluntary  ignorance  :  and  this 
must  be  obvious  to  every  one  who  considers  the 
clearness  with  which  the  highest  truths  are  disclosed, 
and  the  incontrovertible  evidence  by  which  they  are 
supported.  This  applies  equally  to  the  principles 
both  of  natural  and  of  revealed  religion.  The  im- 
portant truths  of  natural  religion  are  partly  matters 
of  the  most  simple  induction  from  the  phenomena 
of  nature  which  are  continually  before  us,  and 
partly  impressed  upon  our  own  moral  constitution 
in  the  clearest  and  most  forcible  manner.  From 
the  planet  revolving  in  its  appointed  orbit,  to  the 
economy  of  the  insect  on  which  we  tread,  all  nature 
demonstrates,  with  a  power  which  we  cannot  put 
away  from  us,  the  great  incomprehensible  One,  a 
being  of  boundless  perfections  and  infinite  wisdom. 
In  regard  to  his  moral  attributes,  also,  he  has  not 
left  himself  without  a  witness  ;  for  a  sense  of  these 
he  has  impressed  upon  us  in  the  clearest  manner 
in  that  wondrous  part  of  our  constitution — the 
moral  principle  or  conscience.  From  these  two 
sources  may  be  derived  a  knowledge  of  the  char- 
acter of  the  Deity,  and  of  our  relation  to  him  as 
moral  beings  ;  and  the  man  is  left  entirely  without 
excuse  who  fails  to  direct  to  them  his  most  earnest 
attention,  and  to  make  the  impressions  derived  from 
them  the  habitual  rule  of  his  volitions,  and  the  guide 


INEUIilNCii   OP   KmrHlEIEEE.  Ill 

of  his  whole  character.  "  He  hath  the  rule  of  right 
within,"  says  an  eminent  writer,  "  all  that  is  wanting 
is,  that  he  honestly  attend  to  it." 

Similar  observations  apply  with  equal  or  greater 
force  to  the  truths  of  revealed  religion.  These  are 
supported  by  a  weight  of  miraculous  evidence,  and 
are  transmitted  to  us  by  a  chain  of  testimony,  car- 
rying absolute  conviction  to  the  mind  of  every 
candid  inquirer.  They  are  further  confirmed  by  a 
probability,  and  a  force  of  internal  evidence,  which 
fix  themselves  upon  the  moral  feelings  of  every 
sound  understanding  with  a  power  which  is  irresisti- 
ble. The  whole  is  addressed  to  us  as  rational 
beings  ;  it  is  pressed  upon  our  attention  as  creatures 
destined  for  another  state  of  existence  ;  and  the  duty 
is  imposed  upon  every  individual  seriously  to  ex- 
amine and  to  consider.  Every  man  is  in  the 
highest  degree  responsible  for  the  care  with  which 
he  has  informed  himself  of  these  evidences,  and  for 
the  attention  with  which  he  has  given  to  every  part 
of  them  its  due  weight  in  the  solemn  inquiry.  He 
is  further  responsible  for  the  influence  of  any  pre- 
viously formed  prejudice,  or  any  degree  of  that 
vitiated  state  of  his  moral  feelings,  which  prevents 
him  from  approaching  the  subject  with  the  simplicity 
of  an  uncontaminated  mind.  From  the  want  of 
these  essential  elements  of  character,  it  may  very 
often  happen  that  a  man  may  fancy  he  has  formed 
his  opinions  after  much  examination,  while  the  result 
of  his  prejudiced  or  frivolous  inquiry  has  been  only 
to  fix  him  in  delusion  and  falsehood.  Among  the 
singular  sophistries,  indeed,  by  which  some  men 


112  THE    WILL. 

shut  their  minds  against  inquiries  of  the  highest  im- 
port, is  a  kind  of  impression,  not  perhaps  distinctly 
avowed  in  words,  but  clearly  recognised  in  practice, 
that  these  subjects  of  belief  are  in  a  great  measure 
matters  of  opinion, — ^instead  of  being  felt  to  rest 
upon  the  basis  of  immutable  and  eternal  truth.  Can 
any  thing  be  more  striking  than  the  manner  in  which 
a  late  distinguished  poet  expresses  himself  on  the 
subject  of  a  future  life  ;  as  if  this  truth  were  a  mere 
opinion  which  could  be  taken  up  or  laid  down  at 
pleasure,  to  suit  the  taste  of  the  individual  inquirer. 
"  Of  the  two,  I  should  think  the  long  sleep  better 
than  the  agonized  vigil.  But  men,  miserable  as 
they  are,  cUng  so  to  any  thing  like  life,  thai  they 
probably  would  prefer  damnation  to  quiet.  Besides, 
they  think  themselves  so  important  in  the  creation, 
that  nothing  less  can  satisfy  their  pride, — the  in- 
sects I"'-^  Such  is  the  frivolous  sophistry  by  which 
one  who  holds  a  high  rank  in  the  hteratUre  of  his 
country  could  put  away  from  him  the  most  momen- 
tous inquiry  that  can  engage  the  attention  of  a 
rational  being. 

II.  Next  to  the  acquisition  of  knowledge,  and 
the  formation  of  opinions,  calculated  to  act  upon  us 
as  moral  beings,  is  the  important  rule  of  habitually 
attending  to  them,  so  as  to  bring  their  influence  to 
bear  upon  our  volitions.  He  who  honestly  attends 
to  what  is  passing  within  will  perceive  that  this  is 
a  voluntary  exercise  of  his  thinking  and  reasoning 
faculties.  When  a  particular  desire  is  present  to 
♦  Byron's  Letters,  Moore's  Life,  vol  ii,  p.  581, 


INFLUENCE    OP    ATTENTION.  113 

his  mind,  he  has  the  power  to  act  upon  the  first  im- 
pulse, or  upon  a  very  partial  and  limited,  perhaps  a 
distorted,  view  of  the  considerations  and  motives  by 
which  he  ought  to  be  influenced  ;  and  he  has  the 
power  to  suspend  acting,  and  direct  his  attention 
deliberately  and  fully  to  the  facts  and  principles 
which  are  calculated  to  guide  his  determination. 
This  is  the  first  great  step  in  that  remarkable  chain 
of  sequences  which  belong  to  the  regulation  of  the 
will.  It  is  what  every  one  is  conscious  of;  and, 
putting  aside  all  those  metaphysical  subtleties  in 
which  the  subject  has  been  involve^,  this  constitutes 
man  a  free  and  responsible  agent.  In  this  import- 
ant process,  the  first  mental  state  is  a  certain  move- 
ment of  one  of  the  desires  or  one  of  the  affections  ; 
to  prevent  circumlocution,  we  may  use  the  term 
Inclination,  as  including  both.  The  second  is  a 
reference  of  the  inclination  to  the  moral  causes  or 
motives  which  more  peculiarly  apply  to  it, — espe- 
cially the  indications  of  conscience  and  the  prin- 
ciples of  moral  rectitude.  If  these  be  found  to  har- 
monize with  the  inclination,  volition  and  action  fol- 
low, with  the  full  concurrence  of  every  moral  feel- 
ing. If  the  inclination  be  condemned  by  these,  it 
is,  in  a  well-regulated  mind,  instantly  dismissed, 
and  the  healthy  condition  of  the  moral  being  is  pre- 
served. But  this  voluntary  and  most  important 
mental  process  may  be  neglected ;  the  inclination 
may  be  suffered  to  engross  the  mind  and  occupy 
fully  the  attention  :  the  power  may  not  be  exercised 
of  directing  it  to  moral  causes  and  motives,  and  of 
comparing  with  them  the  inclination  which  is  present. 
K2 


114  THE    WILL. 

The  consequence  may  be,  that  the  man  runs  heed- 
lessly into  volition  and  action,  from  which  the  due 
exercise  of  this  process  of  the  mind  might  have  pre- 
served him. 

But  a  third  condition  may  take  place,  which  pre- 
sents a  subject  of  the  highest  interest.  The  moral 
causes  may  be  so  far  attended  to  as  to  prevent  the 
inclination  from  being  followed  by  action ;  while 
the  inclination  is  still  cherished,  and  the  mind  is 
allowed  to  dwell,  with  a  certain  feeling  of  regret,  on 
the  object  which  it  had  been  obliged  to  deny  itself. 
Though  the  actual  deed  be  thus  prevented,  the  har- 
mony of  the  moral  feelings  is  destroyed  ;  and  that 
mental  condition  is  lost  which  is  strictly  to  be  called 
purity  of  heart.  Eotibis^consists  in  the  desires  an^l 
affections,  as  well  as  the  conduct,  being  in  strict 
subjection  to  the  indications  of  conscience'^and  the 
principles  of  moral  rectitude.  The  inclination,  thus 
cherished,  gradually  acquires  greater  ascendency 
over  the  moral  feelings ;  at  each  succeeding  con- 
test, it  more  and  more  occupies  the  mind  ;  the  atten- 
tion is  less  and  less  directed  to  the  moral  truths  and 
motives  which  are  opposed  to  it ;  the  inclination  at 
length  acquires  the  predominance,  and  is  followed 
by  volition.  This  is  what  we  mean  by  a  man  being 
carried  away  by  passion,  in  opposition  to  his  moral 
conviction ;  for  passion  consists  in  a  desire  or  an 
affection  which  has  been  allowed  to  engross  the 
mind,  until  it  gradually  overpowers  the  moral  causes 
which  are  calculated  to  counteract  its  influence. 
Now  in  the  whole  of  this  course  each  single  move- 
ment of  the  mind  is  felt  to  be  entirely  voluntary. 


INFLUENCE    OP   ATTENTION.  116 

From  that  step,  which  constitutes  the  first  departure 
from  moral  purity,  the  process  consists  in  a  desire 
being  cherished  which  the  moral  feelings  condemn ; 
while,  at  each  succeeding  step,  the  influence  of 
these  feelings  is  gradually  weakened,  and  finally 
destroyed.  Such  is  the  economy  of  the  human 
heart,  and  such  the  chain  of  sequences  to  be  traced 
in  the  moral  history  of  every  man,  who,  with  a  con- 
viction upon  his  mind  of  what  is  right,  has  followed 
the  downward  course  which  gradually  led  him 
astray  from  virtue.  When  we  trace  such  a  process 
backwards  in  a  philosophical  point  of  view,  the 
question  still  recurs, — what  was  the  first  step,  or 
that  by  which  the  mind  was  led  into  the  course 
which  thus  terminated  in  favour  of  vice.  In  the 
wonderful  chain  of  sequences  which  has  been  estab- 
lished in  the  mental  constitution,  it  would  appear, 
that  a  very  slight  movement  only  is  required  for 
deranging  the  deHcate  harmony  which  ought  to  exist 
among  the  moral  feelings  ;  but  this  each  individual 
feels  to  be  entirely  voluntary.  It  may  consist  in  a 
desire  being  cherished  which  the  moral  feelings  dis- 
approve ;  and,  though  the  effect  at  first  may  be 
small,  a  morbid  influence  has  arisen,  which  gains 
strength  by  continuance,  and  at  last  acquires  the 
power  of  a  moral  habit.  The  more  the  desire  is 
cherished,  the  less  is  the  attention  directed  to  the 
considerations  or  moral  causes  by  which  it  might  be 
counteracted.  According  to  the  mental  economy, 
these  causes,  in  this  manner,  gradually  lose  their 
power  over  the  volitions  or  determinations  of  the 
mind ;  and,  at  a  certain  period  of  this  progress,  the 


116  THE    WILL. 

judgment  itself  comes  to  be  changed  respecting  the 
moral  aspect  of  the  deed. 

There  is  still  another  mental  condition  to  be 
mentioned  in  connexion  with  this  subject ;  in  which 
the  harmony  of  the  moral  feelings  may  be  destroyed, 
without  the  action  following.  This  takes  place 
when  the  inclination  is  cherished,  as  in  the  former 
case,  in  opposition  to  the  indications  of  conscience  ; 
while  the  action  is  opposed  by  some  inferior  motives, 
— as  a  regard  to  reputation  or  interest.  The  deed 
may  thus  be  prevented,  and  the  interests  of  society 
may  benefit  by  the  difference  ;  but,  so  far  as  regards 
the  individual  himself,  the  disruption  of  moral  har- 
mony is  the  same ;  and  his  moral  aspect  must  be 
similar  in  the  eye  of  the  Almighty  One,  who  regards 
not  the  outward  appearance  alone,  but  who  looketh 
into  the  heart.  In  this  manner  it  may  very  often 
happen,  that  strong  inducements  to  vice  are  resisted 
from  motives  referring  merely  to  health,  or  to  char- 
acter. But  this  is  not  to  overcome  temptation, — 
it  is  only  to  balance  one  selfish  feeling  against 
another. 

III.  From  the  state  of  mind  which  has  now  been 
referred  to,  there  gradually  results  a  Moral  Habit, 
This  is  a  mental  condition,  in  which  a  desire  or  an 
affection,  repeatedly  acted  upon,  is,  after  each  repe- 
tition, acted  upon  with  less  and  less  effort ;  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  a  truth  or  moral  principle,  which  has 
been  repeatedly  passed  over  without  adequate  atten- 
tion, after  every  such  act  makes  less  and  less  im- 
pression, until  at  length  it  ceases  to  exert  any  influ- 


INFLUENCE  OF  HABIT.  117 

ence  over  the  moral  feelings  or  the  conduct.  I  had 
occasion  to  illustrate  this  remarkable  principle  in 
another  point  of  view,  when  treating  of  the  connexion 
between  the  emotions  of  sympathy  and  benevolence, 
and  the  conduct  wliich  naturally  arises  out  of  them. 
This  conduct  at  first  may  require  a  certain  effort, 
and  is  accompanied  by  a  strong  feeling  of  the  emo- 
tion which  leads  to  it.  But,  after  each  repetition 
the  acts  go  on  with  less  feeling  of  the  emotion,  and 
less  reference  to  the  principle  from  which  they  spring ; 
while  there  is  progressively  forming  the  habit  of 
active  benevolence.  It  is  precisely  the  same  'with 
habits  of  vice.  At  first  a  deed  requires  an  effort, — 
and  a  powerful  contest  with  moral  principles  ;  and 
it  is  speedily  followed  by  that  feeling  of  regret  to 
which  superficial  observers  give  the  name  of  repent- 
ance. This  is  the  voice  of  conscience ;  but  its 
power  is  more  and  more  diminished  after  each  repe- 
tition of  the  deed;  even  the  judgment  becomes 
perverted  respecting  the  first  great  principles  of 
moral  rectitude  ;  and  acts  which  at  first  occasioned 
a  violent  conflict  are  gone  into  without  remorse,  or 
almost  without  perception  of  their  moral  aspect.  A 
man  in  this  situation  may  still  retain  the  knowledge 
of  truths  and  principles  which  at  one  time  exerted 
an  influence  over  his  conduct ;  but  they  are  now 
matters  of  memory  alone.  Their  power  as  moral 
causes  is  gone,  and  even  the  judgment  is  altered  re- 
specting their  moral  relations.  He  views  them  novf 
perhaps  as  the  superstitions  of  the  vulgar,  or  the 
prejudices  of  a  contracted  education  ;  and  rejoices, 
it  may  be,  in  his  emancipation  from  their  authority 


118  THE    WILL. 

He  knows  not, — for  he  has  not  the  moral  perception 
now  to  know,  that  he  has  been  pursuing  a  downward 
course,  and  that  the  issue,  on  which  he  congratulates 
himself,  consists  in  his  last  degradation  as  a  moral 
being.  Even  in  this  state  of  moral  destitution,  in- 
deed, the  same  warning  principle  may  still  raise  its 
voice, — unheeded,  but  not  subdued, — repelled  as  an 
enemy,  not  admitted  as  a  friendly  monitor  and  guide. 
"  I  have  not  the  smallest  influence  over  Lord  Byron, 
in  this  particular,"  writes  one  of  the  chosen  friends 
of  that  distinguished  individual :  "  if  I  had,  I  cer- 
tainly should  employ  it  to  eradicate  from  his  great 
mind  the  delusions  of  Christianity,  which,  in  spite  of 
his  reason,  seem  perpetually  to  recur,  and  to  lie  in 
ambush  for  the  hours  of  sickness  and  distress."  It 
would  be  interesting  to  know  what  the  particular 
impressions  were  from  which  this  sympathizing 
friend  was  anxious  to  rescue  the  poet.  They  were 
probably  the  suggestions  of  a  power  within,  which, 
in  certain  seasons  of  reflection,  compelled  his  atten- 
tion in  spite  of  his  attempts  to  reason  against  it, — 
pleading  with  authority  for  a  present  Deity  and  a  life 
to  come. 

The  principle  of  Habit,  therefore,  holds  a  most 
important  place  in  the  moral  condition  of  every  man  ;" 
and  it  applies  equally  to  any  species  of  conduct,  or 
any  train  of  mental  operations,  which,  by  frequent 
repetition,  have  become  so  familiar  as  not  to  be  ac- 
companied by  a  recognition  of  the  principles  from 
which  they  originally  sprang.  In  this  manner  good 
habits  are  continued  without  any  immediate  sense  of 
the  right  principles  by  which  they  were  formed  ;  but 


INFLUENCE    OF   HABIT.  119 

they  arose  from  a  frequent  and  uniform  acting  upon 
these  principles,  and  on  this  is  founded  the  moral 
approbation  which  we  attach  to  habits  of  this  descrip- 
tion. In  the  same  manner  habits  of  vice,  and  habits 
of  inattention  to  any  class  of  duties,  are  perpetuated 
without  a  sense  of  the  principles  and  affections  which 
they  violate  ;  but  this  arose  from  a  frequent  viola- 
tion of  these  principles,  and  a  frequent  repulsion  of 
these  affections,  until  they  gradually  lost  their  power 
over  the  conduct ;  and  in  this  consists  the  guilt  of 
habits.  Thus,  one  person  acquires  habits  of  benevo- 
lence, veracity,  and  kindness, — of  minute  attention 
to  his  various  duties, — of  correct  mental  discipUne, 
and  active  direction  of  his  thoughts  to  all  those  ob- 
jects of  attention  which  ought  to  engage  a  well 
regulated  mind  :  another  sinks  into  habits  of  list- 
less vacuity  or  frivolity  of  mind, — of  vicious  indul- 
gence and  contracted  selfishness, — of  neglect  of  im- 
portant duties,  disregard  to  the  feelings  of  others,  and 
total  indifference  to  all  those  considerations  and  pur- 
suits which  claim  the  highest  regard  of  every  responsi- 
ble being  ;  and  the  striking  fact  is,  that,  after  a  certain 
period,  all  this  may  go  on  without  a  feeling  that 
aught  is  wrong  either  in  the  moral  condition  or  the 
state  of  mental  discipline  :  such  is  the  power  of  a 
moral  habit. 

The  important  truth,  therefore,  is  deserving  of  the 
deepest  and  most  habitual  attention,  that  character 
consists  in  a  great  measure  in  habits, — and  that 
habits  arise  out  of  individual  actions  and  individual 
operations  of  the  mind.  Hence  the  importance  of 
carefully  weighing  every  action  of  our  lives,  and 


120  THE    WILL. 

every  train  of  thought  that  we  encourage  in  our 
minds  ;  for  we  never  can  determine  the  effect  of  a 
single  act,  or  a  single  mental  process,  in  giving  that 
influence  to  the  character,  or  to  the  moral  condition, 
the  result  of  which  shall  be  decisive  and  permanent. 
In  the  whole  history  of  habits,  indeed,  we  see  a  won- 
drous display  of  that  remarkable  order  of  sequences 
which  has  been  established  in  our  mental  constitu- 
tion, and  by  which  every  man  becomes,  in  an  import- 
ant sense,  the  master  of  his  own  moral  destiny.  For 
each  act  of  virtue  tends  to  make  him  more  virtuous ; 
-—and  each  act  of  vice  gives  new  strength  to  an  in- 
fluence within,  which  will  certainly  render  him  more 
and  more  vicious. 

These  considerations  have  a  practical  tendency  of 
the  utmost  interest.  In  subduing  habits  of  an  inju- 
rious character,  the  laws  of  mental  sequences,  which 
have  now  been  referred  to,  must  be  carefully  acted 
upon.  When  the  judgment,  influenced  by  the  indi- 
cations of  conscience,  is  convinced  of  the  injurious 
nature  of  the  habit,  the  attention  must  be  steadily  and 
habitually  directed  to  this  impression.  There  will 
thus  arise  desire  to  be  delivered  from  the  habit, — or, 
in  other  words,  to  cultivate  the  course  of  action  that 
is  opposed  to  it.  This  desire,  being  cherished  in  the 
mind,  is  then  made  to  bear  upon  every  indivi(Jual 
case  in  which  a  propensity  is  felt  towards  particular 
actions,  or  particular  mental  processes,  referable  to 
the  habit.  The  new  inclination  is  at  first  acted  upon 
with  an  effort,  but,  after  every  instance  of  success, 
less  effort  is  required,  until  at  length  the  new  course 
of  action  is  confirmed,  and  overpowers  the  habit  to 


INFLUENCE    OF   HABIT*  121 

wliich  it  was  opposed.  But  that  this  result  may 
take  place,  it  is  necessary  that  the  mental  process  be 
followed  in  the  manner  distinctly  indicated  by  the 
pliilosophy  of  the  moral  feelings  :  for,  if  this  is  not 
attended  to,  the  expected  effect  may  not  follow,  even 
under  circumstances  which  appear,  at  first  sight,  most 
likely  to  produce  it.  On  this  principle  we  are  to  ex- 
plain the  fact,  that  bad  habits  may  be  long  suspended 
by  some  powerful  extrinsic  influence,  while  they  are 
in  no  degree  broken.  Thus,  a  person  addicted  to 
intemperance  will  bind  himself  by  an  oath  to  abstain, 
for  a  certain  time,  from  intoxicating  liquors.  In  an 
instance  which  has  .been  related  to  me,  an  individual 
under  this  process  observed  the  most  rigid  sobriety 
for  five  years, — but  was  found  in  a  state  of  intoxica- 
tion the  very  day  afler  the  period  of  abstinence 
expired.  In  such  a  case  the  habit  is  suspended  by 
the  mere  influence  of  the  oath ;  but  the  desire  con- 
tinues unsubdued,  and  resumes  all  its  former  power 
whenever  this  artificial  restraint  is  withdrawn.  The 
effect  is  the  same  as  if  the  man  had  been  in  con- 
finement during  the  period,  or  had  been  kept 
from  his  favourite  indulgence  by  some  other  restraiat 
entirely  of  an  external  kind :  the  gratification  was 
prevented,  but  his  moral  nature  continued  un- 
changed. 

These  principles  may  be  confidently  stated  as 
facts  in  the  moral  constitution  of  man,  challenging 
the  assent  of  every  candid  observer  of  human  nature. 
Several  conclusions  seem  to  arise  out  of  them,  of 
the  utmost  practical  importance.  We  perceive,  in 
L 


122  THE    WILL. 

the  first  place,  a  state  which  the  mind  may  attain,  in 
which  there  is  such  a  disruption  of  its  moral  harmony, 
that  no  power  appears  in  the  mind  itself  capable  of 
restoring  it  to  a  healthy  condition.  This  important 
fact  in  the  philosophy  of  human  nature  has  been  clearly 
recognised,  from  the  earliest  ages,  on  the  mere  prin- 
ciples of  human  science.  It  is  distinctly  stated  by 
Aristotle  in  his  Nicomachean  Ethics,  where  he  draws 
a  striking  comparison  between  a  man  who,  being  first 
misled  by  sophistical  reasonings,  has  gone  into  a  life 
of  voluptuousness  under  an  impression  that  he  was 
doing  no  wrong, — and  one  who  has  followed  the 
same  course  in  opposition  to  his  own  moral  convic- 
tions. The  former,  he  contends,  might  be  reclaimed 
by  argument ;  but  the  latter  he  considers  as  incura- 
ble. In  such  a  state  of  mind,  therefore,  it  follows, 
by  an  induction  which  cannot  be  controverted,  either 
that  the  evil  is  irremediable  and  hopeless,  or  that  we 
must  look  for  a  power  from  without  the  mind  which 
may  afford  an  adequate  remedy.  We  are  thus  led 
to  perceive  the  adaptation  and  the  probability  of  the 
provisions  of  Christianity,  where  an  influence  is  in- 
deed disclosed  to  us,  capable  of  restoring  the  har- 
mony which  has  been  lost,  and  raising  man  anew  to 
his  place  as  a  moral  being.  We  cannot  hesitate  to 
believe  that  the  Power  who  framed  the  wondrous 
fabric  may  thus  hold  intercourse  with  it,  and  redeem 
it  from  disorder  and  ruin.  On  the  contrary,  it  accords 
with  the  highest  conceptions  we  can  form  of  the 
benevolence  of  the  Deity,  that  he  should  thus  look 
upon  his  creatures  in  their  hour  of  need  ;  and  the 
system  disclosing  such  communication  appears,  upon 


INFLUENCE    OF     HABIT.  123 

every  principle  of  sound  philosophy,  to  be  one  o{* 
harmony,  consistency,  and  truth.  The  subject,  there- 
fore, leads  our  attention  to  that  inward  change,  so 
often  the  scoff  of  the  profane,  but  to  which  so  promi- 
nent a  place  is  assigned  in  the  sacred  writings,  in 
which  a  man  is  said  to  be  created  anew  by  a  power 
from  heaven,  and  elevated  in  his  whole  views  and 
feelings  as  a  moral  being.  Sound  philosophy  teaches 
us,  that  there  is  a  state  in  which  nothing  less  than 
such  a  complete  transformation  can  restore  the  man 
to  a  healthy  moral  condition, — and  that,  for  producing 
it,  nothing  will  avail  but  an  influence  from  without 
the  mind, — a  might  and  a  power  from  the  same 
Almighty  One  who  originally  framed  it.  Philosophy 
teaches,  in  the  clearest  manner,  that  a  portion  of 
mankind  require  such  a  transformation  ;  Christianity 
informs  us  that  it  is  required  by  all.  When  the  in- 
ductions of  science  and  the  dictates  of  revelation 
harmonize  to  this  extent,  who  shall  dare  to  assert 
that  the  latter  are  not  truth  ?  Who,  that  places  him- 
self in  the  presence  of  a  Being  of  infinite  purity,  will 
say  he  requires  not  such  a  change  ;  or  that,  for 
the  production  of  it,  he  needs  no  agency  beyond  the 
resources  of  his  own  mind.  If  none  be  found  who 
is  entitled  to  believe  he  forms  the  exception,  we  are 
forced  into  the  acknowledgment  of  the  truth  so  power- 
fully impressed  upon  us  in  the  sacred  writings,  that, 
in  the  eye  of  the  Almighty  One,  no  man  in  himself 
is  righteous  ;  and  that  his  own  power  avEiils  not  for 
restoring  him  to  a  state  of  moral  purity. 

From  the  whole  of  this  inquiry  we  see  the  deep 


124  THE  will: 

influence  of  habits ;  and  the  fearful  power  which 
they  may  acquire  over  the  whole  moral  system ; 
considerations  of  the  highest  practical  interest  to 
those  who  would  prevent  the  formation  of  habits  of 
on  injurious  nature,  or  who,  feeling  their  influence, 
strive  to  be  delivered  from  them.  There  is  indeed 
a  point  in  this  downward  course,  where  the  habit  has 
acquired  undisputed  power,  and  the  whole  moral 
feehngs  yield  to  it  unresisting  submission.  Peace 
may  then  be  within,  but  that  peace  is  the  stillness  of 
death ;  and,  unless  a  voice  from  heaven  shall  wake 
the  dead,  the  moral  being  is  lost.  But,  in  the  pro- 
gress towards  this  fearful  issue,  there  may  be  a 
tumult,  and  a  contest,  and  a  strife  ;  and  the  voice  of 
conscience  may  still  command  a  certain  attention  tc 
its  warnings.  While  there  are  these  indications  of 
life,  there  is  yet  hope  of  the  man  ;  but,  on  each  mo- 
ment is  now  suspended  his  moral  existence.  Let 
him  retire  from  the  influence  of  external  things ; 
and  listen  to  that  voice  within,  which,  though  often 
unheeded,  still  pleads  for  God.  Let  him  call  to  aid 
those  high  truths  which  relate  to  the  presence  and 
inspection  of  this  Being  of  infinite  purity,  and  the 
solemnities  of  a  life  which  is  to  come.  Above  all, 
let  him  look  up  in  humble  supplication  to  that  pure 
and  holy  One,  who  is  the  witness  of  this  warfare, — 
who  will  regard  it  with  compassion,  and  impart  his 
powerful  aid.  But  let  him  not  presumptuously  rely 
on  this  aid,  as  if  the  victory  were  already  secured. 
The  contest  is  but  begun  ;  and  there  must  be  a  con- 
tinued effort  and  an  unceasing  watchfulness, — an  hab- 
itual direction  of  the  attention  to  those  truths  which, 


MEANS    OF   REGULATING    IT.  125 

as  moral  causes,  are  calculated  to  act  upon  the  mind, 
— and  a  constant  reliance  upon  the  power  from  on 
high  which  is  felt  to  be  real  and  indispensable.  With 
all  this  provision,  his  progress  may  be  slow ;  for  the 
opposing  principle,  and  the  influence  of  established 
moral  habits,  may  be  felt  contending  for  their  former 
dominion  :  but,  by  each  advantage  that  is  achieved 
over  them,  their  power  will  be  broken  and  finally 
destroyed.  Now  in  all  this  contest  towards  the 
purity  of  the  moral  being,  each  step  is  no  less  a  pro- 
cess of  the  mind  itself  than  the  downward  course  by 
which  it  was  preceded.  It  consists  in  a  surrender 
of  the  will  to  the  suggestions  of  conscience,  and  an 
habitual  direction  of  the  attention  to  those  truths 
which  are  calculated  to  act  upon  the  moral  volitions. 
In  this  course,  the  man  feels  that  he  is  authorized  to 
look  for  a  might  and  an  influence  not  his  own.  This 
is  no  imaginary  or  mysterious  impression,  which  one 
may  fancy  that  he  feels,  and  then  pass  on  contented 
with  the  vision ;  but  a  power  which  acts  through 
the  healthy  operations  of  his  own  mind ;  it  is  in  his 
own  earnest  exertions,  as  a  rational  being,  to  regu- 
late these  operations,  that  he  is  warranted  to  expect 
its  communication  ;  and  it  is  in  feeling  these  assum- 
ing the  characters  of  moral  health  that  he  has  the 
proof  of  its  actual  presence. 

And  where  is  the  improbability  that  the  pure  and 
holy  One  who  framed  the  wondrous  moral  being 
may  thus  hold  intercourse  with  it,  and  impart  an 
influence  in  its  hour  of  deepest  need.  According  to 
the  utmost  of  our  conceptions,  it  is  the  highest  of 
his  works, — for  he  has  endowed  it  with  powers  of 
L2 


126  THE  will: 

rising  to  the  contemplation  of  himself,  and  with  the 
capacity  of  aspiring  to  the  imitation  of  his  own  moral 
perfections.  We  cannot,  for  a  moment,  doubt,  that 
his  eye  must  reach  its  inmost  movements,  and  that 
all  its  emotions,  and  desires,  and  volitions  are  ex- 
posed to  his  view.  We  must  believe  that  he  looks 
with  displeasure  when  he  perceives  them  wandering 
from  himself ;  and  contemplates  with  approbation  the 
contest,  when  the  spirit  strives  to  throw  off  its  moral 
bondage,  and  to  fight  its  way  upwards  to  a  con- 
formity to  his  will.  Upon  every  principle  of  sound 
philosophy,  all  this  must  be  open  to  his  inspection ; 
and  we  can  perceive  nothing  opposed  to  the  sound- 
est inductions  of  reason  in  the  belief,  that  he  should 
impart  an  influence  to  the  feeble  being  in  this  high 
design,  and  conduct  him  to  its  accompUshment.  In 
all  this,  in  fact,  there  is  so  Httle  improbability,  that 
we  find  it  impossible  to  suppose  it  could  be  other- 
wise. We  find  it  impossible  to  believe  that  such  a 
mental  process  could  go  on  without  the  knowledge 
of  him  whose  presence  is  in  every  place, — or  that, 
looking  upon  it,  he  should  want  either  the  power  or 
the  willingness  to  impart  his  effectual  aid. 

But,  independently  of  our  conviction  of  an  actual 
communication  from  the  Deity,  there  is  a  power  in 
the  mind  itself,  which  is  calculated  to  draw  down 
upon  it  an  influence  of  the  most  efficient  kind.  This 
is  produced  by  the  mental  process  which  we  call 
Faith ;  and  it  may  be  illustrated  by  an  impression 
which  many  must  have  experienced.  Let  us  sup- 
pose that  we  have  a  friend  of  exalted  intelligence 
and  virtue,  who  has  often  exercised  over  us  a  com- 


MEANS    OF   REGULATING    IT.  127 

manding  influence, — restraining  us  from  pursuits  to 
which  we  felt  an  inclination, — exciting  us  to  virtuous 
conduct, — and  elevating,  by  his  intercourse  with  us, 
our  impressions  of  a  character  on  which  we  wished 
to  form  our  own.  Let  us  suppose  that  we  are  're- 
moved to  a  distance  from  this  friend,  and  that  cir- 
cumstances of  difficulty  or  danger  occur,  in  which 
we  feel  the  want  of  a  guide  and  counsellor.  In  the 
reflections  which  the  situation  naturally  gives  rise  to, 
the  image  of  our  friend  is  brought  before  us ;  an 
influence  is  conveyed  analogous  to  that  which  was 
often  produced  by  his  presence  and  his  counsel ;  and 
we  feel  as  if  he  were  actually  present,  to  render  his 
advice  and  watch  our  conduct.  How  much  would 
this  impression  be  increased,  could  we  further  enter 
tain  the  thought,  that  this  absent  friend  was  able,  in 
some  way,  to  communicate  with  us,  so  far  as  to  be 
aware  of  our  present  circumstances,  and  to  perceive 
our  efforts  to  recall  the  influence  of  his  character 
upon  our  own.  Such  is  the  intercourse  of  the  soul 
with  God.  Every  movement  of  the  mind  is  known 
to  him  ;  his  eye  is  present  with  it,  when,  in  any  situa- 
tion of  duty,  distress,  or  mental  discipline,  the  man, 
under  this  exercise  of  faith,  realizes  the  presence 
and  character  of  the  Deity,  and  solemnly  inquires 
how,  in  the  particular  instance,  his  moral  feelings 
and  his  conduct  will  appear  in  the  eye  of  Him  who 
seeth  in  secret.  This  is  no  vision  of  the  imagina- 
tion, but  a  fact  supported  by  every  principle  of  sound 
reason, — an  influence  which  a  man  brings  down 
upon  himself,  when,  by  an  effort  of  his  own  mind, 
he  thus  places  himself  in  the  immediate  presence  of 


128  THE    WILL. 

the  Almighty.  The  man  who  does  so  in  every  de- 
cision of  life  is  he  who  lives  by  faith ;  and,  whether 
we  regard  the  inductions  of  reason,  or  the  dictates 
of  sacred  truth,  such  a  meui  is  taught  to  expect  an 
influence  greater  and  more  effectual  still.  This  is  a 
power  immediately  from  God,  which  shall  be  to  him 
direction  in  every  doubt, — light  in  every  darkness, — 
strength  in  his  utnjost  weakness, — and  comfort  in 
all  distress  ;  a  power  which  shall  bear  upon  all  the 
principles  of  his  moral  nature,  when  he  carries  on 
the  mighty  conflict  of  bringing  every  desire  and  every 
volition  under  a  conformity  to  the  Divine  will.  We 
again  hazard  with  confidence  the  assertion,  that  in 
all  this  there  is  no  improbability ;  but  that,  on  the 
contrary,  the  improbability  is  entirely  on  the  other 
side, — in  supposing  that  any  such  mental  process 
could  take  place  without  the  knowledge  and  the  in- 
terposition of  that  incomprehensible  One,  whose  eye 
is  upon  all  his  works. 


PART  III. 


OF  THE  MORAL  PRINCIPLE,  OR  CONSCIENCE. 


There  has  been  much  dispute  respecting  the 
nature  and  even  the  existence  of  the  moral  principle, 
as  a  distinct  element  of  our  mental  constitution ;  but 
tliis  controversy  has  now  probably  passed  away,  along 
with  other  speculations  of  a  metaphysical  nature,  in 
regard  to  which  a  kind  of  evidence  was  sought  of 
which  the  subjects  are  not  susceptible.  Without  ar- 
guing respecting  the  propriety  of  speaking  of  a  sepa- 
rate power  or  principle,  we  simply  contend  for  the 
fact,  that  there  is  a  mental  exercise  by  which  we  feel 
certain  actions  to  be  right,  and  certain  others  wrong. 
It  is  an  element  or  a  movement  of  our  moral  nature 
which  admits  of  no  analysis,  and  no  explanation, 
and  is  referable  to  no  other  principle  than  a  simple 
recognition  of  the  fact,  wliich  forces  itself  upon  the 
conviction  of  every  man  who  looks  into  the  processes 
of  his  own  mind.  Of  the  existence  and  the  nature 
of  this  most  important  principle,  therefore,  the  evi- 


130  THE    MORAL    PRINCIPLE. 

dence  is  entirely  within.  We  appeal  to  the  con- 
sciousness of  every  man,  that  he  perceives  a  power 
which,  in  particular  cases,  warns  him  of  the  conduct 
which  he  ought  to  pursue,  and  administers  a  solemn 
admonition  when  he  has  departed  from  it.  For  while 
his  judgment  conveys  to  him  a  certain  impression, 
both  of  the  qualities  and  the  tendencies  of  actions, 
he  has,  besides  this,  a  feeling  by  which  he  views  the 
actions  with  approbation  or  disapprobation,  in  refer- 
ence purely  to  their  moral  aspect,  and  without  any 
regard  to  their  consequences.  When  we  refer  to 
the  sacred  writings,  we  find  the  principle  of  con- 
science represented  as  a  power  of  such  import- 
ance, that,  without  any  acquired  knowledge,  or  any 
actual  precepts,  it  is  sufficient  to  establish,  in  every 
man,  such  an  impression  of  his  duty  as  leaves  him 
without  excuse  in  the  neglect  of  it.  "  For  when 
the  gentiles,  which  have  not  the  law,  do  by  nature 
the  things  contained  in  the  law,  these,  having  not 
the  law,  are  a  law  unto  themselves  :  Which  show  the 
work  of  the  law  written  in  their  hearts,  their  con- 
science also  bearing  witness,  and  their  thoughts  the 
meanwhile  accusing  or  else  excusing  one  another," 
We  even  find  a  power  assigned  to  the  decisions  of 
conscience,  differing  in  extent  only,  but  not  in  kind, 
from  the  judgment  of  the  Almighty — "If  our  heart 
condemn  us,  God  is  greater  than  our  heart,  and 
knoweth  all  things." 

The  province  of  conscience  then  appears  to  be, 
to  convey  to  man  a  certain  conviction  of  what  is 
morally  right  and  wrong,  in  regard  to  conduct  in 
individual  cases, — and  the.  general  exercise  of  the 


THE    MORAL    PRINCIPLE.  1^1 

desires  or  affections.  This  it  does  independently 
of  any  acquired  knowledge,  and  without  reference 
to  any  other  standard  of  duty.  It  does  so,  by  a  rule 
of  right  which  it  carries  within  itself, — and  by  apply- 
ing this  to  the  primary  moral  feelings,  that  is,  the 
desires  and  affections,  so  as  to  preserve  among  them 
a  just  and  healthy  balance  towards  each  other.  It 
seems  therefore  to  hold  a  place  among  the  moral 
powers,  analogous  to  that  which  reason  holds  among 
the  intellectual ;  and,  when  we  view  it  in  this  rela- 
tion, there  appears  a  beautiful  harmony  pervading 
the  whole  economy  of  the  mind. 

By  his  intellectual  operations  man  acquires  the 
knowledge  of  a  certain  series  of  facts  ;  he  remem- 
bers them, — he  separates  and  classifies  them, — and 
forms  them  into  new  combinations.  But  with  the 
most  active  exercise  of  all  these  operations,  his  mind 
might  present  an  accumulation  of  facts,  without 
order,  harmony,  or  utility  ;  without  any  principle  of 
combination, — or  combined  only  in  those  fantastic 
and  extravagant  forms  which  appear  in  the  concep- 
tions of  the  maniac.  It  is  reason  that  reduces  the 
whole  into  order  and  harmony, — by  comparing,  dis- 
tinguishing, and  tracing  their  true  analogies  and  re- 
lations,— and  then  by  deducing  truths  as  conclusions 
from  the  whole.  It  is  in  this  manner  particularly 
that  man  acquires  a  knowledge  of  the  uniform  actions 
of  bodies  on  each  other, — and,  confiding  in  the  uni- 
formity of  these  actions,  learns  to  direct  his  means 
to  the  ends  which  he  has  in  view.  He  knows  also 
his  own  relations  to  other  sentient  beings, — and 
adapts  his  conduct  to  them,  according  to  the  circumr 


132  THE    MORAL   PRINCIPLE* 

stances  in  which  he  is  placed, — the  persons  with 
whom  he  is  connected, — and  the  objects  which  ho 
wishes  to  accomphsh.  He  learns  to  accommodate 
his  measures  to  new  circumstances  as  they  arise,— 
and  thus  is  guided  and  directed  through  his  physical 
relations.  When  reason  is  suspended,  all  this  har- 
mony is  destroyed.  The  visions  of  the  mind  are 
acted  upon  as  facts  ;  things  are  combined  into  fan- 
tastic forms,  entirely  apart  from  their  true  relations  ; 
conduct  is  widely  at  variance  with  what  circum- 
stances require ;  ends  are  attempted  by  means 
which  have  no  relation  to  them  ;  and  the  ends  them- 
selves are  equally  at  variance  with  those  which  are 
suitable  to  the  circumstances  of  the  individual*  Such 
is  the  maniac,  whom  accordingly  we  shut  up,  to  pre- 
vent him  from  being  dangerous  to  the  public ;  for 
he  has  been  known  to  mistake  so  remarkably  the 
relations  of  things,  and  the  conduct  adapted  to  his 
circumstances,  as  to  murder  his  most  valuable  friend, 
or  his  own  helpless  infant. 

In  all  this  process  there  is  a  striking  analogy  to 
certain  conditions  of  the  moral  feelings,  and  to  the 
control  which  is  exercised  over  them  by  the  princi- 
ple of  conscience.  By  self-love  a  man  is  led  to 
seek  his  own  gratification  or  advantage ;  and  the 
desires  direct  him  to  certain  objects  by  which  these 
propensities  may  be  gratified.  But  the  affections 
carry  forth  his  views  to  other  men  with  whom  he  is 
connected  by  various  relations,  and  td  the  offices  of 
justice,  veracity,  and  benevolence,  which  arise  out 
of  them.  Conscience  is  the  regulating  power, 
which,  acting  upon  tne  desires  and  aflTections,  as 


THE   MORAL    PRINCIPLE.  133 

reason  does  upon  a  series  of  facts,  preserves  among 
them  harmony  and  order.  It  does  so  by  repressing 
the  propensity  of  selfishness,  and  reminding  the  man 
of  the  true  relation  between  regard  to  his  own  inter- 
est and  the  duties  he  owes  to  other  men.  It  regu- 
lates his  desires  and  pursuits,  by  carrying  his  views 
beyond  present  feelings  and  present  gratifications, 
to  future  times  and  future  consequences, — and  by 
raising  his  attention  to  his  relation  to  the  great  moral 
Governor  of  the  universe.  He  thus  learns  to  adapt 
his  conduct  and  pursuits,  not  to  present  and  tran- 
sient feelings,  but  to  an  extended  view  of  his  great 
and  true  interests  as  a  moral  being.  Such  is  con- 
science,— still,  hke  reason,  pointing  out  the  moral 
ends  a  man  ought  to  pursue, — and  guiding  him  in 
the  means  by  which  he  ought  to  pursue  them ;  and 
the  man  does  not  act  in  conformity  with  the  consti- 
tution of  his  nature  who  does  not  yield  to  conscience 
the  supremacy  and  direction  over  all  his  other  feel- 
ings and  principles  of  action.  But  the  analogy  does 
not  stop  here  ;  for  we  can  also  trace  a  condition  in 
which  this  controlling  influence  of  conscience  is  sus- 
pended or  lost.  I  formerly  endeavoured  to  trace 
the  manner  in  which  this  derangement  arises,  and 
have  now  only  to  allude  to  its  influence  on  the  har- 
mony of  the  moral  feelings.  Self-love  degenerates 
into  low  selfish  gratification :  the  desires  are  indulged 
without  any  other  restraint  than  that  which  arises 
from  a  mere  selfish  principle, — as  a  regard  to  health, 
perhaps  in  some  degree  to  reputation :  the  affections 
are  exercised  only  in  so  far  as  similar  principles 
impose  a  certain  degree  of  attention  to  them  :  pres- 
M 


134  THE    MORAL   PRINCIPLE. 

ent  and  momentary  impulses  are  acted  upon  with- 
out any  regard  to  future  results  :  conduct  is  adapted 
to  present  gratification,  without  the  perception  either 
of  its  moral  aspect,  or  its  consequences  to  the  man 
himself  as  a  responsible  being ;  and  without  regard  to 
the  means  by  which  these  feehngs  are  gratified. 
In  all  this  violation  of  moral  harmony,  there  is  no 
derangement  of  the  ordinary  exercise  of  judgment. 
In  the  most  remarkable  example  that  can  be  furnished 
by  the  history  of  human  depravity,  the  man  may  be  as 
acute  as  ever  in  the  details  of  business  or  the  pur- 
suits of  science.  There  is  no  diminution  of  his 
sound  estimate  of  physical  relations, — for  this  is  the 
province  of  reason.  But  there  is  a  total  derange- 
ment of  his  sense  and  approbation  of  moral  relations, 
— for  this  is  conscience.  Such  a  condition  of  mind, 
then,  appears  to  be,  in  reference  to  the  moral  feel- 
ings, what  insanity  is  in  regard  to  the  intellectual. 
The  intellectual  maniac  fancies  himself  a  king,  sur- 
rounded by  every  form  of  earthly  splendour, — and 
this  hallucination  is  not  corrected  even  by  the  sight 
of  his  bed  of  straw  and  all  the  horrors  of  his  cell. 
The  moral  maniac  pursues  his  way,  and  thinks  him- 
self a  wise  and  a  happy  man ;  but  feels  not  that  he 
is  treading  a  downward  course,  and  is  lost  as  a 
moral  being. 

In  the  preceding  observations  respecting  the  moral 
principle  or  conscience,  I  have  alluded  chiefly  to  its 
influence  in  preserving  a  certain  harmony  among  the 
other  feelings, — in  regulating  the  desires  by  the  in- 
dications of  moral  purity, — and  preventing  self-love 


THE    MORAL    PRINCIPLE.  135 

from  interfering  with  the  duties  and  affections  which 
we  owe  to  other  men.  But  there  is  another  and  a 
most  important  purpose  which  is  answered  by  this 
faculty,  and  that  is  to  make  us  acquainted  with  the 
moral  attributes  of  the  Deity.  In  strict  philosophi- 
cal language  we  ought  perhaps  to  say,  that  this  high 
purpose  is  accomplished  by  a  combined  operation  of 
conscience  and  reason  :  but,  however  this  may  be, 
the  process  appears  clear  and  intelligible  in  its 
nature,  and  fully  adapted  to  the  end  now  assigned 
to  it.  From  a  simple  exercise  of  mind,  directed  to 
the  great  phenomena  of  nature,  we  acquire  the  know- 
ledge of  a  First  Cause, — a  Being  of  infinite  power 
and  infinite  wisdom ;  and  this  conclusion  is  im- 
pressed upon  us  in  a  peculiar  manner,  when,  from 
our  own  bodily  and  mental  endowments,  we  infer 
the  attributes  of  Him  who  framed  us :  "  he  that 
planted  the  ear,"  says  a  sacred  writer,  "  shall  he 
not  hear ;  he  that  formed  the  eye,  shall  he  not  see  ; 
he  that  teacheth  men  knowledge,  shall  not  he  know  ?' 
When  we  trace  backwards  a  series  of  finite  yet  in- 
telligent beings,  we  must  arrive  at  one  of  two  con- 
clusions :  we  must  either  trace  the  series  through 
an  infinite  and  eternal  succession  of  finite  beings, 
each  the  cause  of  the  one  which  succeeded  it ;  or 
we  must  refer  the  commencement  of  the  series  to 
one  great  intelligent  Being,  himself  uncaused,  infi- 
nite, and  eternal.  To  trace  the  series  to  one  being, 
finite,  yet  uncaused,  is  totally  inadmissible  ;  and  not 
less  so  is  the  conception  of  finite  beings  in  an  in- 
*finite  and  eternal  series.  The  belief  of  one  infinite 
Being,  self-existent  and  eternal,  is,  therefore,  the  only 


136  THE   MORAL   PRINCIPLE. 

conclusion  at  which  we  can  arrive,  as  presenting 
any  characters  of  credibility  or  truth.  The  super- 
intending care,  the  goodness  and  benevolence  of  the 
Deity,  we  learn,  with  a  feeling  of  equal  certainty, 
from  the  ample  provision  he  has  made  for  supplying 
the  wants  and  ministering  to  the  comfort  of  all  the 
creatures  whom  he  has  made.  This  part  of  the  ar- 
gument, also,  is  in  the  clearest  manner  insisted  upon 
in  the  sacred  writings ;  when  the  apostle  Paul,  in 
calling  upon  the  people  of  Lystra  to  worship  the  true 
God,  who  made  heaven  and  earth,  adds,  as  a  source 
of  knowledge  from  which  they  ought  to  learn  his 
character ;  "he  left  not  himself  without  a  witness, 
in  that  he  did  good,  and  gave  us  rain  from  heaven 
and  fruitful  seasons,  fiUing  our  hearts  with  food  and 
gladness." 

A  being  thus  endowed  with  infinite  power,  wis- 
dom, and  goodness  we  cannot  conceive  to  exist 
without  moral  feelings ;  and,  by  a  process  equally 
obvious,  we  arrive  at  a  distinct  knowledge  of  these, 
when,  from  the  moral  perceptions  of  our  own  minds, 
we  infer  the  moral  attributes  of  him  who  thus  formed 
us.  We  have  certain  impressions  of  justice,  vera- 
city, compassion,  and  moral  purity,  in  regard  to  our 
own  conduct, — we  have  a  distinct  approbation  of 
these  qualities  in  others, — and  we  attach  a  feeling 
of  disapprobation  to  the  infringement  of  them.  By 
a  simple  step  of  reasoning,  which  conveys  an  im- 
pression of  absolute  conviction,  we  conclude,  that 
He  who  formed  us  with  these  feelings  possesses,  in 
his  own  character,  corresponding  moral  attributes, 
which,  though  they  resemble  in  kind,  must  infinitely 


\ 

THE    MORAL    PRINCIPLE.  137 

exceed  in  degree,  those  qualities  in  the  wisest  and 
the  best  of  men.  In  our  actual  observation  of  man- 
kind, we  perceive  these  attributes  impaired  in  their 
exercise  by  human  weakness,  distorted  by  human 
passion, — and  impeded  in  their  operation  by  per- 
sonal wants,  personal  feelings,  and  selfish  interests. 
But,  apart  from  such  deteriorating  causes,  we  have 
a  certain  abstract  idea  of  the  full  and  perfect  exercise 
of  those  qualities  ;  and  it  is  in  this  pure  and  perfect 
form  that  we  ascribe  them  to  the  Almighty.  In 
him,  they  can  be  impeded  by  no  weakness,  dis- 
torted by  no  passion,  and  impaired  in  their  operation 
by  no  personal  interest.  We  therefore  conclude 
him  to  be  perfect  in  the  exercise  of  all  these  moral 
attributes,  and  to  take  the  most  rigid  estimate  of  any 
infringement  of  them  by  man ;  this  is  what  we  call 
the  holiness  of  God.  Even  the  man  who  has- him- 
self departed  from  moral  rectitude  still  feels  a  power 
within,  which  points  with  irresistible  force  to  what  is 
purity,  and  fixes  upon  him  a  conviction  that  God  is 
pure. 

When  we  view  such  a  being  apart  from  any  infe- 
rior creature,  all  seems  heirmony  and  consistency ; 
we  have  only  to  contemplate  him  as  high  and  holy, 
and  enjoying  perfect  happiness  in  his  own  spotless 
attributes.  But,  when  we  view  him  in  relation  to 
man  in  a  state  of  moral  discipline,  and,  in  that  state, 
tainted  deeply  with  moral  evil,  a  difficulty  arises  of  an 
appalling  magnitude.  There  is  ample  scope  now, 
we  perceive,  for  the  exercise  of  his  holiness,  veracity, 
and  justice  ;  and  he  appears  in  sublime  and  terrible 
majesty  in  liis  exalted  character  as  a  moral  governor. 
M2 


138  THE    MORAL    PRINCIPLE. 

But,  amid  such  a  display,  there  is  an  obvious  inter- 
ruption to  the  exercise  of  compassion, — especially 
in  that  essential  department  of  it — mercy  or  forgive- 
ness. This  attribute  may  be  exercised  without  re- 
straint by  an  individual,  where  his  own  interests  alone 
are  concerned  ;  because  in  him  it  involves  only  a 
sacrifice  of  self-love.  But  forgiveness  in  a  moral 
governor  either  implies  an  actual  change  of  purpose, 
or  supposes  his  decision  to  have  been  made  without 
sufficient  knowledge  of,  or  due  attention  to,  all  the 
facts  by  which  he  ought  to  have  been  influenced  : 
it  denotes  either  undue  rigour  in  the  law,  or  igno- 
rance or  inattention  in  him  who  administers  it ;  and 
it  may  very  often  interfere  with  the  essential  requisites 
of  justice.  But,  in  a  moral  governor  of  infinite  per- 
fection, there  can  be  neither  ignorance  of  facts  nor 
change  of  purpose ;  the  requirements  of  his  justice 
must  stand  unshaken, — and  his  law,  written  on  the 
nearts  of  all  his  rational  creatures,  must  be  upheld, 
in  the  face  of  the  universe,  as  holy,  and  just,  and  good. 
Is,  then,  the  exercise  of  mercy  to  be  excluded  from 
our  conception  of  the  Divine  character, — and  is  there 
no  forgiveness  with  God  1  The  soundest  inductions 
of  philosophy,  applied  to  the  actual  state  of  man, 
bring  us  to  this  momentous  question ;  but  the  high- 
est eflforts  of  human  science  fail  to  answer  it.  It  is 
in  this  our  utmost  need,  that  we  are  met  by  the  dic- 
tates of  revelation,  and  are  called  to  humble  the  pride 
of  our  reason  before  that  display  of  the  harmony  and 
integrity  of  the  Divine  character.  We  there  learn  the 
truths,  far  beyond  the  utmost  inductions  of  human 
science,  and  the  utmost  conceptions  of  human  thought, 


THE   MORAL   PRINCIPLE.  139 

-^that  an  atonement  is  made,  a  sacrifice  offered ; — Eind 
that  the  exercise  of  forgiveness  is  consistent  with  the 
perfections  of  the  Deity.  Thus,  by  a  process  of  the 
mind  itself,  which  seems  to  present  every  element  of 
fair  and  logical  reasoning,  we  arrive  at  a  full  convic- 
tion of  the  necessity,  and  the  moral  probabiUty,  of 
that  truth  which  forms  the  great  peculiarity  of  the  Chris- 
tian revelation.  More  than  any  other,  in  the  whole 
circle  of  religious  belief,  it  rises  above  the  induc- 
tions of  science,  while  reason,  in  its  soundest  conclu- 
sions, recognises  its  probability, and  receives  its  truth; 
and  it  stands  forth  alone,  simply  proposed  to  our  be- 
lief, and  offered  to  our  acceptance,  on  that  high  but 
peculiar  evidence  by  which  is  supported  the  testimony 
of  God. 

The  truth  of  these  considerations  is  impressed 
upon  us  in  the  strongest  manner,  when  we  turn  our 
attention  to  the  actual  moral  condition  of  mankind. 
When  we  contemplate  man,  as  he  is  displayed  to  us 
by  the  soundest  induction  of  philosophy, — his  capacity 
for  distinguishing  truth  from  falsehood,  and  evil  from 
good  ;  the  feelings  and  affections  which  bind  him  to 
his  fellow-men,  and  the  powers  which  enable  him  to 
rise  to  intercourse  with  God  : — when  we  consider 
the  power,  which  sits  among  his  other  principles  and 
feelings,  as  a  faithful  monitor  and  guide,  carrying  in 
itself  a  rule  of  rectitude  without  any  other  knowledge, 
and  a  right  to  govern  without  reference  to  any  other 
authority, — we  behold  a  fabric  complete  and  har- 
monious in  all  its  parts,  and  eminently  worthy  of  its 
Almighty  Maker;    we  behold  an  ample  provision 


140  THE    MORAL    PRINCIPLE. 

for  peace,  and  order,  and  harmony,  in  the  whole  moral 
world.  But  when  we  compare  with  these  inductions 
the  actual  state  of  man,  as  displayed  to  us  in  the  page 
of  history,  and  in  our  own  daily  observation,  the  con- 
viction is  forced  upon  us  that  some  mighty  change 
has  taken  place  in  this  beauteous  system,  some  mar- 
vellous disruption  of  its  moral  harmony.  The  man- 
ner in  which  this  condition  arose, — or  the  origin  of 
moral  evil  under  the  government  of  God,  is  a  ques- 
tion entirely  beyond  the  reach  of  the  human  faculties. 
It  is  one  of  those,  however,  on  which  it  is  simply  our 
duty  to  keep  in  mind,  that  our  business  is,  not  with 
the  explanation,  but  with  the  facts ;  for,  even  by 
the  conclusions  of  philosophy,  we  are  compelled  to 
believe  that  man  has  fallen  from  his  high  estate, 
and  that  a  pestilence  has  gone  abroad  over  the  face 
of  the  moral  creation. 

In  arriving  at  this  conclusion,  it  is  not  with  the  in- 
ductions of  moral  science  alone  that  we  compare  or 
contrast  the  actual  state  of  man.  For  one  bright 
example  has  appeared  in  our  world,  in  whom  was 
exhibited  human  nature  in  its  highest  state  of  order 
and  harmony.  In  regard  to  the  mighty  purposes 
which  He  came  to  accomplish,  indeed,  philosophy 
fails  us,  and  we  are  called  to  submit  the  inductions 
of  our  reason  to  the  testimony  of  God.  But,  when 
we  contemplate  his  whole  character  purely  as  a  mat- 
ter of  historical  truth,  the  conviction  is  forced  upon 
us  that  this  was  the  highest  state  of  man ;  and  the 
inductions  of  true  science  harmonize  with  the  im- 
pression of   the   Roman  centurion,  when  on  wit- 


1 


THE    MORAL    PRINCIPLE.  141 

nessing  the  conclusion  of  the  earthly  sufferings  of 
the  Messiah,  he  exclaimed  "  Truly,  this  was  the  Son 
of  God." 

When  we  endeavour  to  trace  the  manner  in  which 
mankind  have  departed  so  widely  from  this  high  pat- 
tern, we  arrive  at  moral  phenomena  of  which  we 
can  offer  no  explanation.  But  an  inquiry  of  much 
greater  importance  is  to  mark  the  process  by  which, 
in  individual  instances,  conscience  ceases  to  be  the 
regulating  principle  of  the  character ;  and  this  is 
a  simple  and  legitimate  object  of  philosophical  obser- 
vation. There  cannot,  indeed,  be  an  inquiry  of  more 
intense  and  solemn  interest,  than  to  trace  the  chain 
of  sequences  which  has  been  established  in  the  mind 
of  man  as  a  moral  being.  We  can  view  it  only  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  without  being  able  to  refer  it  to  any 
other  principle  than  the  will  of  Him  who  framed  us ; 
but  the  facts  which  are  before  us  claim  the  serious 
attention  of  every  man  who  would  cultivate  that  most 
important  of  all  pursuits — ^the  knowledge  of  his  own 
moral  condition.  The  fact  to  which  I  chiefly  allude 
is,  a  certain  relation,  formerly  referred  to,  between 
the  truths  which  are  calculated  to  act  upon  us  as  mo- 
ral causes,  and  the  mental  emotions  which  ought  to 
result  from  them  ;  and  between  these  emotions  and 
a  certain  conduct  which  they  tend  to  produce.  If 
the  due  harmony  between  these  be  carefully  cultivated, 
the  result  is  a  sound  moral  condition  ;  but,  by  every 
instance  in  which  this  harmony  is  violated,  a  morbid 
influence  has  been  introduced,  which  gains  strength 
in  each  succeeding  volition,  and  carries  disorder 


142  THE    MORAL    PRINCIPLE. 

through  the  moral  economy.  We  have  formerly 
illustrated  this  important  moral  process,  by  the  rela- 
tion between  the  emotion  of  compassion,  and  the 
conduct  which  ought  to  arise  from  it.  If  this  tend- 
ency of  the  emotion  be  diligently  cultivated,  the 
result  is  the  habit  of  active  benevolence ;  but,  if  the 
emotion  be  violated,  its  influence  is  progressively 
diminished,  and  a  character  is  produced  of  cold  and 
barren  selfishness. 

A  similar  chain  of  sequences  is  to  be  observed 
respecting  the  operation  of  those  great  truths,  which, 
under  the  regulating  power  of  conscience,  are  calcu- 
lated to  act  as  moral  causes  in  our  mental  economy  : 
we  may  take,  for  example,  the  truths  relating  to 
the  character  and  perfections  of  the  Deity,  and  the 
influence  which  these  ought  to  produce  upon  every 
rational  being.  We  have  seen  the  knowledge  which 
we  derive  from  the  light  of  nature  respecting  the 
attributes  of  God,  when,  from  his  works  around  us, 
we  discover  him  as  a  being  of  infinite  power,  wis- 
dom, and  goodness  ;  and  when,  from  the  moral  im- 
pressions of  our  own  minds,  we  infer  his  perfections 
as  a  moral  Governor  of  infinite  holiness,  justice,  and 
truth.  By  a  proper  direction  of  the  mind  to  the 
truths  which  are  thus  conveyed  to  us  respecting  the 
Deity,  there  would  naturally  arise  a  corresponding 
chain  of  emotions  of  which  he  is  the  object.  These 
are,  a  sense  of  veneration  towards  him,  as  infinitely 
great,  wise,  and  powerful, — of  love  and  thankfulness, 
as  infinitely  good, — and  of  habitual  regard  to  his 
authority  and  will,  as  a  moral  governor  of  purity  and 
justice,  and  as  requiring  a  corresponding  character  in 


THE   MORAL    PRINCIPLE.  143 

ill  his  creatures.  A  close  and  constant  relation 
ought  to  be  preserved  between  these  truths  and  these 
emotions,  and  on  this  depends  the  i^ioral  harmony  of 
the  mind.  The  preservation  of  this  harmony,  again, 
is  intimately  connected  with  a  mental  process  which 
every  man  feels  to  be  voluntary, — or  in  his  power  to 
perform,  if  he  wills.  It  consists  in  a  careful  direc- 
tion of  the  mind  to  such  truths,  so  as  to  enable  them 
to  act  as  moral  causes  in  the  mental  economy:  by 
the  estabhshed  order  of  moral  sequences,  the  emo- 
tions naturally  follow :  these  are  then  to  be  cherished 
with  satisfaction  and  reverence  ;  and  a  correspond- 
ing influence  u^on  the  character  and  conduct  is  the 
further  consequence.  But  the  first  step  in  this  im- 
portant process  may  be  neglected :  the  mind  may 
not  be  directed  with  due  care  to  the  truths  which 
thus  claim  its  highest  regard, — and  the  natural  result 
is  a  corresponding  deficiency  in  the  emotions  and 
conduct  which  ought  to  flow  from  them.  This  will 
be  the  case  in  a  still  higher  degree,  if  there  has  been 
formed  any  actual  derangement  of  the  moral  condi- 
tion,— if  deeds  have  been  committed,  or  even  desires 
cherished,  by  which  the  indications  of  conscience  have 
been  violated.  The  moral  harmony  of  the  mind  is 
then  lost,  and,  however  slight  may  be  the  first  im- 
pression, a  morbid  influence  has  begun  to  operate  in 
the  mental  economy,  which  tends  gradually  to  gain 
strength,  until  it  becomes  a  ruling  principle  in  the 
whole  character.  The  truths  connected  with  the 
divine  perfections  are  now  neither  invited  nor  cher- 
ished ;  but  are  felt  to  be  intruders  which  disturb  the 
mental  tranquillity.  The  attention  ceases  to  be  directed 


144  THE   MORAL    PRINCIPLE. 

to  them,  and  the  corresponding  emotions  vanish  from 
the  mind.  Such  appears  to  be  the  moral  history 
of  those  who,  in  the  striking  language  of  the  sacred 
writings  "  do  not  hke  to  retain  God  in  their  know 
ledge." 

When  the  moral  harmony  of  the  mind  has  been 
impaired  to  this  extent,  another  mental  condition 
arises,  according  to  the  wondrous  system  of  moral 
sequences.  This  consists  in  a  distortion  of  the 
understanding  itself,  regarding  the  first  great  prin- 
ciples of  moral  truth.  For,  a  fearless  contempla- 
tion of  the  truth,  respecting  the  divine  perfections, 
having  become  inconsistent  with  the  moral  condition 
of  the  mind,  there  next  arises  a  desire  to  discover  a 
view  of  them  more  in  accordance  with  its  own  feel- 
ings. This  is  followed,  in  due  course,  by  a  cor- 
responding train  of  its  own  speculations  ;  and  these, 
by  a  mind  so  prepared,  are  received  as  truth.  The 
inventions  of  the  mind  itself  thus  become  the  regu- 
lating principles  of  its  emotions,  and  this  mental 
process,  advancing  from  step  to  step,  terminates  in 
moral  degradation  and  anarchy. 

Nothing  can  be  more  striking  than  the  manner 
in  which  these  great  principles  of  ethical  science  are 
laid  down  in  the  sacred  writings ;  "  the  invisible 
things  of  him  fi'om  the  creation  of  the  world  are 
cleEQ-ly  seen,  being  understood  by  the  things  that 
are  made,  even  his  eternal  power  and  Godhead,  so 
that  they  are  without  excuse  :  Because  that,  when 
they  knew  God,  they  glorified  him  not  as  God, 
neither  were  thankful ;  but  became  vain  in  their 
imaginations,  and  their  foolish  heart  was  darkened. 


THE    MORAL    PRINCIPLE.  145 

Professing  themselves  to  be  wise,  they  became 
fools  ;  and  changed  the  glory  of  the  uncorruptible 
God  into  an  image  made  like  to  corruptible  man, 
and  to  birds,  and  four-footed  beasts,  and  creeping 
things." — "  And  even  as  they  did  not  like  to  retain 
God  in  their  knowledge,  God  gave  them  over  to  a 
reprobate  mind,  to  do  those  things  which  are  net 
convenient."  The  various  steps  in  this  course  of 
moral  degradation  are  here  represented  as  a  judicial 
infliction  by  the  Deity.  But  this  solemn  view  of 
the  subject  is  in  no  degree  inconsistent  with  the 
principle  that  it  takes  place  according  to  a  chain  of 
sequences  existing  in  the  mind  itself.  For  the 
.Almighty  One,  who  is  said  to  inflict  as  a  judgment 
this  state  of  moral  ruin,  is  the  same  who  established 
it  as  the  result  of  a  uniform  process  in  the  mental 
economy,  to  be  traced  in  the  history  of  every  man 
who  has  followed  the  downward  course  which  led 
him  astray  from  virtue. 

To  the  principles  which  have  now  been  stated 
we  are  also  to  refer  a  point  in  the  philosophy  of 
human  nature  which  presents  a  subject  of  most  in- 
teresting reflection.  I  allude  to  the  fact,  that  the 
great  truths  of  religious  behef  are  so  often  rejected, 
by  men  who  have  acquired  a  reputation  for  exalted 
powers  of  understanding,  in  other  departments  of 
intellectual  inquiry.  The  fact  is  one  of  intense  in- 
terest ;  and  we  can  scarcely  wonder  that  superficial 
observers  should  have  deduced  from  it  an  impres- 
sion that  it  implies  something  defective  in  the  evi- 
dence by  which  these  truths  are  proposed  to  our 
reception.  But  the  conclusion  is  entirely  unwar- 
N 


146  THE    MORAL    PRINCIPLE. 

ranted ;  and  the  important  principle  cannot  be  too 
often  repeated,  that  the  attainment  of  truth  in  moral 
inquiries  is  essentially  connected  with  the  moral 
condition  of  the  inquirer.  On  this  depends  the 
anxious  care  with  wluch  he  has  directed  his  mind  to 
the  high  pursuit  under  a  deep  and  solemn  feeling 
of  its  supreme  importance.  On  this  depends  the 
sincere  and  humble  and  candid  love  of  truth  with 
which  he  has  conducted  it,  apart  alike  from  preju- 
dice and  frivolity.  For  without  these  essentid  ele- 
ments of  character,  the  most  exalted  intellect  may 
fail  of  reaching  the  truth, — the  most  acute  under- 
standing may  only  wander  into  delusion  and  false- 
hood. 

Before  concluding  this  subject,  there  is  another 
point  which  deserves  to  be  alluded  to ;  namely, 
the  influence  produced  upon  all  our  moral  decisions 
by  Attention.  This  important  process  of  the  mind 
we  have  had  occasion  to  mention  in  various  parts 
of  our  inquiry.  It  consists,  as  we  have  seen,  in 
directing  the  thoughts,  calmly  and  deliberately,  to 
all  the  facts  and  considerations  by  which  we  ought 
to  be  influenced  in  the  particular  case  which  is  under 
our  view;  and  it  should  be  accompanied  by  an 
anxious  and  sincere  desire  to  be  guided,  both  in  our 
opinions  and  conduct,  by  the  true  and  relative  tend- 
ency of  each  of  them.  It  is  a  voluntary  process 
of  the  mind  which  every  man  has  the  power  to  per- 
form ;  and,  on  the  degree  in  which  it  is  habitually 
exercised  depend  some  of  the  great  differences 
between  one  man  and  another  in  their  moral  con- 
dition.    We  have  repeatedly  had  occasion  to  men- 


THE    MORAL    PRINCIPLE.  147 

tion  that  morbid  state  of  the  mind  iu  which  moral 
causes  seem  to  have  lost  their  proper  influence, 
both  on  the  voHtions  of  the  will  and  even  on  the 
decisions  of  the  judgment :  but  it  is  a  truth  which 
cannot  be  too  often  referred  to,  how  much  this  con- 
dition is  influenced  by  the  mental  process  which  we 
are  now  considering.  It  originates,  indeed,  in  some 
degree  of  that  distortion  of  moral  feeling,  in  conse- 
quence of  which  the  inclinations  wander  from  the 
strict  path  of  rectitude  ;  but  the  primary  effect  of 
.this  loss  of  mental  harmony,  and  that  by  which  it  is 
perpetuated,  appears  to  be  chiefly  an  habitual  mis- 
direction of  the  attention, — or  a  total  want  of  con- 
sideration of  the  truths  and  motives  by  which  the 
moral  judgments  and  decisions  ought  to  be  influ- 
enced. Apart  from  this  condition  of  the  mind, 
indeed,  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  actual 
differences  in  moral  judgment  are  in  different  men 
less  than  we  are  apt  to  imagine.  "  Let  any  honest 
man,"  says  Butler,  "  before  he  engages  in  any 
course  of  action,  ask  himself, — is  this  I  am  going  to 
do  right,  or  is  it  wrong, — is  it  good,  or  is  it  evil  ? 
I  do  not  in  the  least  doubt  but  that  these  questions 
would  be  answered  agreeably  to  truth  and  virtue,  by 
almost  any  fair  man  in  almost  any  circumstances." 
It  is  in  a  great  measure  from  the  want  of  this  simple 
exercise  of  attention,  or  of  what  in  common  lan- 
guage we  call  calm  reflection,  that  men  are  led 
away,  by  passion,  prejudice,  and  distorted  moral 
habits,  into  courses  of  action  which  their  own  sober 
judgment  would  condemn  ;  and,  when  a  man  who 
has  thus  separated  from  rectitude  begins  to  retrace 


148  THE    MORAL   PRINCIPLE. 

his  way,  the  first  great  point  is  that  where  he  pauses 
in  his  downward  career,  and  seriously  proposes  to 
himself  the  question,  whether  the  course  he  has  fol- 
lowed be  worthy  of  a  moral  being.  I  allude  not 
here  to  the  means  by  which  a  man  is  led  to  take 
this  momentous  step  in  his  moral  history,  but  only 
to  the  mental  process  of  which  it  consists.  It  is 
primarily  nothing  more  than  an  exercise  of  attention, 
calmly  and  deliberately  directed  to  the  truths  and 
considerations  by  which  his  moral  decisions  ought 
to  be  influenced  ;  but,  when  a  man  has  once  been 
brought  into  this  attitude  of  deep  and  serious 
thought,  conscience  comes  to  bear  its  part  in  the 
solemn  process  ;  and  the  inquirer  is  likely  to  arrive 
at  just  conclusions  on  those  great  questions  of  which 
he  feels  the  importance  to  his  moral  condition. 


Before  leaving  the  subject  of  the  Moral  Principle, 
there  are  two  points  closely  connected  with  it  which 
remain  to  be  noticed.  The  one  relates  to  the  origin 
and  immutability  of  moral  distinctions, — and,  in 
connexion  with  this,  a  class  of  speculations  which 
hold  a  conspicuous  place  in  the  history  of  Ethical 
science,  under  the  name  of  Theories  of  Morals. 
The  other  refers  to  a  certain  harmony  or  principle 
of  arrangement,  which  the  different  moral  feelings 
ought  to  preserve  towards  each  other  in  a  well 
regulated  mind. 


THEORIES    OF   MORALS.  149 


4  I.— OF  THE  ORIGIN  AND  IMMUTABILITY  OF  MO- 
RAL DISTINCTIONS  AND  THEORIES  OF  MORALS. 

In  treating  of  the  moral  powers,  I  have  considered 
various  feelings  as  distinct  parts  of  our  constitution, 
each  intended  to  answer  a  specific  purpose  in  the 
present  scene  of  moral  discipline.  I  am  aware  of 
an  objection  that  may  be  urged  against  this  mode 
of  viewing  the  subject, — namely,  that  it  is  an  unne- 
cessary multiplication  of  original  principles.  I  am 
not  inclined  to  dispute  respecting  the  term  original 
principles.  I  only  contend  for  the  fact,  that  there 
are  certain  feeUngs  or  propensities  which  are  found 
to  operate  in  the  whole  of  mankind ;  and,  with 
regard  to  these,  I  consider  our  object  to  be  simply 
to  view  man  as  he  is.  In  his  physical  relations,  we 
find  him  endowed  with  a  variety  of  senses,  and  a 
great  variety  of  bodily  functions, — each  adapted  to 
its  proper  purpose,  and  all  distinct  from  each  other ; 
and  the  physiologist  is  content  to  view  them  simply 
as  they  are.  Were  he  to  exercise  his  ingenuity 
upon  them,  he  might  contend,  with  much  plausibility, 
that  it  is  highly  incorrect  to  speak  of  ^ve  distinct 
and  separate  senses ;  for  that  they  are  all  merely 
modifications  of  sensation,  difiering  only  in  the  veui- 
ous  kinds  of  the  external  impression.  Thus,  what 
is  vulgarly  called  sight  is  the  simple  sensation  of 
light, — and  heaidng  is  merely  the  sensation  of  sound. 
This  would  be  all  very  trucj-^-'but  it  does  not  appear 


150  THE    MORAL    PRINCIPLE. 

to  elucidate  the  subject ;  nor,  by  any  ingenuity  of 
such  speculation,  could  we  be  enabled  to  know 
more  concerning  these  senses  than  when  we  called 
them  sight  and  hearing.  In  the  same  manner,  it 
would  appear,  that  the  course  of  inquiry  respecting 
our  moral  feelings  is  simply  to  observe  what  these 
feelings  really  are  ;  and  what  are  their  obvious  tend- 
encies in  an  uncontaminated  mind.  When  we  have 
done  so  on  adequate  foundation,  I  conceive  we  have 
every  reason  for  considering  them  as  principles  im- 
planted in  us  by  the  Creator,  for  our  guidance  in 
our  present  relations  ;  and,  like  the  functions  of  our 
bodies,  so  the  powers  and  feelings  of  our  minds 
show  a  wonderful  adaptation  and  design,  worthy  of 
Iheir  Omnipotent  cause.  But,  we  can  know  nothing 
of  them  beyond  the  facts, — and  nothing  is  to  be 
gained  by  any  attempt,  however  ingenious,  to  sim- 
plify or  explain  them.  We  have  formerly  had  occa- 
sion to  allude  to  various  speculations,  of  a  similar 
character,  respecting  the  powers  of  perception  and 
simple  intellect, — all  of  which  have  now  given  way 
before  the  general  admission  of  the  truth,  that,  on  the 
questions  to  which  they  refer,  no  human  sagacity 
can  carry  us  one  step  beyond  the  simple  knowledge 
of  the  facts. 

It  will  probably  be  admitted,  that  there  have  been 
many  similar  unprofitable  speculations  in  the  phi- 
/osophyof  the  moral  feelings;  and  that  these  specula- 
tions, instead  of  throwing  any  light  upon  the  subject, 
iiave  tended  rather  to  withdraw  the  attention  of 
inquirers  from  the  questions  of  deep  and  serious 
anportance  connected  with  the  investigation.  Among 


THEORIES    OF    MORALS.  151 

these,  perhaps,  we  may  reckon  some  of  the  doc- 
trines which  hold  a  prominent  place  in  the  history  of 
this  branch  of  science,  under  the  name  of  Theories 
of  JVEorals.  These  doctrines  agree  in  admitting  the 
fact,  that  there  are  among  mankind  certain  notions 
respecting  right  and  wrong, — moral  and  immoral 
actions  ;  and  they  then  profess  to  account  for  these 
impressions,  or  to  explain  how  men  come  to  think 
one  action  right  and  another  wrong.  A  brief  view  of 
these  theories  may  properly  belong  to  an  outline  of 
this  department  of  science. 

In  contemplating  the  conduct  of  men  as  placed 
in  certain  relations  towards  each  other,  we  perceive 
some  actions  which  we  pronounce  to  be  right,  and 
others  which  we  pronounce  to  be  wrong.  In  form- 
ing our  opinion  of  them  in  this  manner,  we  refer  to 
the  intentions  of  the  actor,  and,  if  we  are  satisfied 
that  he  really  intended  what  we  see  to  be  the  effect 
or  the  tendency  of  his  conduct,  or  even  that  he  pur- 
posed something  which  he  was  prevented  from  ac- 
complishing, we  view  him  with  feelings  of  moral 
approbation  or  disapprobation, — or,  in  other  words, 
apply  to  him  the  award  of  praise  or  blame.  Such 
is  our  simple  idea  of  virtue  or  vice,  as  applied  either 
to  the  act  or  the  agent.  We  have  a  conviction  that 
there  is  a  line  of  conduct  to  which  ourselves  and 
others  are  bound  by  a  certain  kind  of  obligation : 
a  departure  from  this  constitutes  moral  demerit 
or  vice  ;  a  correct  observance  of  it  constitutes 
virtue. 

This  appears  to  be  the  simple  view  of  our  primary 


152  THE    MORAL   PRINCIPLE. 

impression  of  vice  and  virtue.  The  next  question 
is,  what  is  the  origin  of  the  impression,  or  on  what 
ground  is  it  that  we  conclude  certain  actions  to  be 
right,  and  others  wrong  ?  Is  it  merely  from  a  view 
of  their  consequences  to  ourselves  or  others  1  or  do 
we  proceed  upon  an  absolute  conviction  of  certain 
conduct  being  right,  and  certain  other  wrong,  with- 
out carrying  the  mind  further  than  the  simple  act,  or 
the  simple  intention  of  the  actor, — without  any  con- 
sideration of  the  effects  or  the  tendencies  of  the 
action  ?  This  is  the  question  which  has  been  so 
keenly  agitated  in  the  speculations  of  Ethical  science, 
namely,  respecting  the  origin  and  nature  of  moral 
distinctions.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  contended, 
that  these  moral  impressions  are  in  themselves  im- 
mutable, and  that  an  absolute  conviction  of  their 
immutability  is  fixed  upon  us,  in  that  part  of  our  con- 
stitution which  we  call  conscience  ;  in  other  words, 
there  is  a  certain  conduct  to  which  we  are  bound  by 
a  feeling  of  obligation,  apart  from  all  other  considera- 
tions whatever ;  and  we  have  an  impression  that  a 
departure  from  this  in  ourselves  or  others  constitutes 
vice.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  maintained,  that  these 
distinctions  are  entirely  arbitrary,  or  arise  out  of  cir- 
cumstances, so  that  what  is  vice  in  one  case  may  be 
virtue  in  another.  Those  who  have  adopted  the 
latter  hypothesis  have  next  to  explain,  what  the  cir- 
cumstances are  which  give  rise,  in  this  manner,  to 
our  impressions  of  vice  and  virtue,  moral  approba- 
tion or  disapprobation.  The  various  modes  of  ex- 
plaining this  impression  have  led  to  the  Theories  of 
Morals. 


THEORIES    OF   MORALS.  153 

The  system  of  Mandeville  ascribes  our  impres- 
sions of  moral  rectitude  entirely  to  the  enactments 
of  legislators.  Man,  he  says,  naturally  seeks  only 
his  own  gratification,  without  any  regard  to  the  hap- 
piness of  other  men.  But  legislators  found  that  it 
would  be  necessary  to  induce  him,  in  some  way,  to 
surrender  a  portion  of  his  personal  gratification  for 
the  good  of  others,  and  so  to  promote  the  peace  and 
harmony  of  society.  To  accompUsh  this  with  such 
a  selfish  being,  it  was  necessary  to  give  him  some 
equivalent  for  the  sacrifice  he  thus  made ;  and  the 
principle  of  his  nature  which  they  fixed  upon  for  this 
purpose  was  his  love  of  praise.  They  made  certain 
laws  for  the  general  good,  and  then  flattered  mankind 
into  the  belief  that  it  was  praiseworthy  to  observe 
them,  and  noble  to  sacrifice  a  certain  degree  of  their 
own  gratification  for  the  good  of  others.  What  we 
call  virtue  thus  resolves  itself  into  the  love  of  praise. 
In  regard  to  such  a  system  as  this,  it  has  been 
thought  suflicient  to  point  out  the  distinction,  between 
the  immutable  principles  of  morality  and  those  ar- 
rangements which  are  dependent  upon  mere  enact- 
ment. Such  are  many  of  the  regulations  and  re- 
strictions of  commerce.  They  are  intended  for  the 
pubHc  good,  and,  while  they  are  in  force,  it  is  the 
duty  of  every  good  citizen  to  obey  them.  A  change 
of  the  law,  however,  changes  their  character,  for 
they  possess  in  themselves  none  of  the  qualities  of 
merit  or  demerit.  But  no  laws  can  alter,  and  no 
statutes  modify,  those  great  principles  of  moral  con- 
duct which  are  graved  indelibly  on  the  conscience 


154  THE    MORAL    PRINCIPLE 

of  all  classes  of  men.  Kings,  it  has  been  said,  may 
make  laws,  but  cannot  create  a  virtue. 

By  another  modification  of  this  system,  our  im- 
pressions of  virtue  and  vice  are  said  to  be  derived 
entirely  from  mutual  compact.  Men,  finding  that 
there  was  a  certain  course  of  action  which  would 
contribute  to  their  mutual  advantage,  and  vice  versa, 
entered  into  an  agreement  to  observe  certain  con- 
duct, and  abstain  from  certain  other.  The  violation 
of  this  compact  constituted  vice,  the  observance  of 
it  virtue. 

By  a  theory,  supported  by  some  eminent  men,  as 
Clarke  and  Wollaston,  virtue  was  considered  to 
depend  on  a  conformity  of  the  conduct  to  a  certain 
sense  of  the  fitness  of  things, — or  the  truth  of  things. 
The  meaning  of  this,  it  must  be  confessed,  is  rather 
obscure.  It  however  evidently  refers  the  essence 
of  virtue  to  a  relation  perceived  by  a  process  of 
reason ;  and  therefore  may  be  held  as  at  variance 
with  the  belief  of  the  impression  being  universal. 

According  to  the  Theory  of  Utility,  as  warmly 
supported  by  Mr.  Hume,  we  estimate  the  virtue  of 
an  action  and  an  agent  entirely  by  their  usefulness. 
He  seems  to  refer  all  our  mental  impressions  to  two 
principles,  reason  and  taste.  Reason  gives  us  simply 
the  knowledge  of  truth  or  falsehood,  and  is  no  motive 
of  action.  Taste  gives  an  impression  of  pleasure  or 
pain,  and  so  constitutes  happiness  or  misery,  and 
becomes  a  motive  of  action.  To  this  he  refers  our 
impressions  of  beauty  and  deformity,  vice  and  virtue. 


THEORIES    OP    MORALS.  155 

He  has,  accordingly,  distinctly  asserted  that  the 
words  right  and  wrong  signify  nothing  more  than 
sweet  or  sour,  pleasant  or  painful,  being  only  effects 
upon  the  mind  of  the  spectator  produced  by  the  con- 
templation of  certain  conduct, — and  this,  as  we  have 
already  seen,  resolves  itself  into  the  impression  of 
its  usefulness.  An  obvious  objection  to  the  system 
of  utility  was,  that  it  might  be  applied  to  the  effects 
of  inanimate  matter  as  correctly  as  to  the  deeds  of  a 
voluntary  agent.  A  printing-press  or  a  steam-engine 
might  baas  n^eritorious  as  a  man  of  extensive  virtue. 
To  obviate  this,  Mr.  Hume  was  driven  to  a  distinc- 
tion, which  in  fact  amounted  to  giving  up  the  doc- 
trine, namely,  that  the  sense  of  utility  must  be  com- 
bined with  a  feeling  of  approbation.  This  leads  us 
back  to  the  previous  question,  on  what  this  feeling  of 
approbation  is  founded,  and  at  once  recognises  a 
principle,  distinct  from  the  mere  perception  of  utility. 
Virtuous  conduct  may  indeed  always  contribute  to 
general  utility,  or  general  happiness  ;  but  triis  is  an 
effect  only,  not  the  cause  or  the  principle  which  con- 
stitutes it  virtuous.  This  important  distinction  has 
been  well  stated  by  Professor  Mills  of  Oxford.  He 
defines  morality  to  be, — "  an  obedience  to  the  law 
and  constitution  of  man's  nature,  assigned  him  by 
the  Deity  in  conformity  to  his  own  essential  and 
unchangeable  attributes,  the  effect  of  which  is  the 
general  happiness  of  his  creatures."* 

We  come  now  to  the  Selfish  System  of  morals, 

*  Lecture  on  the  Theory  of  MoraT  Obligation.    Oxford,  1830. 


156  THE    MORAL   PRINCIPLE. 

according  to  which  the  fundamental  principle  of  the 
conduct  of  mankind  is  a  desire  to  promote  their  own 
gratification  or  interest.  This  theory  has  appeared 
in  various  forms,  from  a  very  early  period  in  the  his- 
tory of  Ethical  science ;  but  the  most  remarkable 
promoter  of  it  in  more  modem  times  was  Mr. 
Hobbes.  According  to  him,  man  is  influenced 
entirely  by  what  seems  calculated,  more  immediately, 
or  more  remotely,  to  promote  his  own  interest; 
whatever  does  so  he  considers  as  right, — the  oppo- 
site as  wrong.  He  is  driven  to  society  by  neces- 
sity, and  then,  whatever  promotes  the  general  good 
he  considers  as  ultimately  calculated  to  promote  his 
own.  This  system  is  founded  upon  a  fallacy  simi- 
lar to  that  referred  to  under  the  former  head.  Vir- 
tuous conduct  does  impart  gratification,  and  that  of 
the  highest  kind ;  and,  in  the  strictest  sense  of  the 
word,  it  promotes  the  true  interest  of  the  agent :  but 
this  tendency  is  the  effect,  not  the  cause  ;  and  never 
can  be  considered  as  the  principle  which  imparts  to 
conduct  its  character  of  virtue  ;  nor  do  we  perform 
it  merely  because  it  affords  us  gratification,  or  pro- 
motes our  interest.  The  hypothesis,  indeed,  may 
be  considered  as  distinctly  contradicted  by  facts, — 
for,  even  in  our  own  experience,  it  is  clear,  that  the 
pleasure  attending  an  act  of  generosity  or  virtue  in 
ourselves,  as  well  as  our  approbation  of  it  in  others, 
is  diminished  or  destroyed  by  the  impression  that 
there  was  a  selfish  purpose  to  answer  by  it. 

There  is  a  modification  of  the  selfish  system  which 
attempts  to  get  rid  of  its  more  offensive  aspect  by  a 


THEORIES    OF    MORALS.  157 

Bingular  and  circuitous  chain  of  moral  emotions. 
We  have  experienced,  it  is  said,  that  a  certain  atten- 
tion to  the  comfort  or  advantage  of  others  contrib- 
utes to  our  own.  A  kind  of  habit  is  thus  formed, 
by  which  we  come  at  last  to  seek  the  happiness 
of  others  for  their  own  sake ;  so  that,  by  this  pro- 
cess, actions  which  at  first  were  considered  only  as 
inexpedient,  from  being  opposed  to  self-love,  at 
length  and  insensibly  come  to  be  considered  as  im- 
moral. This  can  be  considered  as  nothing  more 
than  an  ingenious  play  upon  words,  and  deserves 
only  to  be  mentioned  as  an  historical  fact,  in  a  view 
of  those  speculations  by  which  this  important  subject 
has  been  obscured  and  bewildered. 

Another  modification  of  the  theories  of  morals 
remeuns  to  be  mentioned ;  namely,  that  of  the  dis- 
tmguished  Paley.  This  eminent  writer  is  decidedly 
opposed  to  (he  doctrine  of  a  moral  sense  or  moral 
principle  ;  but  the  system  which  he  proposes  to  sub- 
stitute in  its  place  must  be  acknowledged  to  be  liable 
to  considerable  objections.  He  commences  with 
the  proposition  that  virtue  is  doing  good  to  mankind, 
in  obedience  to  the  will  of  God,  and  for  the  sake  of 
everlasting  happiness.  The  good  of  mankind, 
therefore,  is  the  subject — the  will  of  God,  the  rule 
— and  everlasting  happiness,  the  motive  of  human 
virtue.  The  will  of  God,  he  subsequently  goes  on 
to  show,  is  made  known  to  us  partly  by  revelation, 
and  partly  by  what  we  discover  of  his,  designs  and 
dispositions  from  his  works,  or,  as  we  usually  call  it, 
the  light  of  nature.  From  this  last  source  he  thinks 
0 


158  THE    MORAL    PRINCIPLE. 

it  is  clearly  to  be  inferred,  that  God  wills  and  wishes 
the  happiness  of  his  creatures  ;  consequently  actions 
which  promote  that  will  and  wish  must  be  agreeable 
to  him,  and  the  contrary.  The  method  of  ascer- 
taining the  will  of  God  concerning  any  action,  by 
the  light  of  nature,  therefore,  is,  to  inquire  into  the 
tendency  of  the  action  to  promote  or  diminish  gene- 
ral happiness.  Proceeding  on  these  grounds,  he 
then  arrives  at  the  conclusion,  that  whatever  is  ex- 
pedient is  right ;  and  that  it  is  the  utility  of  any 
moral  rule  alone  which  constitutes  the  obligation  of 
it.  In  his  further  elucidation  of  this  theory.  Dr. 
Paley  admits,  that  an  action  may  be  useful  in  an 
individual  case  which  is  not  right.  To  constitute 
it  right,  it  is  necessary  that  it  shall  be  "  expedient 
upon  the  whole, — at  the  long  run,  in  all  its  effects, 
collateral  and  remote  as  well  as  those  which  are 
immediate  and  direct." 

Without  entering  on  the  various  peculiarities  of 
this  system,  there  are  two  considerations  which 
appear  to  be  serious  objections  to  it  as  a  doctrine  to 
be  applied  to  practical  purposes.  (1.)  If  we  sup- 
pose a  man  deliberating  respecting  an  action,  which 
he  perceives  would  be  eminently  expedient  and  use- 
ful in  an  individual  case,  and  which  he  feels  to  be 
highly  desirable  in  its  immediate  reference  to  that 
case  ;  we  may  naturally  ask  whether  he  is  in  a 
likely  condition  to  find  his  way  to  a  sound  conclu- 
sion respecting  the  consequences  of  the  action  "  upon 
the  whole,  at  the  long  run,  in  all  its  consequences, 
remote  and  collateral."  It  may  certainly  be  doubted, 
whether,  in  any  case,  there  is  not  great  danger  of 


THEORIES    OF   MORALS.  159 

differences  of  opinion  arising  respecting  this  ex- 
tended and  ultimate  expediency  of  an  action  ;  and, 
in  particular,  whether  in  the  man  now  referred  to, 
the  very  circumstances  of  his  perception  of  great  and 
immediate  utiUty,  and  the  state  of  desire  connected 
with  it,  do  not  constitute  a  moral  condition  which 
might  interfere,  in  a  very  material  degree,  with  his 
calculation  as  to  its  ultimate  expediency.  (2.)  In- 
dependently of  this  consideration,  we  may  be  allowed 
to  doubt,  whether  any  human  being  can  arrive  at 
such  an  extensive  knowledge,  as  this  theory  seems 
to  render  necessary,  of  all  the  consequences  of  an 
action,  remote  and  collateral.  This  would  appear 
to  constitute  a  kind  and  a  degree  of  knowledge  to 
be  found  only  in  the  omniscience  of  the  Deity. 

If  these  observations  are  well  founded,  I  think  we 
cannot  hesitate  to  maintain,  that,  on  such  a  nice  cal- 
culation of  consequences,  it  is  impossible  to  found  a 
rule  of  morals  in  any  degree  adapted  to  the  neces- 
sities of  man.  The  same  objection  applies  to  every 
doctrine  which  does  not  recognise  the  supreme 
authority  of  conscience  as  an  original  part  of  our 
moral  constitution,  warning  us  of  certain  conduct 
as  immutably  right,  and  certain  other  conduct  as 
immutably  wrong,  without  any  regard  either  to  our 
own  advantage  or  to  our  judgment  of  the  tendency 
of  the  deeds.  Whenever  we  depart  from  this  great 
principle,  we  reduce  every  moral  decision  to  what 
must  primarily  be  a  process  of  reasoning,  and  in 
which,  consequently,  there  may  be  differences  of 
opinion  respecting  the  tendency  of  actions,  instead 
of  that  absolute  conviction  which  the  deep  import- 


160  THE    MORAL    PRINCIPLE. 

ance  of  the  subject  renders  indispensable.  It  may, 
further,  be  confidently  stated  as  a  matter  of  fact,  that 
a  conscientious  man,  in  considering  an  action  which 
involves  a  point  of  moral  duty,  does  not  enter  upon 
any  such  calculation  of  its  consequences.  He 
simply  asks  himself,  is  it  right  1  and  so  decides, 
according  to  an  impulse  within  which  he  feels  tc  be 
a  part  of  his  moral  constitution,  susceptible  of  no 
explanation,  and  not  admitting  of  being  referred  to 
any  other  principle. 

The  foundation  of  all  these  Theories  of  Morals, 
then,  seems  to  be  the  impression,  that  there  is 
nothing  right  or  wrong,  just  or  unjust  in  itself;  but 
that  our  ideas  of  right  and  wrong,  justice  and  in- 
justice arise  either  from  actual  law  or  mutual  com- 
pact,— or  from  our  view  of  the  tendencies  of  actions. 
There  is  another  modification  of  these  theories,  but 
liable  to  similar  objecfion,  which  ascribes  the  origin 
of  right  and  wrong  directly  to  the  will  of  the  Deity, 
and  holds  that  there  is  nothing  wrong  which  might 
not  have  been  right,  if  he  had  so  ordained  it.  By 
the  immutability  of  moral  distinctions,  as  opposed 
to  all  these  theories,  we  mean — that  there  are  cer- 
tain actions  which  are  immutably  right,  and  which 
we  are  bound  in  duty  to  perform,  and  certain  actions 
which  are  immutably  wrong,  apart  from  any  othei 
consideration  whatever ;  and  that  an  absolute  con- 
viction of  this  is  fixed  upon  us,  in  the  moral  princi- 
ple or  conscience,  independently  of  knowledge  de- 
rived from  any  other  source  respecting  the  will  or 
laws  of  the  Almighty.     By  thi^  system,  therefore, 


THEORIES    OF    MORALS.  161 

which  refers  our  moral  impressions  to  the  supreme 
authority  of  conscience,  a  principle  is  disclosed, 
which,  independently  even  of  revelation,  not  only 
establishes  an  absolute  conviction  of  the  laws  of 
moral  rectitude,  but  leads  us  to  the  impression  of 
moral  responsibiUty  and  a  moral  Governor,  and, 
as  immediately  flowing  from  this,  a  state  of  future 
retribution.  We  have  already  shown  this  to  accord 
with  the  declarations  of  the  sacred  writings,  and  it  is 
evidently  the  only  system  on  which  we  can  account 
for  that  uniformity  of  moral  sentiment  which  is  abso- 
lutely required  for  the  harmonies  of  society.  For 
it  is,  in  fact,  on  a  conviction  of  the  immutability  of 
this  feeling  in  ourselves, — and  of  the  existence  of  a 
similar  and  universal  principle  in  others, — that  is 
founded  all  the  mutual  confidence  which  keeps  man- 
kind together.  It  is  this  reciprocity  of  moral  feeling 
ttiat  proves  a  constant  check  upon  the  conduct  of 
men  in  the  daily  transactions  of  life  ;  but,  to  answer 
this  purpose,  there  is  evidently  required  an  impres- 
sion of  its  uniformity, — or  a  conviction  that  the 
actions  which  we  disapprove  in  others  will  be  con- 
demned in  us  by  the  unanimous  decision  of  other 
men.  It  is  equally  clear  that  we  have  no  such  im- 
pression of  a  uniformity  of  sentiment  on  any  other 
subject,  except  on  those  referable  to  the  class  of 
first  truths  ;  and  this  immediately  indicates  a  marked 
distinction  between  our  moral  impressions,  and  any 
of  those  conclusions  at  which  we  arrive  by  a  process 
of  the  understanding.  It  is  clear,  also,  that  this 
uniformity  can  arise  from  no  system  which  either 
refers  us  directly  to  the  will  of  God,  or  is  liable  to 
02 


162  THE    MORAL    PRINCIPLE. 

be  affected  by  the  differences  which  may  exist  in 
the  judgment,  the  moral  taste,  the  personal  feel- 
ings, or  the  interests  of  different  individuals.  It 
must  be,  in  itself,  fixed  and  immutable,  conveying  an 
absolute  conviction,  which  admits  of  no  doubt  and 
no  difference  of  opinion.  Such  is  the  great  princi- 
ple of  conscience.  However  its  warnings  may  be 
neglected,  and  its  influence  obscured  by  passion  and 
moral  degradation,  it  still  asserts  its  right  to  govern 
the  whole  man.  "  Had  it  strength,"  says  Butler, 
"  as  it  had  right, — had  it  power,  as  it  had  manifest 
authority,  it  would  absolutely  govern  the  world." 

It  remains  only  that  we  briefly  notice  the  system 
of  Dr.  Adam  Smith,  commonly  called  the  theory  of 
Sympathy.  According  to  this  ingenious  writer,  it  is 
required  for  our  moral  sentiments  respecting  an 
action,  that  we  enter  into  the  feelings  both  of  the 
agent  and  of  him  to  whom  the  action  relates.  If 
we  sympathize  with  the  feelings  and  intentions  of  the 
agent,  we  approve  of  his  conduct  as  right, — if  not, 
we  consider  it  as  wrong.  If,  in  the  individual  to 
whom  the  action  refers,  we  sympathize  with  a  feel- 
ing of  gratitude,  we  regard  the  agent  as  worthy  of 
praise, — if  with  a  feeling  of  resentment,  the  contrary. 
We  thus  observe  our  feelings  respecting  the  conduct 
of  others,  in  cases  in  which  we  are  not  personally 
concerned, — then  apply  these  rules  to  ourselves  ;  and 
thus  judge  of  our  own  conduct.  This  very  obvious 
statement,  however,  of  what  every  man  feels,  does 
not  supply  the  place  of  a  fundamental  rule  of  right 
and  wrong ;  and  indeed  Dr.  Smith  does  not  appear 


OFFICE    OF    REASON.  163 

to  contend  that  it  does  so.  It  applies  only  to  the  ap- 
plication of  a  principle,  not  to  the  origin  of  it.  Our 
sympathy  can  never  be  supposed  to  constitute  an 
action  right  or  wrong ;  but  it  enables  us  to  apply  to 
individual  cases  a  principle  of  right  and  wrong 
derived  from  another  source  ;  and  to  clear  our  judg- 
ment in  doing  so,  from  the  bUnding  influence  of 
those  selfish  feelings  by  which  we  are  so  apt  to  be 
misled  when  we.  apply  it  directly  to  ourselves.  In 
estimating  our  own  conduct,  we  then  apply  to  it 
tliose  conclusions  which  we  have  made  with  regard 
to  the  conduct  of  others, — or  we  imagine  others 
applying  the  same  process  in  regard  to  us,  and  con- 
sider how  our  conduct  would  appear  to  an  impartial 
observer. 

In  regard  to  the  whole  of  this  subject,  an  im- 
portant distinction  is  to  be  made  between  the  fun- 
damental principle,  from  which  actions  derive  their 
character  of  right  and  wrong, — and  the  application 
of  reason  in  judging  of  their  tendencies.  Before 
concluding  this  part  of  the  subject,  therefore,  we 
have  to  add  a  very  few  observations  on  the  influence 
exerted  on  our  moral  decisions  by  reason, — always, 
however,  in  subserviency  to  the  great  principle  of 
conscience.  The  office  of  reason  appears  to  be, 
in  the  first  place,  to  judge  of  the  expediency,  pro- 
priety, and  consequences  of  actions,  which  do  not 
involve  any  feeling  of  moral  duty.  In  regard  to  the 
affections,  again,  a  process  of  reason  is  often  neces- 
sary, not  only  respecting  the  best  mode  of  exercising 
them,  but  also,  m  many  cases,  in  deciding  whether 


164  THE    MORAL   PRINCIPLE. 

we  shall  exercise  them  at  all.  Thus,  we  may  feel 
compassion  in  a  particular  instance,  but  perceive  the 
individual  to  be  so  unworthy  that  what  we  could  do 
would  be  of  no  benefit  to  him.  In  such  a  case  we 
may  feel  it  to  be  a  matter  not  only  of  prudence,  but 
of  duty,  to  resist  the  affection,  and  to  reserve  the  aid 
we  have  to  bestow  for  persons  more  deserving. 

In  cases  in  which  an  impression  of  moral  duty  is 
concerned,  an  exercise  of  reason  is  still,  in  many 
instances,  necessary  for  enabling  us  to  adapt  our 
means  to  the  end  which  we  desire  to  accomplish. 
We  may  feel  an  anxious  wish  to  promote  the  interest 
or  relieve  the  distress  of  another,  or  to  perform  some 
high  and  important  duty, — but  call  reason  to  our 
aid  respecting  the  most  effectual  and  the  most  judi- 
cious means  of  doing  so.  Conscience,  in  such 
cases,  produces  the  intention, — reason  suggests  the 
means  :  and  it  is  familiar  to  every  one  that  these  do 
not  always  harmonize.  Thus,  a  man  may  be  sound 
in  his  intentions,  who  errs  in  judgment  respecting 
the  means  for  carrying  them  into  effect.  In  such 
cases,  we  attach  our  feeling  of  moral  approbation  to 
the  intention  only ;  we  say  the  man  meant  well,  but 
erred  in  judgment ;  and  to  this  error  we  affix  no 
feeling  of  moral  disapprobation, — unless,  perhaps, 
in  some  cases,  we  may  blame  him  for  acting  pre- 
cipitately on  his  own  judgment,  instead  of  taking 
the  advice  of  those  quaUfied  to  direct  him.  We 
expect  such  a  man  to  acquire  wisdom  from  experi- 
ence, by  observing  the  deficiency  of  his  judgment 
in  reference  to  his  intentions  ;  and,  in  future  in- 
stances, to  learn  to  take  advice.     There  are  other 


OFFICE    OF    REASON.  165 

circumstances  in  which  an  exercise  of  reason  is 
frequently  brought  into  action  in  regard  to  moral 
decisions ;  as  in  some  cases  in  which  one  duty- 
appears  to  interfere  with  another ;  likewise  in  judg- 
.  ing  whether,  in  particular  instances,  any  rule  of  duty 
is  concerned,  or  whether  we  are  at  liberty  to  take  up 
the  case  simply  as  one  of  expediency  or  utility.  In 
making  their  decisions  in  doubtful  cases,  we  observe 
great  differences  in  the  habits  of  judging  in  different 
individuals.  One  shows  the  most  minute  and  scru- 
pulous anxiety  to  discover  whether  the  case  involves 
any  principle  of  duty, — and  a  similar  anxiety  in 
acting  suitably  when  he  has  discovered  it.  This  is 
what  we  call  a  strictly  conscientious  man.  Another, 
who  shows  no  want  of  a  proper  sense  of  duty  when 
the  line  is  clearly  drawn,  has  less  anxiety  in  such 
cases  as  these,  and  may  sacrifice  minute  or  doubt- 
ful points  to  some  other  feehng, — as  self-interest,  or 
even  friendship, — where  the  former  individual  might 
have  discovered  a  principle  of  duty. 

Reason  is  also  concerned  in  judging  of  a  de- 
scription of  cases  in  which  a  modification  of  moral 
feeling  arises  from  the  complexity  of  actions, — or, 
in  other  words,  from  the  circumstances  in  which  the 
individual  is  placed.  This  may  be  illustrated  by  the 
difference  of  moral  sentiment  which  we  attach  to  the 
act  of  taking  away  the  life  of  another, — ^when  this  is 
done  by  an  individual  under  the  impulse  of  revenge, 
— ^by  the  same  individual  in  self-defence, — or  by  a 
judge  in  the  discharge  of  his  public  duty. 

There  is  still  another  office  frequently  assigned 


166  THE    MORAL    PRINCIPLE. 

to  reason  in  moral  decisions, — as  when  we  speak  of 
a  man  acting  upon  reason  as  opposed  to  passion. 
This  however  is,  correctly  speaking,  only  a  different 
use  of  the  term  ;  and  it  means  that  he  acts  upon  a 
calm  consideration  of  the  motives  by  which  he 
ought  to  be  influenced,  instead  of  being  hurried  aw^ay 
by  a  desire  or  an  aflfection  which  has  been  allowed 
to  usurp  undue  influence. 

The  important  distinction,  therefore,  which  these 
observations  have  been  intended  to  illustrate  may 
be  briefly  recapitulated  in  the  following  manner.  The 
aspect  of  actions,  as  right  or  wrong,  is  founded  upon 
a  principle  in  the  human  mind  entirely  distinct  from 
a  simple  exercise  of  reason, — and  the  standard  of 
moral  rectitude  derived  from  this  source  is,  in  its 
own  nature,  fixed  and  immutable.  But  there  are 
many  cases  in  which  an  exercise  of  reason  may  be 
employed  in  referring  particular  actions  to  this  stand- 
ard, or  trying  them,  as  it  were,  by  means  of  it.  Any 
such  mental  process,  however,  is  only  to  be  con- 
sidered as  a  kind  of  test  applied  to  individual 
instances,  and  must  not  be  confounded  with  the 
standard  to  which  it  is  the  office  of  this  test  to  refer 
them.  Right  or  virtuous  conduct  does,  in  point  of 
fact,  contribute  to  general  utility,  as  well  as  to  the 
advantage  of  the  individual,  in  the  true  and  extended 
sense  of  that  term,  and  these  tendencies  are  per- 
ceived by  reason.  But  it  is  neither  of  these  that 
constitutes  it  right.  This  is  founded  entirely  on  a 
different  principle, — ^the  immutable  rule  of  moral 
rectitude ;  it  is  perceived  by  a  different  part  of  our 


HARMONY  OF  THE  MORAL  FEELINGS.    167 

constitution, — the  moral  principle,  or  conscience  ; 
and,  by  the  operation  of  this  principle,  we  pronounce 
it  right,  without  any  reference  to  its  consequences 
either  to  ourselves  or  others. 


^  11.  OF  THE  HARMONY  OF  THE  MORAL 
FEELINGS. 

On  whatever  system  we  may  consider  the  moral 
feelings,  we  perceive  that  there  are  various  classes 
of  them, — each  answering  a  special  purpose  in  our 
various  relations  as  accountable  beings.  Some  of 
them,  we  have  seen^  relate  to  objects  of  desire,  the 
attainment  of  which  appears  hkely  to  bring  satisfac- 
tion. Others  lead  us  to  those  relations  which  we 
bear  to  our  fellow-men.  A  third  class,  which  re- 
mains to  be  considered,  calls  our  attention  to  the 
relation  in  which  we  stand  to  the  moral  Governor  of 
the  universe,  and  to  a  certain  regulation  of  the  moral 
feelings  arising  out  of  this  relation.  '  But  there  is 
still  another  inquiry  of  the  deepest  interest  connected 
with  this  subject,  namely,  regarding  the  harmony,  or 
principle  of  arrangement,  which  these  various  classes 
of  moral  emotions  ought  to  bear  towards  each  other. 
They  all  form  parts  of  our  constitution,  and  deserve 
a  certain  degree  of  attention,  which  must  be  care- 
fully adapted  to  the  relative  importance  of  each ;  and 
the  correct  adjustment  of  this  harmony  is  one  of  the 


168  THE    MORAL   PRIXCIPLE. 

objects  to  be  answered  by  the  moral  principle,  com- 
bined with  a  sound  exercise  of  judgment.  The 
rules  which  apply  to  it  may  be  stated  in  the  follow- 
ing manner. 

When  we  consider  man  as  an  immortal  being, 
passing  through  a  course  of  discipline  to  another 
state  of  existence,  it  is  obvious  that  his  highest  con- 
sideration is  his  own  moral  condition,  and  the  aspect 
in  which  he  stands  towards  the  Deity.  In  imme- 
diate connexion  with  this  first  of  all  concerns  are  the 
great  and  general  principles  of  justice  and  veracity, 
as  referring  to  our  connexion  with  all  mankind,  and 
a  class  of  private  responsibilities  which  peculiarly 
regard  each  individual  in  his  domestic  relations ; 
such  as  the  duties  of  children  to  their  parents,  and 
parents  to  their  children ;  the  latter,  particularly, 
presenting  a  class  of  the  most  solemn  kind,  as  it 
embraces  the  concerns  of  the  present  hfe,  and  of 
that  which  is  to  come.  Then  follow  the  duties  of 
benevolence,  friendship,  and  patriotism  ;  after  these, 
the  ordinary  avocations  of  life,  as  the  acquisition  of 
knowledge  and  the  pursuits  of  business  ;  and,  finally, 
those  personal  recreations  and  enjoyments,  which, 
when  kept  in  their  proper  place,  are  legitimate  and 
necessary  to  every  human  being.  These  are  all 
proper  and  laudable,  provided  they  are  kept  in  a 
proper  subserviency  to  each  other.  But  the  import- 
ant consideration  is,  that  a  man  may  be  acting  un- 
worthily of  his  moral  nature,  when  he  devotes  him- 
self to  any  one  of  them  in  a  manner  which  encroaches 
upon  the  harmony  of  the  whole. 

To  begin  with  the  lowest  of  them,  it  is  unneces- 


HARMONY  OP  THE  MORAL  FEELINGS.    169 

sary  to  state  how  this  remark  appUes  to  the  man 
whose  life  is  devoted  to  pursuits  which  rank  no 
higher  than  recreation  or  amusement.     It  must  be 
obvious  to  every  one  of  the   smallest  degree  of 
reflection,  that  such  a  man  is  living  only  for  the 
present   life.      What   cannot   be   denied   of  mere 
amusement  must  also  be  admitted  respecting  a  life 
of  business,  however  important  in  themselves  the 
concerns  may  be  which  engross  the  mind.     They 
still  refer  only  to  present  things,  and  carry  not  the 
thoughts   beyond   the   moment   which  bounds  the 
period  of  moral  discipline.*    Even  the  engagements 
of  benevolence  and  public  usefulness,  estimable  as 
they  are,  may  be  allowed  to  usurp  an  improper  place ; 
and  they  do  so  if  they  withdraw  the  attention  from 
responsibilities  and  duties  which  belong  more  par- 
ticularly to  ourselves  as  individuals — such  as  the 
duties  of  parents  and  of  children, — and  the  other 
claims  which  arise  out  of  the  relations  of  domestic 
life.     Finally,  it  is  ever  to  be  kept  in  mind,  that  no 
engagements  of  any  description  must  be  allowed  to 
interfere  with  obligations  of  the  highest  interest  to 
every  man, — those  which  relate  to  his  own  moral 
condition,  in  the  sight  of  Him  who  is  now  his  wit- 
ness, and  will  soon  be  his  Judge.     From  want  of 
due  attention  to  this  consideration,  year  after  year 
glides  over  us,  and  life  hastens  to  its  close,  amid 
cares  and  toils  and  anxieties  which  relate  only  to 
the  present  world.     Thus  fame  may  be  acquired, 
or  wealth  accumulated  ;  or,  after  a  laborious  ascent, 
a  man  may  have  gained  the  height  of  ambition, — 
when  the  truth  bursts  upon  him  that  life  is  nearly 
P 


170  THE    MORAL    PRIJfCIPLE. 

over,  while  its  great  business  is  yet  to  begin, — the 
preparation  of  the  moral  being  for  an  eternal  exist- 
ence. 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  add,  on  the  other  hand, 
that  attention  to  this  first  of  all  concerns  must  not 
be  allowed  to  estrange  the  mind  from  the  various 
duties  and  responsibilities  of  active  life.  It  is  only, 
indeed,  when  the  conduct  is  regulated  by  partial  and 
unsound  motives,  that  some  of  these  objects  of 
attention  are  allowed  to  usurp  the  place  of  others. 
He  who  acts,  not  from  the  high  principles  of  moral 
duty,  but  from  a  desire  of  notoriety,  or  the  applause 
of  man,  may  devote  himself  to  much  benevolence 
and  usefulness  of  a  public  and  ostensible  kind ; 
while  he  neglects  duties  of  a  higher,  though  more 
private  nature, — and  overlooks  entirely,  it  may  be, 
his  own  moral  condition.  The  ascetic,  on  the  other 
hand,  shuts  himself  up  in  his  cell,  and  imagines  that 
he  pleases  God  by  meditation  and  voluntary  austeri- 
ties. But  this  is  not  the  part  of  him  who  truly  feels 
his  varied  relations,  and  correctly  estimates  his  true 
responsibilities.  It  is  striking,  also,  to  remark,  how 
the  highest  principles  lead  to  a  character  of  harmony 
and  consistency,  which  all  inferior  motives  fail  en- 
tirely in  producing.  The  man  who  estimates  most 
deeply  and  correctly  his  own  moral  relations  to  an 
ever-present  and  presiding  Deity  will  also  fee]  his 
way  through  the  various  duties  of  life,  with  a  degree 
of  attention  adapted  to  each  of  them.  In  the  retire- 
ments of  domestic  life,  he  is  found  in  the  anxious 
discharge  of  the  high  responsibilities  which  arise  out 
of  its  relations.     He  is  found  in  the  path  of  private 


HARMONY  OF  THE  MORAL  FEELINGS.    171 

benevolence  and  public  usefulness,  manifesting  the 
kind  and  brotherly  interest  of  one  who  acts  on  the 
purest  of  all  motives, — the  love  of  God,  and  a  prin- 
ciple of  devotedness  to  his  service.  Whether  ex- 
posed to  the  view  of  his  fellow-men,  or  seen  only  by 
Him  who  seeth  in  secret,  his  conduct  is  the  same, — 
for  the  principles  on  which  he  acts  have  in  both 
situations  equal  influence.  In  the  ordinary  con- 
cerns of  life,  the  power  of  these  principles  is  equally 
obvious.  Whether  he  engage  in  its  business  or 
partake  of  its  enjoyments  ;  whether  he  encounter  its 
difficulties,  or  meet  its  pains,  disappointments,  and 
sorrows, — ^he  walks  through  the  whole  with  the  calm 
dignity  of  one  who  views  all  the  events  of  the  pres- 
ent life  in  their  immediate  reference  to  a  life  which 
is  to  come. 

The  high  consistency  of  character  which  results 
from  this  regulated  condition  of  the  moral  feelings 
tends  thus  to  promote  a  due  attention  to  the  various 
responsibilities  connected  with  the  situation  in  which 
the  individual  is  placed.  It  does  so  by  leading  him, 
with  anxious  consideration,  to  feel  his  way  through 
these  requirements,  arid  to  recognise  the  supreme 
authority  of  conscience  over  his  whole  moral  sys- 
tem. It  does  so,  especially,  by  habitually  raising 
his  views  to  the  eternal  One,  who  is  the  witness  of 
all  his  conduct,  and  to  whom  he  is  responsible  for 
his  actions  in  each  relation  of  life.  It  thus  tends  to 
preserve  him  from  all  those  partial  and  inconsistent 
courses  into  which  men  are  led  by  the  mere  desire 
of  approbation,  or  love  of  distinction,  or  by  any 


172  THE    MORAL    PRINCIPLE. 

other  of  those   inferior  motives  which  are   really 
resolvable  into  self-love. 

Such  uniformity  of  moral  feeling  is  equally  op- 
posed to  another  distortion  of  character,  not  less  at 
variance  with  a  sound  condition  of  the  mind.  This 
is  what  may  be  called  religious  pretension,  showing 
itself  by  much  zeal  for  particular  opinions  and  cer- 
tain external  observances,  while  there  is  no  corres- 
ponding influence  upon  the  moral  feelings  and  the 
character.  The  truths  which  form  the  great  object 
of  religious  belief  are  of  so  momentous  a  kind,  that,  ^ 
when  they  are  really  believed,  they  cannot  fail  to 
produce  effects  of  the  most  decided  and  most  ex- 
tensive nature ;  and,  where  this  influence  is  not 
steadily  exhibited,  there  is  a  fatal  error  in  the  moral 
economy, — there  is  either  self-deception,  or  an  in- 
tention to  deceive  others.  From  such  inconsistency 
of  character  arises  an  evil,  which  has  a  most  inju- 
rious influence  upon  two  descriptions  of  persons. 
Those  of  one  class  are  led  to  assign  an  undue  im- 
portance to  the  profession  of  a  peculiar  creed^  and 
the  mere  externals  of  religion, — to  certain  observ- 
ances which  are  considered  as  characteristic  of  a 
particular  party,  and  to  abstinence  from  certain  in- 
dulgences or  pursuits  which  that  party  disapprove. 
Those  of  the  other  class,  finding,  in  many  instances, 
much  zeal  for  these  peculiarities,  without  a  state  of 
moral  feeling  adapted  to  the  truths  which  are  pro- 
fessed, are  apt  to  consider  the  whole  as  either  pre- 
tence or  delusion. 

In  their  mutual  error  there  is  to  both  matter  of  im- 
portant warning.     It  becomes  the  latter  to  beware, 


HARMONY  OF  THE  MORAL  FEELINGS.    173 

lest,  misled  by  the  failings  of  weak  or  inconsistent 
men,  they  withdraw  their  attention  from  truths  of 
solemn  import  to  themselves  as  moral  beings. 
There  may  be  much  pretension  where  there  is  no 
real  feeling ;  but  are  they  from  this  entitled  to  infer 
that  there  is  not  a  reality  in  that  which  these  pretend- 
ers counterfeit  ]  By  a  slight  gilding,  articles  of 
trifling  value  are  made  to  assume  the  appearance  of 
gold ;  but  would  it  be  reasonable  to  contend,  that  there 
are  no  articles  of  intrinsic  worth  which  these  are  made 
to  imitate  1  The  fair  induction  is,  in  both  instances, 
the  opposite.  Were  there  no  such  articles  of  pure 
gold,  this  ingenuity  would  not  be  employed  in  fabri- 
cating base  imitations  ;  and  the  hypocrite  would  not 
assume  qualities  he  does  not  possess,  were  they  not 
real  virtues,  from  a  resemblance  to  which  he  hopes 
to  procure  for  his  character  that  ostensible  vsdue 
which  may  enable  it  to  deceive.  But  let  those  who 
have  detected  this  deception  beware  of  founding  upon 
it  conclusions  which  it  does  not  warrant.  They 
have  not  found  the  reality  here,  but  there  is  not  the 
less  a  pure  and  high  standard  which  claims  their  ut- 
most regard.  If  they  search  for  it  either  among  in- 
consistent or  among  designing  men,  they  seek  the 
living  among  the  dead.  Let  them  contemplate  it 
especially  as  it  is  displayed  in  the  character  of  the 
Messiah  ;  in  him  it  was  exhibited  in  a  manner  which 
demands  the  imitation  of  every  rational  man,  while  it 
challenges  the  cordial  assent  of  the  most  acute  under- 
standing, that  this  is  the  perfection  of  a  moral  being. 
On  the  odier  hand,  let  diose  who  profess  to  be  in- 
fluenced by  the  highest  of  all  motives  study  to  exhibit 
P2 


174  THE    MORAL    PRINCIPLE. 

their  habitual  influence  in  a  consistent  uniformity  of 
the  whole  character.  It  is  easy  to  acquire  a  pecu- 
liar phraseology,  to  show  much  zeal  for  peculiar 
opinions,  and  rigid  attention  to  pecuhar  observances  ; 
and,  among  a  party,  it  is  not  difficult  to  procure  a 
name,  by  condemning  certain  other  comphances 
which  by  them  are  technically  styled  the  manners  of 
the  world.  But  all  this,  it  is  evident,  may  be  assumed ; 
it  may  be,  and  probably  often  is,  no  better  than,  a 
name ;  it  often  amounts  to  nothing  more  than  sub- 
stituting one  kind  of  excitement  for  another,  while 
the  moral  being  continues  unchanged.  True  reli- 
gion is  seated  in  the  heart,  and  sends  out  from  thence 
a  purifying  influence  of  the  whole  character.  In  its 
essential  nature  it  is  a  contest  within,  open  only  to  the 
eye  of  Him  who  seeth  in  secret.  It  seeks  not,  there- 
fore, the  applause  of  men :  and  it  shrinks  from  that 
spurious  religionism  whose  prominent  characters  are 
talk,  and  pretension,  and  external  observance,  often 
accompanied  by  uncharitable  censure.  Like  its 
divine  pattern,  it  is  meek  and  lowly, — "  it  is  pure  and 
peaceable,  gentle  and  easy  to  be  entreated,  full  of 
mercy  and  of  good  fruits,  without  partiality,  and  with- 
out hypocrisy."  It  aims  not  at  an  ostentatious  dis- 
play of  principles,  but  a  steady  exhibition  of  fruits. 
Qualities  which  it  cultivates  with  especial  care  are 
humility,  and  charity,  and  mercy, — the  mortification 
of  every  selfish  passion,  and  the  denial  of  every  sel- 
fish indulgence.  When  thus  exhibited  in  its  true  and 
genuine  characters,  it  commands  the  respect  of  every 
sound  understanding,  and  challenges  the  assent  of  all 
to  its  reality  and  its  truth,  as  the  highest  principle  that 
can  regulate  the  conduct  of  a  moral  being. 


PART  IV- 


OF  THE  MORAL  RELATION  OF  MAN  TOWARDS 
THE  DEITY. 


The  healthy  state  of  a  moral  being  is  strikingly 
referred,  in  the  sacred  writings,  to  three  great  heads  : 
— justice,  benevolence,  and  a  conformity  of  the 
moral  feelings  to  a  reverential  sense  of  the  presence 
and  perfections  of  the  Deity  ;  "  to  do  justly, — ^to 
love  mercy, — and  to  walk  humbly  with  thy  God." 
The  two  fonner  of  these  topics  lead  us  to  the  duties 
which  a  man  owes  to  his  fellow-men ;  the  latter 
calls  our  attention  to  that  homage  of  the  mind  and  of 
the  heart  which  he  owes  peculiarly  to  God.  For  the 
duties  of  the  former  class  we  are  equally  responsible 
to  Him  as  the  moral  governor  of  the  universe,  but 
their  immediate  reference  is  to  our  connexions  with 
other  men  ;  those  of  the  latter  class  respect  our  re- 
lation to  the  Deity  himself,  and  consequently  consist, 
in  a  great  measure,  in  the  purity  and  devotedness  of 
the  mind.  In  human  systems  of  etliics,  attention  has 
been  chiefly  directed  to  the  obligations  of  social  and 
relative  morality ;  but  the  two  classes  are  closely 


176  THE    MORAL    RELATION    OF    MAN 

associated  in  the  sacred  writings  ;  and  the  sound  con- 
dition of  the  moral  feelings  is  pointed  out  as  that 
acquirement  which,  along  with  a  corresponding  in- 
tegrity of  character,  qualifies  man,  in  an  especial  man- 
ner, for  intercourse  with  the  Deity.  "  Who  shall 
ascend  into  the  hill  of  the  Lord,  or  who  shall  stand 
in  his  holy  place  ?  He  that  hath  clean  hands  and  a 
pure  heart,  who  hath  not  lifted  up  his  soul  unto  vanity, 
nor  sworn  deceitfully." — "Blessed  are  the  pure  in 
heart,  for  they  shall  see  God." 

Such  declarations  challenge  the  assent  and  abso- 
lute conviction  of  every  sound  understanding.  Are 
we,  as  responsible  creatures,  placed  in  immediate 
relation  to  a  great  moral  Governor,  a  being  of  infinite 
purity  and  boundless  perfections  1 — Is  the  structure 
of  our  bodies,  and  the  still  more  wonderful  fabric  of 
our  minds,  alike  the  work  of  his  hand  1  Then  it  is 
impossible  to  put  away  from  us  the  impression,  that 
each  movement  of  these  minds  must  be  fully  exposed 
to  his  inspection.  It  is  equally  impossible  to  repel 
from  us  the  solemn  truth, — that  it  is  by  the  desires, 
the  feelings,  and  the  motives  of  action  which  exist 
there,  that  our  condition  is  to  be  estimated  in  his 
sight ;  and  that  a  man,  whose  conduct  to  his  fellow- 
men  does  not  violate  propriety  and  justice,  may  be 
in  a  state  of  moral  degradation  in  the  eyes  of  him 
who  seeth  in  secret ;  "  for,"  says  the  sacred  writer, 
"  man  looketh  on  the  outward  appearance,  but  the 
Lord  looketh  on  the  heart." 

There  carmot,  therefore,  be  an  inquiry  of  more 
intense  interest,  than  what  is  that  condition  of  the 
heart  and  of  the  mind  which  every  man  ought  to 


TOWARDS    TKE    DEITY.  177 

seek  after,  when  he  considers  himself  as  exposed  to 
the  continual  inspection  of  the  Almighty.  It  may, 
perhaps,  be  briefly  referred  to  the  following  heads. 

I.  An  habitual  effort  to  cultivate  a  sense  of  (he 
divine  presence,  and  an  habitual  desire  to  have  the 
whole  moral  condition  regulated  by  this  impression. 
It  implies,  therefore,  sacred  respect  to  the  character 
of  the  Deity,  and  is  opposed  to  every  kind  of  profane- 
ness,  or  aught  by  which  one  might  weaken  in  himself, 
or  others,  the  reverential  feeling  due  towards  the 
character,  and  even  the  name,  of  the  Almighty.  This 
must  be  extended,  not  to  the  outward  conduct  alone, 
but  to  the  desires  and  affections  of  the  heart.  There 
is  a  state  of  mind,  formerly  referred  to,  in  which  a 
desire,  which  the  moral  feelings  disapprove,  may  not 
be  followed  by  volition  ;  while  the  desire  is  still  in- 
dulged, and  the  mind  is  allowed  to  cherish  it  with 
some  feeling  of  regret,  or  even  to  luxuriate  with  a 
sense  of  pleasure  in  the  imaginary  gratification.  In 
the  same  manner,  a  malevolent  affection  to  our  fel- 
low-men may  be  checked  from  producing  injurious 
conduct,  while  the  feeling  still  rankles  in  the  heart, 
in  the  form  of  envy  or  hatred.  These  mental  con- 
ditions, while  they  are  widely  at  variance  with  the 
healthy  state  of  a  rational  and  responsible  being, 
must  be  regarded  by  the  Deity  as  constituting  moral 
guilt  and  moral  degradation.  Nor  is  it  only  on  the 
mind  which  cherishes  malevolent  passions  and  im- 
pure desires  and  imaginations,  that  the  Holy  One 
must  look  with  a  feeling  of  condemnation.  There 
maybe  another  mental  condition  in  which  the  thoughts 


178  THE    MORAL    RELATION    OP   MAN 

and  desires  are  directed  to  transient  and  frivolous 
objects,  and  thus  run  to  waste  amid  the  trifles  of  the 
passing  hour,  without  any  feehng  of  the  truths  and 
motives  which  demand  the  attention  of  moral  beings. 
The  pursuits  of  such  a  man  may  have  nothing  in  them 
that  is  referable  either  to  impure  desire  or  malevolent 
affection.  They  may  be  the  acquisition  of  wealth, 
— the  grasp  after  power, — ^the  love  of  distinction, — 
or  a  devotedness  to  merely  trivial  occupations ; 
while  there  is  a  total  neglect  of  those  great  concerns 
which  really  demand  our  chief  and  highest  regard. 
Amid  the  legitimate  and  even  the  laudable  pursuits 
of  ordinary  life,  we  are  too  apt  to  lose  sight  of  those 
duties  and  responsibilities  which  attend  a  state  of 
moral  discipline,  and  that  culture  of  the  soul  required 
as  a  preparation  for  the  future  state  of  existence  to 
which  we  are  hastening.  But  we  cannot  doubt  that 
these  considerations  bear  an  important  asjpect  in  the 
eye  of  the  Deity  ;  and  that  the  mind  in  which  they 
hold  not  an  habitual  influence  is  contemplated  by  him 
as  in  a  state  of  moral  destitution. 

There  are,  accordingly,  two  classes  of  characters 
clearly  pointed  out  in  the  sacred  writings, — namely, 
one  in  whom  the  conduct  indicates  the  depravity 
within, — and  another,  in  whom  the  external  character 
preserves  a  respectable  aspect  in  the  estimation  of 
men,  while  the  moral  feelings  are  in  a  corrupted  con- 
dition in  the  sight  of  the  Deity.  We  have  formerly 
endeavoured  to  trace  the  laws  to  which  this  fact  is 
to  be  referred,  on  the  principles  of  the  philosophy  of 
the  human  mind  : — they  are  chiefly  two.  (1.)  We 
have  seen  that  there  are  original  principles  in  our 


TOWARDS    THE    DEITY.  179 

nature  which  lead  to  a  certedn  exercise  of  justice, 
veracity,  and  benevolence,  independently  of  any 
recognition  of  divine  authority.  They  are  a  part  of 
our  moral  constitution,  and  calculated  to  promote 
important  purposes  in  the  harmony  of  human  so- 
ciety; and  they  carry  along  with  them  a  certain 
principle  of  reciprocal  compensation  which  is  entirely 
*  distinct  from  any  impression  of  their  moral  aspect. 
The  man  who  is  deficient  in  them,  indeed,  incurs 
guilt ;  but  a  certain  discharge  of  them  may  arise 
from  mere  natural,  or  even  selfish  feeling,  uncon- 
nected with  any  sense  of  responsibility ;  and  this 
consequently  conveys  no  impression  of  moral  ap- 
probation. In  the  very  exercise  of  them  a  man 
receives  his  reward,  partly  by  a  feeling  of  satisfac- 
tion, which,  from  the  constitution  of  his  nature,  they 
are  calculated  to  yield,  and  partly  as  a  member  of 
that  community  where  they  promote  peace,  and 
order,  and  harmony ;  and  he  is  not  entitled  to 
look  farther,  or  to  claim  from  them  any  feeling  of 
merit  in  the  sight  of  the  Deity.  (2.)  A  second 
principle,  which  bears  an  important  relation  to  this 
subject,  is  the  manner  in  which  a  man's  character  is 
influenced  by  the  particular  motive  or  pursuit  to 
which  he  has  resigned  the  guidance  of  his  conduct. 
One  surrenders  himself  to  the  animal  propensities, 
and  becomes  a  selfish  profligate,  insensible  to  every 
right  principle  of  action,  while  his  depraved  condition 
is  obvious  to  all  around  him.  A  second  devotes 
himself  to  ambition ;  and  a  third  to  avarice  :  these 
ruling  passions,  it  may  be,  are  found  to  be  adverse 
to  the  selfish  indulgence  and  open  profligacy  of  the 


180      THE  MORAL  RELATION  OF  MAN 

former ;  and  a  character  may  arise  out  of  them  dis- 
tmguished  by  much  that  is  decent  and  respectable, 
and  worthy  of  approbation  in  the  eye  of  man.  In  a 
fourth,  the  ruUng  motive  may  be  the  desire  of  esteem 
and  approbation ;  and  this  may,  and  often  does,  be- 
come a  principle  of  such  influence  as  to  overpower, 
in  a  great  measure,  the  selfish  propensities,  and  to 
produce  a  character  estimable  not  only  for  justice 
and  veracity,  but  a  higher  degree  of  active  benevo- 
lence. Such  a  man  sacrifices  to  his  ruling  passion 
much  that  might  be  turned  to  the  purposes  of  ambi- 
tion, avarice,  or  selfish  indulgence,  by  those  who  are 
guided  by  these  propensities ;  and  in  doing  so,  he 
has  his  reward.  He  finds  it  in  the  gratification  of 
that  principle  which  in  him  has  become  predominant ; 
and,  rather  than  hazard  the  loss  of  esteem  by  those 
whose  approbation  he  values,  he  will  submit  to  much 
personal  exertion,  and  sacrifice  much  selfish  ad- 
vantage, which  others  might  deem  highly  worthy  of 
attainment.  But  all  this  may  go  on  without  any  re- 
cognition of  divine  authority ;  and  may  all  exist  in  a 
inan  in  whom  there  is  much  impurity  of  desire,  and 
much  deficiency  of  moral  feeling.  It  is  all  referable 
to  a  motive  of  a  personal  nature,  and  in  the  gratifi- 
cation of  this  his  ruling  principle  is  satisfied. 

The  state  of  mind  which  is  under  the  influence 
of  an  habitual  sense  of  the  divine  presence  may, 
therefore,  be  considered  under  two  relations, — the 
one  referring  more  immediately  to  the  Deity,  the 
other  to  our  fellow-men.  The  former  seems  chiefly 
to  include  an  eflfort  to  have  every  desire,  thought, 
and  imagination  of  the  heart,  regulated  by  a  sense 


TOWARDS    THE    DEITY.  181 

,  of  the  presence  and  the  purity  of  God,  and  in  con- 
formity to  his  will.  Amid  much  feeling  of  deficiency 
in  these  respects,  it  leads  our  attention  to  that  inter- 
esting mental  condition  in  which  there  is  a  contest 
and  a  warfeire  within, — and  a  prevailing  opposition 
to  every  thing  that  is  at  variance  with  the  purity  of 
a  moral  being.  The  second  division  includes  the 
cultivation  of  feeUngs  of  kindness  and  benevolence 
towards  all  men;  the  love  of  justice, — the  love  of 
truth, — the  love  of  peace, — the  forgiveness  of  inju- 
ries,— the  mortification  of  selfishness  ;  in  a  word, 
the  earnest  and  habitual  desire  to  promote  the  com- 
fort and  alleviate  the  distresses  of  others.  From 
these  two  mental  conditions  must  spring  a  charac- 
ter, distinguished  alike  by  piety  towards  God,  and 
by  high  integrity,  benevolence,  and  active  usefulness 
towards  man.  He  who  earnestly  cultivates  this 
purity  within  feels  that  he  requires  continual  watch- 
fulness, and  a  constant  direction  of  the  mind  to  those 
truths  and  moral  causes  which  are  calculated  to  in- 
fluence his  volitions.  He  feels  further  that  he  is  in 
need  of  a  might  not  his  own  in  this  high  design ;  but 
for  this  he  knows  also  he  can  look,  with  humble  con- 
fidence and  hope,  when,  under  a  sense  of  moral 
weakness,  he  asks  its  powerful  aid. 

II.  An  humble  and  dutiful  submission  to  the  ap- 
pointments of  Providence, — as  part  of  a  great  system 
which  is  regulated  by  infinite  wisdom.  The  man 
who  bears  upon  his  mind  this  sublime  impression 
has  learned  to  contemplate  the  Almighty  One  as 
disposing  of  the  events  of  the  lower  world,  and 

Q 


182      THE  MORAL  RELATION  OF  MAN 

assigning  to  each  of  his  rational  creatures  the  place 
which  he  occupies.  That  place,  whatever  it  may 
be,  he  perceives  has  attached  to  it  special  duties  and 
responsibilities,  and  calls  for  the  cultivation  of 
moral  qualities  peculiarly  adapted  to  it.  Is  it  one 
of  comfort,  wealth,  or  influence, — solemn  obligations 
arise  out  of  the  means  of  usefulness  which  these 
command.  Is  it  one  of  humble  life,  privation,  or 
actual  suffering, — each  of  these  also  has  its  peculiar 
duties,  and  each  is  to  be  contemplated  as  belonging 
to  a  great  system  of  moral  disciphne,  in  which  no 
part  can  be  wanting  in  consistency  with  the  harmony 
of  the  whole.  Such  a  submission  of  the  soul  to  the 
appointments  of  God  does  not  preclude  the  use  of 
all  legitimate  means  for  bettering  our  condition, — or 
for  preventing  or  removing  sources  of  distress.  But 
when,  under  the  proper  use  of  such  means,  these  are 
not  removed,  it  leads  us  habitually  to  that  higher 
power,  to  whose  will  all  such  attempts  must  be  sub- 
servient ;  and  while  it  elevates  our  thoughts  above 
present  events  and  second  causes,  it  reminds  us  of 
that  great  scheme  of  discipline  through  wliich  we 
are  passing,  and  the  purposes  which  these  events 
are  calculated  to  promote  in  our  own  moral  improve- 
ment. Viewed  under  such  feelings,  the  ills  of  life 
lose  that  aspect  in  which  we  are  too  apt  to  contem- 
plate them ;  and  will  be  considered  with  new  and 
peculiar  interest,  as  essential  to  that  system,  the 
great  object  of  which  is  to  prepare  and  purify  us  for 
a  higher  state  of  being. 

III.  A  sense  of  moral  imperfection  and  guilt,— 


TOWARDS    THi:    DEITY.  183 

and  that  humility  and  devout  self-abasement  which 
arise  out  of  it.  This  must  be  a  prominent  feeling 
in  every  one  who  views  his  own  conduct,  and  his 
mental  emotions  in  reference  to  the  purity  of  God. 
It  naturally  leads  to  supplication  for  his  mercy  and 
forgiveness ;  and,  in  the  wondrous  display  of  his 
character,  given  in  the  sacred  writings,  a  provision 
is  disclosed,  in  virtue  of  which  the  exercise  of  mercy 
is  made  consistent  with  the  truth  and  justice  of  a 
moral  governor.  This  dispensation  of  peace  we 
find  habitually  represented  as  adapted  to  man  in  a 
state  of  spiritual  destitution ;  and  no  mental  condi- 
tion is  more  frequently  referred  to,  as  acceptable 
with  the  Deity,  than  that  which  consists  of  contrition 
and  lowliness  of  mind.  "  Thus  sayeth  the  high  and 
lofty  One  that  inhabiteth  eternity,  whose  name  is 
Holy  ;  I  dwell  in  the  high  and  holy  place,  with  him 
also  that  is  of  a  contrite  and  humble  spirit, — to  revive 
the  spirit  of  the  humble,  and  to  revive  the  heart  of 
the  contrite  ones."  With  this  state  of  mind  is  very 
naturally  associated  a  sense  of  moral  weakness, — 
and  a  constant  reliance  on  divine  aid,  both  for  di- 
rection through  life,  and  for  the  culture  of  the  moral 
being. 

IV.  It  is  only  necessary  to  add, — a  profound 
sense  of  gratitude  and  love  towards  the  Deity  as  the 
Giver  of  all  good,  as  our  daily  Preserver  and  Bene- 
factor. These  feelings  will  have  a  special  refer- 
ence to  the  display  which  he  has  given  of  his  char- 
acter as  merciful,  gracious,  and  slow  to  anger ;  and 
to  the  provision  which  he  has  made  for  the  recovery 


184      THE  MORAL  RELATION  OF  MAN 

and  restoration  of  his  fallen  creatures,  through  "  God 
manifest  in  the  flesh."  Of  this  divine  Person,  and 
the  work  which  he  came  to  accomplish,  philosophy 
presumes  not  to  speculate ;  but  we  have  seen  the 
light  afforded  by  the  inductions  of  moral  science 
respecting  the  probability  of  this  revelation,  and  its 
adaptation  to  the  actual  state  of  man  in  his  relation 
to  the  Deity.  We  have  seen  the  impression  con- 
veyed by  the  character  of  the  Messiah,  considered 
merely  as  matter  of  historical  truth, — exhibiting  such 
a  pattern  as  never  appeared  in  our  world,  except  in 
him,  of  a  pure  and  perfect  moral  being.  We  have 
seen,  further,  the  incontrovertible  nature  of  that  evi- 
dence, transmitted  by  testimony,  and  confirmed,  as 
it  is,  in  a  very  peculiar  manner,  by  periodical  observ- 
ances, on  which  the  whole  revelation  is  supported  ; 
and  the  inductions  of  sound  philosophy  harmonize 
with  the  impressions  of  the  man,  who,  feeling  his 
own  moral  necessities,  yields  his  cordial  assent  to 
this  mystery  of  God,  and  seeks  in  its  provisions  his 
peace  in  the  life  that  now  is,  and  his  hope  for  the  life 
that  is  to  come. 

From  the  whole  mental  condition,  thus  slightly 
delineated,  there  will  naturally  arise  a  character  and 
conduct  adapted  to  the  feelings  and  principles  which 
rule  within.  This  implies,  as  we  have  seen,  a  due 
regulation  of  the  desires,  and  an  habitual  direction  of 
them  to  objects  of  real  and  adequate  importance,— 
a  diligent  cultivation  and  exercise  of  all  the  affections, 
— and  a  conduct  distinguished,  in  the  highest  degree, 
by  purity,  integrity,  veracity,  and  active  benevolence. 


TOWARDS    THE    DEITY.  185 

It  implies  a  profound  submission  to  the  will  of  the 
Almighty,  which  puts  to  silence  every  murmuring  or 
repining  thought  under  any  dispensation  of  his  provi- 
dence. It  comprehends  the  habitual  suppression  of 
every  selfish  principle,  and  the  constant  aspiration 
after  a  state  of  moral  feeling,  which  proposes  to 
itself  no  lower  standard  than  that  which  will  bear  the 
inspection  of  a  being  of  infinite  purity.  This  charac- 
ter seems  to  correspond  with  that  high  tone  of  morals 
enjoined  in  the  sacred  writings.  Its  elements  are 
defined  and  clear :  would  we  seek  to  estimate  its 
sublimity  and  its  truth,  we  have  only  to  compare  it 
with  those  distorted  and  temporizing  systems  which 
have  resulted  from  the  inventions  of  men.  A  feeling 
of  dissatisfaction,  the  same  in  kind,  though  it  may 
differ  in  degree,  will  attach  to  them  all ;  and  there  is 
none  in  which  we  can  confidently  rest,  until  we  rise 
o  the  sublime  morality  of  the  gospel.  That  great 
system  of  ethical  purity  comes  to  us  under  the  sanc- 
tion of  divine  revelation,  and  established  by  the  mi- 
raculous evidence  by  which  the  proof  of  this  is  con- 
veyed ;  but  it  is  independent  of  any  other  support 
than  that  which  it  carries  in  itself, — consistency 
with  the  character  of  God, — and  harmony  with  the 
best  feelings  of  man.  In  yielding  an  absolute  con- 
sent to  its  supreme  authority,  we  require  no  external 
evidence.  We  have  only  to  look  at  the  record  in  its 
own  majestic  simplicity,  tried  by  the  highest  inductions 
of  the  philosophy  of  the  moral  powers,  to  enable  us 
to  point  to  the  morality  of  the  gospel,  and  say,  with 
unshrinking  confidence, — this  is  truth. 

If  we  would  seek  for  that,  which  must  be  of  all 
Q2 


186      THE  MORAL  RELATION  OF  MAN 

conceivable  things  of  the  highest  moment  both  for  the 
peace  and  the  improvement  of  the  moral  being,  it  is 
to  be  found  in  the  habit  of  mind,  in  which  there  is 
the  uniform  contemplation  of  the  divine  character, 
with  a  constant  reliance  on  the  guidance  of  the  Al- 
mighty in  every  action  of  life.  "  One  thing,"  says 
an  inspired  writer,  "  have  I  desired  of  the  Lord,  that 
will  I  seek  after  ;  that  I  may  dwell  in  the  house  of 
the  Lord  all  the  days  of  my  life,  to  behold  the  beauty 
of  the  Lord,  and  to  inquire  in  his  temple."  The 
man  who  thus  cultivates  the  habitual  impression  of 
the  divine  presence  lives  in  an  atmosphere  peculiarly 
his  own.  The  storms  which  agitate  the  lower  world 
may  blow  around  or  beneath,  but  they  touch  not 
him  ;  as  the  traveller  has  seen  from  the  mountain's 
top  the  war  of  elements  below,  while  he  stood  in  un- 
clouded sunshine.  In  the  works,  and  ways,  and 
perfections  of  the  Eternal  One  he  finds  a  subject  of 
exalted  contemplation,  in  comparison  with  which  the 
highest  inquiries  of  human  science  sink  into  insignifi- 
cance. It  is  an  exercise,  also,  which  tends  at  once 
to  elevate  and  to  purify  the  mind.  It  raises  us  from 
the  minor  concerns  and  transient  interests  which  are 
so  apt  to  occupy  us,  to  that  wondrous  field  in  which 
"  worlds  and  worlds  compose  one  universe," — and 
to  that  mind  which  bade  them  move  in  their  appointed 
orbits,  and  maintains  them  all  in  undeviating  har- 
mony. While  it  thus  teaches  us  to  bend  in  humble 
adoration  before  a  wisdom  which  we  cannot  fathom, 
and  a  power  which  we  cannot  comprehend,  it  directs 
our  attention  to  a  display  of  moral  attributes  which 
at  once  challenge  our  reverence  and  demand  our 


TOWARDS   THE   DEITY.  187 

imitation.  By  thus  leading  us  to  compare  ourselves 
with  the  supreme  excellence,  it  tends  to  produce 
profound  humility,  and,  at  the  same  time,  that  habitual 
aspiration  after  moral  improvement  which  constitutes 
the  highest  state  of  man.  "  The  proud,"  says  an 
eloquent  writer,  "  look  down  upon  the  earth,  and  see 
nothing  that  creeps  upon  its  surface  more  noble  than 
themselves ;  the  humble  look  upwards  to  their  God." 
This  disposition  of  mind,  so  far  from  being  opposed 
to  the  acquirements  of  philosophy,  sits  with  peculiar 
grace  upon  the  man  who,  through  the  most  zealous 
cultivation  of  human  science,  ascends  to  the  eternal 
Cause.  The  farther  he  advances  in  the  wonders  of 
nature,  the  higher  he  rises  in  his  adoration  of  the 
power  and  the  wisdom  which  guide  the  whole ; — 
'*  Where  others  see  a  sun,  he  sees  a  Deity."  And 
then,  in  every  step  of  life,  whether  of  danger,  distress, 
or  difficulty,  the  man  who  cultivates  this  intercourse 
with  the  incomprehensible  One  "  inquires  in  his  tem- 
ple." He  inquires  for  the  guidance  of  divine  wisdom, 
and  the  strength  of  divine  aid,  in  his  progress  through 
the  state  of  moral  discipline ;  he  inquires,  in  a  pe- 
cuHar  manner,  for  this  aid  in  the  culture  of  his  moral 
being,  when  he  views  this  mighty  undertaking  in  its 
important  reference  to  the  life  which  is  to  come  ; 
he  inquires  for  a  discernment  of  the  ways  of  Divine 
Providence,  as  he  either  feels  it  in  his  own  concerns, 
or  views  it  in  the  chain  of  events  which  are  going  on 
in  the  world  around  him.  He  learns  to  trace  the 
whole  to  the  same  unerring  hand  which  guides  the 
planet  in  its  course  ;  and  thus  rests  in  the  absolute 
conviction  that  the  economy  of  Providence  is  one 


188      THE  MORAL  RELATION  OF  MAN 

great  and  magnificent  system  of  design,  and  order, 
and  harmony.  These,  we  repeat  with  confidence, 
are  no  visions  of  the  imagination,  but  the  sound  in- 
ductions of  a  calm  and  rational  philosophy.  They 
are  conclusions  which  compel  the  assent  of  every 
candid  inquirer,  when  he  follows  out  that  investiga 
tion  of  mighty  import, — what  is  God, — and  what  is 
that  essence  in  man  which  he  has  endowed  with  tho 
power  of  rising  to  himself. 

To  enlarge  upon  these  important  subjects  would 
lead  us  away  from  the  proper  design  of  a  work  which 
is  intended  chiefly  to  investigate  the  light  we  derive 
from  the  phenomena  of  the  mind  itself.  The  points 
which  have  been  stated,  as  arising  out  of  the  impres- 
sions of  every  sound  understanding,  challenge  the 
assent  of  all  who  believe  in  a  present  and  presiding 
Deity, — a  being  of  infinite  power  and  wisdom,  and 
of  perfect  purity.  With  him  who  calls  in  question 
this  sublime  truth  we  have  no  common  feeling,  and 
no  mutual  premises  on  which  an  argument  can  be 
founded.  We  must  therefore  leave  him  to  sit  in  soli- 
tary pride,  while  he  views  the  chaos  which  his  feincy 
has  framed, — and  strives  to  reconcile  the  discordant 
elements  of  a  system  in  which  there  are  effects  with- 
out a  cause,  and  harmony  without  a  regulating  power ; 
and  in  which  the  mind  can  perceive  no  element  of 
credibility,  consistency,  or  truth. 

With  this  slight  outline,  therefore,  we  must  quit  a 
subject  of  the  deepest  interest,  but  which  belongs  ra- 
ther to  the  theologian  than  to  the  inquirer  in  mental 
science ;  and  proceed  briefly  to  investigate  the  means 
by  which  the  condition  of  the  moral  feelings,  which 


TOWARDS    THE    DEITY.  189 

has  been  the  subject  of  the  preceding  observations, 
may  be  promoted  and  cultivated  as  the  regulating 
principle  of  the  whole  character.  Two  views 
may  be  taken  of  this  point,  which,  though  they 
harmonize  with  each  other  in  practice,  are  to  be  con- 
sidered, in  their  philosophical  aspect,  as  distinct. 

The  restoration  of  man  from  a  state  of  estrange- 
ment, anarchy,  or  moral  death  we  are  taught  in  the 
sacred  writings  to  refer  to  a  power  from  without  the 
mind, — an  influence  directly  from  God.  We  have 
seen  the  various  considerations  derived  from  the 
phenomena  of  the  mind,  and  our  impressions  of  the 
divine  character,  giving  to  this  great  doctrine  a  prob- 
ability which  claims  the  assent  of  every  correct  un- 
derstanding. But,  without  in  any  degree  losing  sight 
of  the  truth  and  the  importance  of  this  principle,  the 
immediate  object  of  our  attention,  as  a  branch  of  men- 
tal science,  is  rather  the  process  of  the  mind  itself, 
by  means  of  which  an  habitual  influence  is  produced 
upon  the  whole  character. .  This  is  a  compound 
operation,  which  may  probably  be  analyzed  in  the 
following  manner.  It  seems  to  be  composed  of 
reason,  attention,  and  a  modification  of  concep- 
tion. The  province  of  Reason  is  to  examine  the 
truth  of  the  statements  or  doctrines  which  are  proposed 
to  the  mind  as  calculated  to  act  upon  its  moral  feel- 
ings ;  and  upon  this  being  done  in  a  correct  manner 
must  depend  the  validity  of  the  subsequent  parts  of 
the  mental  process.  This  being  premised,  it  is  the 
office  of  Attention,  aided  by  reason,  to  direct  the 
mind  assiduously  to  the  truths,  so  as  fully  to  perceive 
their  relations  and  tendencies.     By  the  farther  pro 


190      THE  MORAL  RELATION  OF  MAN 

cess,  analogous  to  Conception,  they  are  then  placed 
before  us  in  such  a  manner  as  to  give  them  the  effect 
of  real  and  present  existence.  By  these  means, 
truths  relating  to  things  for  which  we  have  not  the 
evidence  of  our  senses,  or  referring  to  events  which 
are  future,  but  fully  expected  to  happen,  are  kept 
before  the  mind,  and  influence  the  moral  feelings  and 
the  character  in  the  same  manner  as  if  the  facts  be- 
lieved were  actually  seen,  or  the  events  expected  were 
taking  place  in  our  view.  This  mental  o[)eration  is 
Faith ;  and  for  the  sound  exercise  of  it  the  con- 
stituent elements  now  mentioned  are  essentially  ne- 
cessary. The  truth  must  be  received  by  the  judg- 
ment upon  adequate  evidence ;  and,  by  the  other 
parts  of  the  process,  it  must  be  so  kept  before  the 
mind,  that  it  may  exercise  such  a  moral  influence 
as  might  arise  from  the  actual  vision,  or  present 
existence,  of  the  things  believed. 

Attention  to  these  considerations  will  probably 
enable  us  to  discover  some  of  the  fallacies  which 
have  obscured  and  bewildered  this  important  subject. 
When  the  impression  which  is  thus  allowed  to  influ- 
ence the  mind  is  one  which  has  not  been  received  by 
the  judgment,  upon  due  examination,  and  adequate 
evidence  of  its  truth, — this  is  enthusiasm, — not  faith. 
Our  present  course  of  inquiry  does  not  lead  us  to 
treat  of  the  notions  which  have,  in  various  individuals, 
been  thus  allowed  to  usurp  the  place  of  truth.  To 
those  who  would  preserve  themselves  from  the  in- 
fluence of  such,  the  first  great  inquiry,  respecting 
their  own  mental  impressions,  ought  to  be, — are 
they  facts  1 — and  on  what  evidence  do  they  rest  which 


TOWARDS    THE    DEITV.  191 

con  satisfy  a  sound  understanding  that  they  are  so  ? 
On  the  other  hand  is  to  be  avoided  an  error,  not  less 
dangerous  than  the  wildest  fancies  of  the  enthusiast, 
and  not  less  unworthy  of  a  regulated  mind.  This 
consists  in  treating  real  and  important  truths  as  if  they 
were  visions  of  the  imagination,  and  thus  dismissing 
them,  without  examination,  from  the  influence  which 
they  ought  to  produce  upon  the  moral  feelings.  I* 
is  singular  also  to  remark  how  these  two  modifica- 
'  tions  of  character  may  be  traced  to  a  condition  of  the 
reasoning  powers  essentially  the  same.  The  former 
receives  a  fiction  of  the  imagination,  and  rests  upon 
it  as  truth.  The  latter,  acting  upon  some  prejudice 
or  mental  impression  which  has  probably  no  better 
foundation,  puts  away  real  and  important  truths  with- 
out any  examination  of  the  evidence  on  which  they 
are  founded.  The  misapplication  of  the  reasoning 
powers  is  the  same  in  both.  It  consists  in  proceed- 
ing upon  a  mere  impression,  without  exercising  the 
judgment  on  the  question  of  its  evidence,  or  on 
the  facts  and  considerations  which  are  opposed  to  it. 
Two  characters  of  a  very  opposite  description  thus 
meet  in  that  mental  condition,  which  draws  them 
equally,  though  in  different  directions,  astray  from 
the  truth. 

When  a  truth  has  fully  received  the  sanction  of 
the  judgment,  the  second  office  of  faith  is,  by  atten- 
tion and  conception,  to  keep  it  habitually  before  the 
mind,  so  that  it  may  produce  its  proper  influence 
upon  the  character.  This  is  to  live  by  faith  ;  and 
in  this  consists  that  operation  of  the  great  principle 
which  eflfectually  distinguishes  it  from  all  pretended 


192      THE  MORAL  RELATION  OF  MAN 

feelings  and  impressions  assuming  its  name.  We 
speak,  in  common  language,  of  a  head-knowledge 
which  does  not  affect  the  heart ;  and  of  a  man  who 
is  sound  in  his  creed,  while  he  shows  little  of  its  in- 
fluence upon  his  conduct.  The  mental  condition  of 
such  a  man  presents  a  subject  of  intense  interest. 
His  alleged  belief,  it  is  probable,  consists  merely  in 
words,  or  in  arguing  ingeniously  on  points  to  which 
he  attaches  no  real  value.  These  may  have  been 
impressed  upon  him  by  education ;  they  may  con- 
stitute the  creed  of  a  party  to  which  he  has  devoted 
himself;  and  he  may  argue  in  support  of  them  with 
all  the  energy  of  party  zeal.  In  the  same  manner, 
a  man  may  contend  warmly  in  favour  of  compassion 
whose  conduct  shows  a  cold  and  barren  selfishness : 
but  this  is  not  benevolence ;  and  the  other  is  not 
faith.  Both  are  empty  professions  of  a  behef  in 
certmn  truths,  which  have  never  fixed  themselves  in 
the  mind  so  as  to  become  regulating  principles  or 
moral  causes  in  the  mental  constitution.  We  may 
indeed  suppose  another  character,  slightly  removed 
from  tliis,  in  which  the  truths  have  really  received 
the  approbation  of  the  judgment,  and  yet  fail  to  pro- 
duce their  proper  influence.  This  arises  from  dis- 
torted moral  habits,  and  a  vitiated  state  of  the  moral 
faculties,  which  have  destroyed  the  healthy  balan^ 
of  the  whole  economy  of  tiie  mind.  The  conse 
quence  is,  that  the  man  perceives  and  approves  of 
truths,  without  feeling  their  tendencies,  and  without 
manifesting  their  power.  \ 

Intimately  connected  with  this  subject,  also,  is  a 
remarkable  principle  in  our  mental  constitution,  for-  : 


TOWARDS    THE    DEITY.  193 

merly  referred  to, — namely,  the  relation  between 
certain  facts  or  truths,  and  certain  moral  emotions 
which  naturally  arise  from  them,  according  to  the 
chain  of  sequences  which  has  been  established  in 
the  economy  of  the  mind.  A  close  connexion  thus 
exists  between  our  intellectual  habits  and  our  moral 
feelings,  which  leads  to  consequences  of  the  utmost 
practical  moment.  Though  we  have  httle  imme- 
diate voluntary  power  over  our  moral  emotions,  we 
have  a  power  over  the  intellectual  processes  with 
which  these  are  associated.  We  can  direct  the 
mind  to  truths,  and  we  can  cherish  trains  of  thought, 
which  are  calculated  to  produce  correct  moral  feel- 
ings ;  and  we  can  avoid  or  banish  mental  images  or 
trains  of  thought  which  have  an  opposite  tendency. 
This  is  the  power  over  the  succession  of  our 
thoughts,  the  due  exercise  of  which  forms  so  im- 
portant a  feature  of  a  well-regulated  mind  in  regard 
to  intellectual  culture ;  its  influence  upon  us  as 
moral  beings  is  of  still  higher  and  more  vit£d  im- 
portance. 

The  sound  exercise  of  that  mental  condition 
which  we  call  Faith  consists,  therefore,  in  the  recep- 
tion of  certain  truths  by  the  judgment, — the  proper 
direction  of  the  attention  to  their  moral  tendencies, 
— and  the  habitual  influence  of  them  upon  the  feel- 
ings and  the  conduct.  When  the  sacred  writers  tell 
us  that,  without  faith  it  is  impossible  to  please  God, 
— and  when  they  speak  of  a  man  being  saved  by 
faith, — it  is  not  to  a  mere  admission  of  certain  truths 
as  a  part  of  his  creed  that  they  ascribe  consequences 
so  important ;  but  to  a  state  in  which  these  truths 
P 


194      THE  MORAL  RELATION  OF  MAN 

are  uniformly  followed  out  to  certain  results  which 
they  are  calculated  to  produce,  according  to  the  usual 
course  of  sequences  in  every  sound  mind.  This 
principle  is  strikingly  illustrated  by  one  of  these 
writers,  by  reference  to  a  simple  narrative.  During 
the  invasion  of  Canaan  by  the  armies  of  Israel,  two 
men  were  sent  forward  as  spies  to  bring  a  report 
concerning  the  city  of  Jericho.  The  persons  en- 
gaged in  this  mission  were  received  in  a  friendly 
manner  by  a  woman  whose  house  was  upon  the 
wall  of  the  city ;  when  their  presence  was  dis- 
covered, she  hid  them  from  their  pursuers ;  and 
finally  enabled  them  to  escape  by  letting  them  down 
by  a  cord  from  a  window.  Before  taking  leave  of 
them,  she  expressed  her  firm  conviction  that  the 
army  to  which  they  belonged  was  soon  to  take  pos- 
session of  Jericho,  and  of  the  whole  country;  and 
she  made  them  swear  to  her,  that,  when  thi»  should 
take  place,  they  would  show  mercy  to  her  father's 
house.  The  engagement  was  faithfully  fulfilled. 
When  the  city  was  taken,  and  the  other  inhabitants 
destroyed,  the  woman  was  preserved,  with  all  her 
kindred.  In  this  very  simple  occurrence,  the  woman 
is  represented  by  the  sacred  writer  as  having  been 
saved  by  faith.  The  object  of  her  faith  was  the 
event  which  she  confidently  expected, — that  the  city 
of  Jericho  was  to  be  destroyed.  The  ground  of 
her  faith  was  th^  rapid  manner  in  which  the  most 
powerful  nations  had  already  fallen  before  the  armies 
of  Israel, — led,  as  she  believed,  by  a  divine  power. 
Acting  upon  this  convicfion,  in  the  manner  in  which 
a  belief  so  deeply  affecting  her  personal  safety  was 


TOWARDS    THE    DEITY.  195 

likely  to  influence  any  sound  mind,  she  took  means 
for  her  preservation  by  making  friends  of  the  spies. 
Her  faith  saved  her,  because  without  it  she  would 
not  have  made  this  provision ;  but,  unless  she  had 
followed  out  her  belief  to  the  measure  which  was 
calculated  to  effect  this  object,  the  mere  belief  of  the 
event  would  have  availed  her  nothing.  When  we 
therefore  ascribe  important  results  to  faith,  or  to  any 
other  mental  operation,  we  ascribe  them,  not  to  th6 
operation  itself,  but  to  this  followed  out  to  the  con- 
sequences which  it  naturally  produces  according  to 
the  constitution  of  the  human  mind.  In  the  same 
manner,  we  may  speak  of  one  man  in  a  certain  state 
of  danger  or  difficulty  being  saved  by  liis  wisdom, 
and  another  by  his  strength.  In  doing  so,  we  ascribe 
such  results,  not  to  the  mere  possession  of  these 
quaUties,  but  to  the  efforts  which  naturally  arose 
from  them  in  tlie  circumstances  in  which  the  indi- 
vidual was  placed.  And  when  the  inspired  writer 
says,  that  without  feiith  it  is  impossible  to  please 
God,  he  certainly  refers  to  no  mere  mental  im- 
pression, and  to  no  barren  system  of  opinions  ;  but 
to  the  reception  of  certain  truths,  which,  in  our  pres- 
ent state  of  being,  are  entirely  the  objects  of  faith, 
and  to  all  that  influence  upon  the  moral-feelings  and 
the  character  which  these  must  produce  upon  every 
mind  that  really  believes  them. 

On  this  great  subject  much  misconception  appears 
to  have  arisen  from  not  sufficiently  attending  to  the 
condition  in  which,  as  moral  beings,  we  are  placed 


196      THE  MORAL  RELATION  OF  MAN 

in  the  present  state  of  existence,  and  the  important 
part  which  must  be  performed  by  the  mental  exer- 
cise called  faith.  As  physical  and  intellectual  beings, 
we  have  certain  relations  to  the  objects  by  which  we 
are  surrounded,  and  with  these  we  communicate  by 
means  of  our  bodily  senses.  But,  as  moral  beings, 
our  relations  are  entirely  of  a  different  nature  ;  and 
the  facts  and  motives  which  are  calculated  to  act 
upon  us  in  these  relations  are  chiefly  the  objects  of 
faith ;  that  is,  they  are  not  cognizable  by  any  of  our 
senses,  but  are  to  be  received  by-  a  different  part  of 
our  constitution,  and  upon  a  separate  kind  of  evi- 
dence. This,  accordingly,  is  the  simple  but  im- 
portant distinction  referred  to  by  the  sacred  writer, 
when,  in  allusion  to  our  condition  as  moral  beings, 
he  says, — "  we  walk  by  faith,  not  by  sight."  The 
objects  of  sight,  here  intended  to  express  all  the 
objects  of  sense,  exercise  over  us  an  habitual  and 
powerful  influence.  They  constantly  obtrude  them- 
selves upon  our  notice  without  any  exertion  of  our 
own ;  and  it  requires  a  peculiar  exercise  of  mind  to 
withdraw  our  attention  from  them,  and  to  feel  the 
power  of  events  which  are  future,  and  of  things, 
which  are  not  seen.  This  mental  exercise  is  Faith. 
Its  special  province,  as  we  have  seen,  is  to  receive 
(ruths  which  are  presented  directly  to  the  mind, — to 
place  them  before  us  with  all  the  vividness  of  actual 
and  present  existence, — and  to  make  them  exert 
upon  us  an  agency  analogous  to  that  which  is  pro- 
duced by  objects  of  sight.  The  next  great  point  in 
our  inquiry,  therefore,  is,  what  are  the  truths  which 


TOWARDS    THE    DEITY.  197 

are  calculated  thus  to  operate  upon  us  as  moral 
beings,  and  which  it  is  the  object  of  faith  to  bring 
habitually  before  us. 

When  we  withdraw  our  minds  from  the  influence 
of  sensible  things,  and  send  forth  our  attention  to 
those  truths  which  are  the  province  of  faith,  the  first 
great  object  which  meets  our  view  is  the  eternal 
incomprehensible  One,  the  moral  Governor  of  the 
imiverse,— a  being  of  infinite  perfections  and  infinite 
purity.  From  the  stupendous  works  of  nature,  we 
trace  his  operation  as  the  great  First  Cause, — and 
infer,  with  absolute  certainty,  his  boundless  power 
and  wisdom,  and  his  independent  existence.  The 
impress  of  his  moral  attributes  he  has  fixed  with  in- 
deUble  certainty  upon  our  moral  perceptions, — 
where,  in  the  light  of  conscience,  co-operating  with 
a  simple  process  of  reason,  we  perceive  him  to  be  a 
being  of  infinite  holiness,  and  of  unerring  truth  and 
justice.  Our  knowledge  of  these  attributes  is  not 
the  result  of  any  process  of  reasoning  which  can 
admit  of  deliberation  or  doubt.  They  force  them- 
selves upon  our  conviction  by  the  most  simple  prin- 
ciples of  induction,  when,  from  our  own  mental  and 
moral  endowments,  we  infer  the  perfecfions  of  him 
who  formed  us. 

From  every  conception  we  can  form  of  such  a 
being,  we  have  an  equally  insuperable  conviction  of 
his  universal  presence, — that  he  is  the  witness,  not 
only  of  our  conduct,  but  of  the  thoughts  and  imagina- 
tions of  the  heart  ;  and  that  from  these,  as  indicating 
our  real  condition,  and  not  from  our  conduct  alone, 
R2 


198      THE  MORAL  RELATION  OF  MAN 

our  moral  aspect  is  estimated  by  him, — ^the  pure  and 
holy  One  who  seeth  in  secret.  Each  moment,  as  it 
passes  rapidly  over  us,  we  know  is  bringing  us  nearer 
to  that  period  when  all  our  hopes  and  fears  for  this 
world  shall  lie  with  us  in  the  grave.  But  we  feel 
also  that  this  is  the  entrance  to  another  state  of 
being, — a  state  of  moral  retribution,  where  the  eter- 
nal One  is  to  be  disclosed  in  all  his  attributes  as  a 
moml  Governor.  These  considerations  fix  them- 
selves upon  the  mind,  with  a  feeling  of  yet  new  and 
more  tremendous  interest,  when  we  further  take  into 
view  that  this  future  existence  stretches  out  before 
us  into  endless  duration.  This  is  the  truth  so 
powerfully  expressed  by  the  sacred  writer,  in  terms 
which  by  their  brevity  convey,  in  the  most  adequate 
manner,  their  overwhelming  import, — "  The  things 
which  are  seen  are  temporal,  but  the  things  which 
are  not  seen  are  eternal." 

These  truths  are  not  the  visions  of  enthusiasm ; 
neither  are  they  the  result  of  any  process  of  reason- 
ing by-  which  different  men  may  arrive  at  difierent 
conclusions.  They  force  themselves  upon  our  con- 
viction with  a  power  which  we  cannot  put  away 
from  us,  when  we  turn  our  attention  to  the  solemn 
inquiry,  what  we  are,  and  what  is  God.  In  the 
sacred  writings  they  are  detailed  and  illustrated,  in  a 
connected  and  harmonious  manner;  and  are  im- 
pressed upon  us  with  the  force  of  a  revelation  from 
the  Deity  himself.  But  the  principles  there  dis* 
closed  meet  with  an  impression  in  our  moral  consti- 
tution  which  pleads  with  authority  for  their  truth.  It 
is  the  province  of  faith  to  keep  these  habitually  before 


TOWARDS    THE    DEITY.  199 

the  mind,  and  to  cause  them  to  influence  the  feeHngs 
and  the  conduct  as  if  they  were  objects  of  sense, — 
as  if 'the  Deity  in  all  the  purity  of  his  character  were 
actually  disclosed  to  our  view,— or  as  if  we  were 
present  at  that  dread  hour  which  shall  witness  his 
righteous  retribution.  The  man  who  thus  feels  their 
power,  and  exhibits  their  influence  upon  his  charac- 
ter, is  he  who  lives  by  faith. 

When,  under  this  mental  exercise,  a  man  brings 
himself  into  the  immediate  presence  of  the  Eternal 
One ;  when  he  arraigns  himself,  as  it  were,  before 
the  bar  of  the  omniscient  Judge ;  when  he  places 
before  him  that  future  state  which  stretches  forth  into 
endless  existence,  a  train  of  feelings  must  arise  in 
his  mind,  to  which  he  was  a  stranger,  so  long  as  he 
placidly  resigned  himself  to  the  influence  of  sensible 
things.  He  views  this  being  of  infinite  purity  as  one 
who  has  been  all  his  hffe  the  daily  witness  of  his  con- 
duct ;  and  feels  that  even  the  secrets  of  the  heart 
have  been  at  all  times  open  to  Divine  inspection. 
Each  day,  as  it  passed  unheeded  over  him,  was  a 
portion  gone  by  of  his  period  of  moral  discipline  ; 
and  each,  as  it  glided  amid  the  frivolities  of  Hfe,  or 
the  active  pursuit  of  temporal  good,  had  its  moral 
aspect  assigned  to  it  in  the  judgment  of  the  Eternal 
mind.  Along  with  these  impressions,  which  no 
reflecting  man  can  put  away  from  him,  a  voice  within 
forces  upon  him  the  conviction,  that,  were  hi^  whole 
history  disclosed  to  his  fellow-men,  he  would,  even  in 
their  estimation,  be  found  wanting.  How  much 
more  deeply  must  this  be  fixed  upon  his  inmost  soul, 
when  he  feels  that  the  whole  is,  at  one  glance,  ex- 


200      THE  MORAL  RELATION  OF  MAN 

posed  to  the  eye  of  Omniscience  ;  and  that  an  hour 
is  rapidly  approaching,  when  a  strict  account  must 
be  rendered,  £ind  a  righteous  sentence  pronounced, 
the  result  of  which  will  extend  into  eternal  existence^ 
With  these  truths  upon  his  mind,  what  reflecting  man 
can  view  without  awe  the  moment  which  is  to  close 
his  state  of  moral  discipline,  when,  disencumbered 
from  his  earthly  tenement,  he  shall  find  himself  alone 
with  God,  and  there  shall  burst  upon  his  astonished 
faculties  the  blaze  of  an  endless  day.  These  are 
not  the  speculations  of  fancy,  but  eternal  truth. 
The  man  who  habitually  acts  under  their  influence 
knows  that  this  faith  rests  upon  a  conviction  which 
cannot  be  shaken,  when  he  recognises  in  all  his  ways 
the  presence  and  the  inspection  of  the  Deity,  when 
he  feels  the  obligation  to  have  even  the  desires  and 
afl^ections  under  subjection  to  his  will,  and  when  he 
resigns  himself  to  his  guidance,  and  asks  his  power- 
ful aid,  both  for  the  conduct  of  this  life,  and  the 
preparation  for  the  life  which  is  to  come. 

Solemn  is  the  hour  when  a  man  thus  retires  from 
the  tumult  of  life,  and  seriously  proposes  to  himself 
the  question,  what  is  his  condition  as  a  moral  being  ? 
what  have  been  his  leading*  pursuits  in  that  life 
which  is  hastening  to  a  close  ?  what  is  his  aspect 
in  the  view  of  that  incomprehensible  One,  who  per- 
ceives at  a  single  glance  the  whole  details  of  his 
moral  history.  Is  he  safe  to  meet  the  full  splendour 
of  that  eye  ?  has  he  no'  apprehension,  that,  when 
called  to  account  in  the  immediate  presence  of  un- 
erring purity,  he  may  not  be  able  to  answer.     The 


TOWARDS    THE    DEITY.  201 

nan  lives  not  who  can  appeal  to  his  o^vn  heart  and 
say,  after  serious  inquiry,  that  he  can  thus  meet  th»^ 
penetrating  search  of  him,  whose  knowledge  is  per- 
fect as  his  purity  is  infinite :  the  man  lives  not, 
who  can  look  back  upon  his  whole  life,  without  feel- 
ing that,  in  the  sight  of  this  unspotted  One,  he  is 
polluted  with  guilt :  and,  if  his  heart  condemn  him, 
with  all  its  partiality  for  his  own  views  and  feelings, 
and  all  its  forgetfulness  of  many  points  in  his  moral 
history,  he  must  feel  that  God  is  greater  than  his 
heart,  and  knoweth  all  things.  Under  such  an  im- 
pression, to  what  refuge  shall  he  betake  himself? 
Does  he  appeal  to  an  indefinite  idea  of  the  mercy 
of  the  Deity, — it  must  be  evident  that  this  conveys 
no  distinct  principle,  and  will  not  bear  the  confidence 
which  is  essential  to  hope  and  peace.  For  we  can- 
not go  to  the  extent  of  supposing  a  mercy  so  indis- 
criminate, that  the  Deity  will  depart  from  all  the  laws 
which  he  has  made,  £md  which  he  has  impressed 
upon  us  as  a  part  of  our  moral  constitution.  This 
would  be  ascribing  to  infinite  wisdom  an  indecision 
and  a  change  of  purpose  unworthy  of  the  weakest 
human  lawgiver.  If,  then,  we  do  not  boldly  assume 
this  position,  how  are  we  to  draw  the  line  where  such 
mercy  is  to  terminate ;  and  where  the  Almighty  is 
to  appear  in  his  character  of  justice,  as  a  righteous 
moral  governor.  If  we  find  that  each  individual  fixes 
a  different  standard,  and  that  each  extends  it  so  as'to 
favour  his  own  condition,  it  is  clear  that  the  system 
presents  no  character  of  truth,  and  that  it  is  incapa- 
ble of  ministering  to  the  consolation  of  him  who 
feels  his  own  necessities,  and  seriously  contemplates 


202       THE  MORAL  RELATION  OF  MAN 

ihe  character  of  God.  He  must  perceive  that  to 
apply  such  reasoning  to  human  enactments  would 
l)e  to  represent  them  as  a  mockery  of  justice  ;  and 
that  it  is  impossible  thug  to  argue  respecting  the  laws 
of  him  who  is  infinite  in  holiness,  and  boundless  in 
wisdom.  He  cannot  but  acknowledge  that  a  uni- 
verse governed  in  such  a  manner  would  run  into 
irremediable  confusion  and  anarchy ;  and  will  find 
it  impossible,  on  any  principle  which  human  reason- 
ing can  furnish,  to  arrive  at  any  other  decision  than 
this, — that  the  Judge  of  all  the  earth  must  be 
unchanging  in  his  purposes,  and  impartial  in  his 
justice. 

To  this  conclusion  we  are  led  by  the  clearest  in- 
ductions of  moral  science ;  but  at  this  momentous 
point  philosophy  fails  us.  No  human  power  can 
find  a  refuge  to  which  the  mind  can  betake  itself 
under  a  sense  of  guilt ;  no  human  wisdom  can  an- 
swer the  inquiry  of  mighty  import,  can  God  be  just, 
and  yet  justify  the  ungodly  1  But  here  we  are  met 
by  a  light  from  heaven  which  has  burst  upon  the 
scene  of  doubt  and  of  darkness ;  and  are  called  to 
bring  down  the  pride  of  our  reason  in  humble  sub- 
mission to  the  testimony  of  God.  It  comes  supported 
by  a  weight  of  evidence  which  challenges  the  cor- 
dial assent  of  the  most  acute  understanding,  and  the 
power  of  which  will  be  best  appreciated  by  those  who, 
with  sincere  desire  for  tmth,  have  made  the  highest 
attainments  in  the  laws  of  rigid  inquiry.  It  discloses 
an  atonement  made  for  sin,  and  an  influence  from 
heaven  calculated  to  restore  the  moral  being  to  the 
purity  in  which  it  was  formed.     It  thus  meets  alike 


TOWARDS    THE    DEITY.  203 

the  necessities  of  maii,  as  in  a  state  of  actual  guilt? 
and  a  state  6f  moral  degradation.  For  the  one,  it 
displays  a  scheme  of  mercy  in  which  the  integrity  of 
the  Divine  character  is  vindicated,  wliile  pardon  is 
extended  to  transgressors.  To  the  other  it  offers 
power  from  heaven,  which  will  correct  the  disorders 
of  the  moral  constitution,  and  raise  the  man  anew  to 
the  likeness  of  God.  It  thus  forms  an  harmonious 
whole,  uniform  and  consistent  in  itself;  worthy  of 
the  character  of  God,  and  adapted  to  the  condition 
of  man ;  and  to  every  one  who  feels  his  own  moral 
necessities,  and  estimates  the  purity  of  the  Deity,  it 
brings  an  absolute  conviction  of  its  truth. 

A  participation  in  the  benefits  of  this  revelation  of 
divine  mercy  is  said,  in  the  sacred  writings,  to  be 
received  by  Fcuth ;  and  this  expression  has  given 
rise  to  controversies  and  contending  systems,  which 
have  involved  the  subject  in  much  perplexity.  While 
some  have  restricted  the  operation  of  faith  to  the 
mere  belief  of  a  certain  system  of  opinions,  others 
have  referred  to  it  a  series  of  mysterious  impressions 
and  enthusiastic  feelings  at  variance  with  every  dic- 
tate of  sound  reasoning.  The  principle  of  faith, 
however,  holds  so  prominent  a  place  in  the  scheme 
of  Christian  truth,  that  some  clear  notions  respecting 
its  nature  must  be  felt  to  be  of  the  highest  interest. 
It  holds  also,  as  we  have  formerly  seen,  a  most  im- 
portant position  in  the  philosophy  of  the  moral  feel- 
ings,— being  that  mental  operation  by  which  we 
receive  a  certain  class  of  truths  of  the  utmost  con- 
sequence to  us  as  responsible  beings.  It  is  a  process 
which  every  one  feels,  but  which  cannot  be  defined ; 


204      THE  MORAL  RELATION  OF  MAN 

and  it  can  be  illustrated  only  by  tracing  its  influence 
in  regard  to  those  objects  to  which  it  is  more  par- 
ticularly directed. 

The  objects  of  faith  are  twofold, — truths  ad« 
dressed  to  our  understanding,  and  benefits  offered 
or  promised.  We  have  formerly  had  occasion  to 
trace  the  action  of  faith  in  regard  to  truth,- — espe- 
cially a  class  of  truths  which  are  calculated,  when 
really  beheved,  to  exert  a  powerful  eflect  upon  our 
moral  feelings  and  conduct.  Its  operation,  we  have 
seen,  is  to  bring  these  truths  before  us  in  such  a 
manner,  that  they  exert  the  same  kind  of  influence 
as  if  the  facts  or  events  were  objects  of  sense.  The 
man  who  beUeves  these  truths,  so  as  thus  habitually  to 
feel  their  power,  is  he  who  receives  them  in  faith. 
This  is  the  province  of  faith  in  regard  to  truth ;  wc 
have  next  to  analyze  its  operation  in  regard  to  offered 
or  promised  benefits, — and  this  we  can  best  do  by 
means  of  an  example. 

Let  us  take  the  illustration  of  a  man  affected  with 
a  disease  supposed  to  be  mortal :  he  is  told  that  a 
remedy  has  been  discovered  of  infalUble  efficacy ; 
and  that  a  person  is  at  hand  who  is  ready  to  admin- 
ister it.  Does  he  perceive  his  danger;  does  he 
believe  the  virtue  of  the  remedy ;  does  he  confide 
in  the  sincerity  of  the  individual  who  ofl*ers  it :  this 
is  faith.  The  immediate  and  natural  result  of  his 
faith  is,  that  he  asks  for  the  remedy  which  is  offered ; 
and  this  result  is  inseparable  from  such  behef,  ac- 
cording to  the  uniform  sequence  of  volitions  in  every 
sound  mind.  The  man  who  professes  to  admit  the 
facts,  and  does  not  show  such  a  result  of  belief,  pro- 


TOWARDS    THE    DEITY.  205 

fesses  what  he  does  not  actually  feel.  If  he  per- 
ceives not  the  extent  of  his  danger,  he  asks  not  the 
remedy,  because  he  values  it  not ;  and  the  same 
effect  may  follow  if  he  doubts  either  its  efficacy  or 
the  sincerity  of  him  who  offers  it.  In  this  case,  it  is 
also  to  be  observed,  that  a  reflection  is  thrown  upon 
the  character  of  this  individual,  by  imputing  to  him 
an  offer  of  what  he  has  either  not  the  power  or  the 
intention  to  perform.  But  if  the  man  really  believes 
the  truths,  he  applies  for  the  remedy ;  and  he  re- 
ceives it.  Thus  his  faith  saves  him  ;  because  by 
means  of  it  he  sought  the  offered  aid.  Could  we 
suppose  him  merely  to  admit  the  facts,  without  ask- 
ing the  remedy,  his  belief  would  avail  him  nothing. 

Such  appears  to  be  the  simple  view  we  are  to 
take  of  Faith,  when  we  apply  it  to  the  great  benefits 
which  are  presented  to  us  in  the  Christian  revelation. 
This  is  addressed  to  us  as  beings  in  a  state  both  of 
guilt  and  of  depravity ;  and  as  having  no  means  of 
our  own  by  which  we  can  rescue  ourselves  from 
condemnation  and  impurity.  It  unfolds  a  dispensa- 
tion of  peace,  by  which,  in  perfect  consistency  with 
the  harmony  of  his  character,  the  Deity  offers  mercy 
and  forgiveness, — and  an  influence  from  himself 
which  has  power  to  purify  the  moral  being.  These 
benefits  are  conferred  on  every  one  who  believes ; 
the  man  who  is  convinced  of  his  guilt  and  perceives 
his  impurity  ;  who  feels  his  inability  to  rescue  him- 
self; who  admits  the  efficacy  of  the  remedy,  and 
confides  in  the  sincerity  with  which  it  is  offered  ;  this 
is  he  who  believes.  His  faith  saves  him  ;  because, 
acting  on  his  conviction,  according  to  the  uniform 
S 


206      THE  MORAL  RELATION  OF  MAN 

sequence  of  volitions  in  every  sound  mind, — he  asks 
the  promised  aid, — and  asking,  receives  it.  Much 
of  the  confusion  in  which  the  subject  has  been  in- 
volved appears  to  have  arisen  from  metaphysical 
refinements  in  which  the  various  parts  of  this  mental 
process  are  separated  from  each  other.  They  form 
one  harmonious  whole,  which  cannot  be  broken. 
The  man  will  not  seek  the  remedy  who  believes  not 
its  efficacy,  and  perceives  not  his  moral  necessities  ; 
but,  however  he  may  profess  to  admit  these  facts,  if  he 
follows  not  out  his  belief  to  its  natural  result  in  ap- 
plying for  the  remedy,  his  mere  belief  will  not  profit 
him.  The  grounds  on  which  these  truths  are 
addressed  to  us  are  contained  in  that  chain  of  evi- 
dence on  which  is  founded  the  whole  system  of 
Christianity, — taken  along  with  the  conviction  which 
every  man  receives  of  his  actual  moral  condition, 
from  the  voice  of  conscience  within.  The  sincerity 
of  the  offer  we  derive  from  our  impression  of  the 
unchangeable  attributes  of  the  Deity.  Accordingly, 
he  who  believes  is  said  to  give  glory  to  God, — that 
is,  to  receive  his  statements  with  absolute  confidence, 
and  to  form  an  honourable  conception  of  the  sin- 
cerity of  his  intentions.  He  who  believes  not  re- 
jects the  statements  of  the  Almighty  as  false, — and 
treats  him  with  the  contempt  which  we  apply  to  one 
whom  we  suppose  to  promise  what  he  has  no  inten- 
tion to  bestow.  The  man  who  comes  to  God  with 
the  hope  of  acceptance  is  therefore  required  to  come 
in  the  assurance  of  faith, — or  an  implicit  conviction 
that  he  is  sincere  in  his  intentions  of  bestowing  the 
blessings  which  he  offers  ;  and  whosoever  hath  not 


TOWARDS    THE    DEITY.  207 

this  assurance  does  dishonour  to  the  divine  charac- 
ter,— or  "  maketh  God  a  liar." 

It  were  vain  to  enter  upon  the  various  systems 
and  opinions  in  which  this  important  doctrine  has 
been  misrepresented  by  its  enemies,  and  often  per- 
verted by  those  who  profess  to  be  its  friends.  Two 
of  these  may  be  briefly  noticed.  Some  have  main- 
tained that  the  doctrine  of  an  unconditional  pardon 
sets  aside  the  obhgations  of  morality,  because  it  has 
no  regard  to  the  personal  character  of  the  individual, 
or  holds  out  the  offer  of  acceptance  to  faith  without 
obedience.  Others  contend  that  an  essential  part 
of  faith  is  an  immediate  and  absolute  assurance  of  a 
man's  own  acceptance  in  the  sight  of  the  Deity ;  and 
that  he  who  has  not  this  is  in  a  state  of  unbelief. 
These  two  opinions,  so  different  from  each  other, 
are  equally  founded  upon  misconception  of  the 
nature  and  provisions  of  the  Christian  economy. 

In  regard  to  the  former,  it  is  only  necessary  to 
remark,  that  the  revelation  of  Christian  truth  is  not 
confined  to  an  offer  of  pardon  to  the  guilty ;  its  great 
object  is  the  recovery  and  purification  of  the  moral 
being ;  and  there  is  an  essential  and  inviolable  union 
between  these  two  parts  of  the  great  scheme  of  re- 
demption. It  provides  in  the  most  effectual  manner 
for  the  interests  of  morality,  by  the  purification  of 
the  desires  and  affections,  the  springs  of  action ;  it 
is  the  morality  of  the  heart.  It  proclaims  a  system 
of  morals  more  pure  and  more  exalted  far  than  ever 
was  contemplated  by  the  wisest  of  men  :  it  exhibits 
an  example  of  the  perfect  state  of  a  moral  being,  in 
the  character  of  the  Messiah  ;  and  enforces  the  imi- 


208  THE    MORAL    RELATION    OF    MAN 

tation  of  this  example  as  indispensable  in  every  one 
who  professes  to  be  his  disciple.  These  different 
parts  of  the  scheme  can  never  be  separated,  and 
tliere  cannot  be  a  greater  perversion  of  reasoning,  or 
a  greater  misconception  of  the  prominent  features  of 
the  gospel  of  peace,  than  to  allege  that  it  does  not 
provide,  in  the  most  effectual  manner,  for  the  highest 
interests  of  morality. 

The  other  opinion  is  equally  founded  upon  error, 
namely,  that  which  considers  it  essential  to  faith  that 
a  man  be  assured  of  his  personal  acceptance  in  the 
sight  of  the  Deity.  It  is  obvious  that  this  is  a 
sophism  clearly  opposed  to  sound  reasoning,  and  to 
the  first  principles  of  the  philosophy  of  the  moral 
feelings.  For  faith,  viewed  as  a  mental  process, 
must  always  have  for  its  object  facts ;  and  these 
facts  must  rest  upon  such  evidence  as  is  sufficient 
to  convince  the  understanding  of  their  truth.  To 
talk  of  faith,  without  such  facts  and  such  evidence, 
is  a  mere  logical  fallacy,  or  an  absurdity  in  terms. 
But  there  is  no  disclosure  of  the  personal  accept- 
ance of  any  individual,  and,  consequently,  on  no 
principle  of  sound  reasoning  can  this  ever  be  con- 
sidered as  the  object  of  faith.  This  doctrine,  there* 
fore,  is  applying  a  most  important  principle  of  the 
mind,  not  to  facts,  which  alone  can  warrant  the  ex- 
ercise of  faith,  but  to  a  vision  of  the  imagination, 
which  admits  of  no  evidence,  and  cannot  be  sub- 
jected to  any  test  of  its  truth. 

Widely  different  from  all  such  flimsy  and  imagin- 
ary hypotheses  is  the  great  system  of  Christian 
truth, — ^harmonious  and  consistent  in  itself, — and 


TOWARDS   THE    DEITY.  209 

challenging  the  approbation  of  the  soundest  under- 
standing. It  reveals,  as  we  have  seen,  a  dispensa- 
tion of  mercy,  in  accordance  with  the  highest  ideas 
we  can  form  of  the  Divine  perfections.  It  is  sup- 
ported by  a  chain  of  evidence  which  carries  convic- 
tion to  the  mind  of  the  most  rigid  inquirer ;  and  thus 
it  is  a  sound  and  legitimate  object  of  faith.  It 
reveals  also  a  provision  for  purifying  the  moral 
nature  ;  and  this  in  every  case  accompanies  the  dis- 
pensation of  mercy  to  those  who  receive  it.  The 
effects  of  this  powerful  agency,  therefore,  become 
the  test  and  the  evidence  of  the  reaUty  of  faith. 
Does  a  man  seek  a  proof  of  his  acceptance, — the 
reference  is  to  facts  in  his  own  moral  condition.  He 
is  to  look  for  it  in  a  change  which  is  tedting  place  in 
his  character, — a  new  direction  of  his  desires,— a 
new  regulation  of  his  affections, — an  habitual  impres- 
sion, to  which  he  was  a  stranger  before,  of  the  pres- 
ence and  the  perfections  of  the  Deity, — and  a  new 
light  which  has  burst  upon  his  view,  respecting  his 
relations  to  this  life  and  to  that  which  is  to  come. 
He  is  to  seek  this  evidence  in  a  mind  which  aims 
at  no  lower  standard  than  that  which  will  bear  the 
constant  inspection  of  infinite  purity ;  he  is  to  seek 
it,  and  to  manifest  it  to  others,  in  a  spirit  which  takes 
no  lower  pattern  than  that  model  of  perfection, — ^the 
character  of  the  Messiah.  These  acquirements, 
indeed,  are  looked  upon,  not  as  a  ground  of  accept- 
ance, but  a  test  of  moral  condition ;  not  as,  in  any 
degree,  usurping  the  place  of  the  great  principle  of 
faith,  but  as  its  fruits  and  evidences.  As  these,  then, 
are  the  only  proofs  of  the  reality  of  this  principle,  so 
S2 


210     THE    MORAL    RELATION    OF    MAN,  ETC. 

they  are  the  only  basis  on  which  a  man  can  rest  any 
sound  conviction  of  his  moral  aspect  in  the  sight  of 
the  Deity ;  and  that  system  is  founded  on  delusion 
and  falsehood  which,  in  this  respect,  holds  out  any 
other  ground  of  confidence  than  the  purification  of 
the  heart, — and  a  corresponding  harmony  of  the 
whole  character.  Such  attainment,  indeed,  is  not 
made  at  once,  nor  is  it  ever  made  in  a  full  and  per- 
fect manner  in  the  present  state  of  being ;  but,  where 
the  great  principle  has  been  fixed  within,  there  is  a 
persevering  effort,  and  a  uniform  contest,  and  a  con- 
tinual aspiration  afi;er  conformity  to  the  great  model 
of  perfection.  Each  step  that  a  man  gains  in  this 
progress  serves  to  extend  his  view  of  the  high  pat- 
tern to  which  his  eye  is  steadily  directed ;  and,  as 
his  knowledge  of  it  is  thus  enlarged,  he  is  led  by 
comparison  to  feel  more  and  more  deeply  his  own 
deficiency.  It  thus  produces  increasing  humility, 
and  an  increasing  sense  of  his  own  imperfection, 
and  causes  him  continually  to  feel  that,  in  this  war- 
fare, he  requires  a  power  which  is  not  in  man.  But 
he  knows  also  that  this  is  provided  as  an  essential 
part  of  the  great  system  on  which  his  hope  is  estal 
lished.  Amid  much  weakness,  therefore,  and  man; 
infirmities,  his  moral  improvement  goes  forward 
Faint  and  feeble  at  first  as  the  earliest  dawn  of  the 
morning,  it  becomes  brighter  and  steadier  as  it  pro- 
ceeds in  its  course,  and,  "  as  the  shining  light, 
shineth  more  and  more  unto  the  perfect  day." 

THB    BND. 


Ut 

ial^^ 
he     ^ 


QUESTIONS 


EXAMINATION    OF    STUDENTS. 


PRELIMINARY  OBSERVATIONS. 

SECTION  I. 

Page  15. 

In  what  twofold  light  is  man  to  be  contemplated  ?— What  is 
the  office  of  the  intellectual  powers  ? — With  what  iiind  of  truths 
are  they  more  especially  conversant  ? 

What  relations  does  he  sustain  viewed  as  a  moral  being?— In 
what  respect  are  these  two  parts  of  his  mental  constitution  per- 
ceived to  be  distinct  from  each  other  ? — What  is  the  case  in  a 
well-regulated  mind  ? — What  ought  to  be  made  to  contribute  to 
man's  purity  as  a  moral  being  ? 

Of  what  fact  does  a  slight  observation  convince  us?— What 
are  some  of  the  circumstances  which  bear  a  part  in  producing 
■  this  derangement  ?— What  is  the  effect  of  the  bustle  of  life  ? — 
With  what  things  are  we  most  deeply  concerned  as  moral 
beings  ? — From  what  source  do  we  in  this  case  receive  benefit  ? 
— What  takes  place  under  such  influence? — In  what  do  we  see 
the  first  of  these  exemplified  ? 

To  what  anticipation  does  this  subject  lead  us  ? — What  con- 
jecture is  rendered  highly  probable  by  certain  facts  in  our  mental 
phenomena  ? — How  should  we  contemplate  impressions  so  re- 
called, and  why? 

Compared  with  this  part  of  man's  nature,  what  other  things 
are  thrown  into  the  background? — Why  ?— What  science  there- 
fore is  to  be  considered  as  the  highest  of  all  human  pursuits  ? — 
WTiat  do  we  feel  besides  its  importance  ? — What  sources  of 
knowledge  have  we  in  this  great  inquiry  to  which  nothing  ana- 
ogous  is  found  in  the  history  of  physical  science  ?— How  will 


212  QUESTIONS. 

some  probably  view  and  appeal  to  the  second  of  these? — Wliat 
is  the  author's  reply  to  this,  and  on  what  founded  ? — To  what  is 
the  disregard  of  Scripture  light  in  these  investigations  com- 
pared ? — How  is  the  comparison  carried  out  ? 

What  are  we  enabled  to  attain  from  these  combined  sources 
of  knowledge  ? — When  in  an  especial  manner  do  we  do  so  1 — 
What  tendency  has  the  science  when  cultivated  on  these  prin- 
ciples ? 

>  SECTION  II. 

Page  22. 

To  how  many  classes  is  the  knowledge  received  through  ou" 
intellectual  powers  referable  ? — How  may  they  be  distinguished  ? 
— How  is  the  former  procured  ? — What  operations  do  they  con 
stitute  ? — What  does  the  full  exercise  of  them  require  ? — How 
does  it  appear  that  such  culture  is  not  essential  to  every  indi 
vidual  ? 

What  is  said  of  the  knowledge  derived  from  the  other  source  ? 
— Under  what  name  are  these  principles  treated  of  in  a  former 
work  ? — How  do  they  differ  from  our  knowledge  of  the  other 
kind  ? — W^hat  are  their  main  positive  characteristics  ? 

What  inference  should  we  naturally  draw  from  the  intellectual 
endowments  bestowed  upon  man? — What  do  we  accordingly 
find? — To  what  part  of  our  constitution  are  they  referable?  — 
What  place  do  the  convictions  arising  from  this  source  seem  to 
occupy? — In  what^other  respects  do  they  resemble  them? — 
From  what  cause  vvill  it  probably  appear  that  these  truths  have 
been  inconclusive  ? — By  what  fact  is  the  force  of  this  analogy  in 
no  degree  weakened  ? — Why  ? — What  different  results  in  differ- 
ent men  are  accounted  for  on  this  ground? — To  what  is  our 
appeal  chiefly  made  in  cases  of  this  kind  ? — What  two  elements 
of  character  must  go  together  in  every  sound  inquiry  in  moral 
science  ? 

What  is  one  of  the  objects  of  divine  revelation? — What  is 
introduced  by  means  of  it  ? — What  is  it  of  importance  to 
remark  ? 

In  classifying  the  first  principles  of  moral  truth,  what  stands 
first  in  order? — What  second? — From  what  does  this  belief 
arise  ? — Upon  what  is  our  sense  of  his  moral  attributes  fixed  ? 
— What  is  said  of  the  prevalence  of  this  belief  in  the  existence 
of  a  supreme  and  ruling  intelligence? — What  attributes  are 
common  to  the  God  of  the  Scriptures  and  the  god  of  the  an- 
cient philosophy  ? — What  was  the  character  of  the  conceptions 
of  the  ancient  sages  on  this  subject  ? — What  was  the  remark  of 
an  African  chief  to  one  of  the  missionaries  ? 


QUESTIONS.  213 

What  is  the  third  of  these  principles? — Wliat  reciprocal 
feeling  exists  in  this  case,  and  what  precept  is  founded 
upon  it  ? 

What  the  fourth  ? — In  reference  to  what  are  they  stated  here  ? 
— To  what  do  we  appeal  for  their  truth  ? — Why  do  we  not  go 
abroad  among  savage  nations  to  inquire  whether  the  impression 
of  them  be  universal  ? — To  whom  do  we  c<intidently  appeal  ? 

What  is  stated  as  a  point  of  the  utmost  practical  importance  ? 
— If  we  do  not  suppose  them  to  originate  in  this  way,  to  what 
alternative  are  we  reduced  ? — Why  can  we  not  believe  that  they 
are  derived  entirely  from  revelation  ? — What  is  said  of  the  other 
supposition  ? — What  is  said  of  the  a  priori  argument  for  the  ex- 
istence and  attributes  of  the  Deity  ? — To  what  other  arguments 
may  the  same  observation  be  applied  ? — Upon  what  considera- 
tions are  these  chiefly  founded? — What  may  be  conceded  in 
reference  to  these  arguments  ? — What,  notwithstanding,  must 
be  said  of  them  ? — What  minds  only  are  adapted  to  feel  their 
force  ? — What,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  character  of  the  truths 
they  are  intended  to  establish  ? — What  therefore  should  we  ex- 
pect as  to  the  evidence  upon  which  they  rest? — What  is  said  of 
the  powerful  reasonings  of  Butler  ?— What  then  ? — WTiat  is 
said  of  the  origin  of  remorse  ? — For  what  does  conscience 
plead  ?— What  is  said  of  its  authority  ? 

To  what  else  do  similar  observations  apply  ? — How  may  this 
question  be  disposed  of? — ^What  is  recognised  by  the  common 
consent  of  mankind,  and  with  how  absolute  a  conviction  ? — How 
does  the  hardened  criminal  show  that  he  recognises  such  princi- 
ples as  a  part  of  the  moral  constitution  ? — How  illustrated  ? — 
How  does  the  criminal  show  the  same  recognition  in  defending 
himself? — What  would  be  the  consequence  were  such  principles 
not  to  be  universally  recognised  ? — In  what  respect  are  human 
laws  deficient  ?— To  what  may  this  controlling  internal  principle 
be  likened  ? 

What  conviction  accompanies  the  consciousness  of  these 
principles  ? — What  impression  arises  from  this  ? — To  what  does 
this  again  give  rise  ? — What  effect  has  this  uniformity  of  moral 
feeling  and  affection  ?— How  illustrated?— What  is  the  remark 
of  Butler? 

Upon  the  whole,  therefore,  what  is  there  ground  for  as 
eummg  ? 


214  QUESTIONS, 

PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  MORAL  FEELINGS. 
Page  35. 

What  first  claims  our  attention  m  analyzing  the  distinguishing 
principles  of  man  as  a  moral  being  ? — By  what,  besides  actions, 
are  we  guided  in  forming  our  judgment,  and  why  ? — What  is 
the  first-named  element  which  enters  into  the  economy  of  an 
intelligent  and  responsible  agent  ? 

What  is  the  determining  principle  of  the  conduct  ? — Under 
what  conditions  does  the  connected  act  follow  ? 

To  how  many  classes  are  the  objects  of  will  referable  ? — With 
what  two  distinct  mental  conditions  are  these  connected? — In 
what  consists  the  act  which  is  the  result  of  volition  ? — What 
other  principle  is  to  be  kept  in  view  in  connexion  with  the  de- 
sires and  aifections  ? — What  is  the  character  of  this  principle  ? 

What  fact  is  next  to  be  attended  to  ? — How  does  it  appear 
that  every  affection  does  not  lead  to  the  conduct  which  might 
flow  from  it  ? — What  do  we  find  on  another  step  backwards '{ 

To  how  many  heads  may  the  principles  here  adverted  to  be 
referred  ? — From  what  may  the  determination  or  decision  arise  ? 
— From  what  does  this  usually  result  f — How  exemplified  ? — 
How  does  this  apply  to  the  emotions  of  anger  and  benevolence  ? 

From  what  other  source  may  the  determination  arise  ? — What 
is  this  principle  called,  and  what  ofl^ice  does  it  perform  in  every 
morally  healthy  mind  ? — To  what  does  it  excite,  and  how  is  its 
general  influence  exerted  ? 

To  what  is  one  of  the  chief  diversities  of  human  character 
owing? — What  knowledge  do  we  acquire  frori  this  source,  and 
how  are  we  able  to  turn  it  to  account  ? — How  exemplified  ? 

What  other  and  higher  class  of  emotions  remains  to  be  speci- 
fied ?— Where  does  the  author  propose  to  consider  this  subject  ? 
— State  the  general  division  of  the  principles  which  constitute 
our  moral  feelings. 

What  may  these  be  called  ? — What  other  class  of  feelings  is 
there  connected  with  them  ? 

When  do  we  feel  desire? — When  hope? — WTien  confidence  ? 
—When  faith? — When  do  we  give  way  to  despair? — When 
experience  pleasure,  or  joy  and  grief? — When  are  we  subject  to 
fear,  and  when  to  its  reverse  ? — Explain  the  manner  in  which 
similar  emotions  attend  on  the  affections. 


QUESTIONS.  215 


PART    I. 


OF    THE    DESIRES,    THE   AFFECTIONS,    AND    SELF-LOVE. 

SECTION  I. 
Page  43 

How  is  desire  defined  ? — What  do  ita  objects  embrace  ?— How 
is  the  object  pursued  in  each  particular  case  determined? — How 
consequently  are  different  objects  regarded  by  different  indi 
viduals  ? 

How  are  we  to  be  guided  in  forming  a  classification  of  the 
desires  ?  — In  referring  them  to  appropriate  heads,  what  is  the  first 
named  ? 

What  is  necessary  in  respect  to  the  animal  appetites  ? — What 
is  the  consequence  of  allowing  them  to  break  through  restraint, 
and  become  leading  principles  of  action  T^To  whom  do  these 
remarks  in  a  special  manner  apply  ? 

What  is  next  enumerated  ? — How  is  it  justly  to  be  regarded  ? 
— In  what  does  it  properly  originate  ? — What  effect  has  the  in- 
fluence of  habit  ? — What  does  it  often  become  ? — WTiat  is  said 
of  its  engrossing  effect,  and  by  what  in  this  case  is  it  usually 
accompanied  ? — To  what  does  it  lead  when  it  breaks  through 
the  restraint  of  law  and  justice? — To  what,  therefore,  is  it 
always  liable  to  be  opposed  ? 

What  stands  next  in  order? — What  is  this?— How  is  its 
strength  evinced? — In  what  class  of  men  especially  do  we 
behold  its  influence? — What  higher  form  does  it  sometimes 
assume  ? 

What  is  mentioned  in  the  fourth  place  ?—  How  does  this  differ 
from  the  former  ? — What  is  its  tendency  ? — In  what  classes  of 
men  is  it  seen  ? — What  more  commendable  form  does  it  some- 
times assume  ? 

W^hat  is  mentioned  in  the  fifth  place  ? — How  has  this  been 
considered  by  most  writers  ? — How  has  it  been  known  to  mani- 
fest itself? — The  reason  of  this? — In  what  else  is  it  found? — 
For  what  is  it  necessary  ?— What  does  it  become  when 
abused  ? 

What  is  the  sixth  principle  named? — Under  what  circum- 
stances may  it  be  considered  a  highly  laudable  principle  ? — To 
what  does  the  healthy  exercise  of  it  prompt  a  man,  and  what 
tlie  reverse  ? — How  is  the  character  of  this  desire  to  be  deter- 
miiied  ? — How  extensive  is  its  operation  ? — What  is  thought  of 


316  QUESTIONS. 

a  man  totally  regardless  of  character  ? — May  there  be  circum- 
stances, however,  in  which  this  indifference  may  be  laudable? 
— What  effect  has  the  desire  of  the  approbation  of  the  virtuous 
and  the  vicious  respectively  upon  the  conduct  ? — What  other 
modification  is  there  of  this  principle,  and  what  is  said  of  its 
operation  ? — How  is  pride  distinguished  from  this  ? 

Of  what  is  our  regard  to  the  opinion  the  origin,  and  what  is 
said  of  its  influence  on  society  and  manners  ? — Of  what  else  is 
it  the  source  ? — What  is  the  foundation  of  this  ? — Upon  what 
does  much  of  a  man's  respectability  in  life  depend  ? — In  what 
class  of  persons  is  this  love  of  esteem  of  extensive  influence  ? — 
To  what  expedients  does  it  prompt  some  men  ? 

To  what  is  assigned  the  seventh  place  in  this  enumeration  ? — 
Upon  what  does  the  tendency  of  this  principle  depend? — To 
what  may  it  be  applied  ? — Why  is  it  necessary  that  it  should  be 
under  the  control  of  a  well-regulated  judgment  ?  —In  whom  ought 
it  to  be  especially  cultivated,  and  why  ? 

What  stands  the  eighth  in  order  ? — What  is  the  tendency  and 
the  peculiar  characteristic  of  this  principle  ? — In  what  respects 
has  it  an  advantage  over  others  before  mentioned  ? — What  effect 
has  it  upon  its  possessor  ? — In  what  does  this  mental  condition 
consist  ? — To  what  does  it  accordingly  lead  ? 

What  do  the  emotions  now  mentioned  include  ? — What  other 
prmciple  ought  to  be  mentioned,  and  how  is  it  characterized  ?— 
What  facts  may  be  accounted  for  on  this  principle  ? — To  what 
class  of  men  does  the  greatest  degree  of  real  enjoyment  belong  ? 

What  lies  in  a  great  measure  at  the  foundation  of  character  ? 
— What  is  requisite  for  a  sound  moral  condition  ? — What  will 
be  the  consequence  of  their  being  thus  controlled,  and  what  of 
their  being  left  without  restraint  ? — When  have  we  evidence  of 
this  ? — From  what  particular  desires  have  some  of  the  greatest 
evils  arisen? — What  is  the  effect  upon  the  mental  character  of 
giving  loose  to  sensual  or  selfish  propensities  ? 

With  what  may  an  ill-regulated  state  of  the  desires  at  the 
same  time  consist  ? — Can  this  be  considered  as  the  healthy  con- 
dition of  a  moral  being,  and  why  ? — What  precepts  of  the  sacred 
writings  bear  upon  this  point  ? — What  is  subservient  to  the  at- 
tainment of  perfect  moral  purity  ? — In  order  to  this  attainment, 
what  is  it  necessary  that  man  should  feel  ? 

SECTION  II. 

Page  56. 

How  does  the  operation  of  the  affections  differ  from  that  of 
the  desires  ? — In  what  light  are  they  to  be  viewed,  and  how  is 
their  operation  to  be  considered  ? — How  exemplified  ^ — What  is 
said  of  this  distinction  ? 


QUESTIONS.  217 

How  therefore  may  an  affection  be  considered  ?— How  have 
the  affections  been  divided,  and  why  is  this  division  to  be  objected 
to  ? — To  what  only  does  this  latter  class  tend  ? — What  appella- 
tions therefore  are  to  be  preferred,  and  what  do  they  respectively 
include  ? 

I.   JUSTICE. 

How  does  the  propriety  of  including  justice  among  the  affec 
tions  appear  ? — Strictly  speaking,  what  might  it  be  considered  ? 
— What  is  the  important  consideration  relating  to  it  ? — What  do 
the  requirements  of  justice  embrace? — How  have  these  rights 
usually  been  divided? — Of  what  do  these  principles  form  the 
basis  ? — What  is  said  of  this,  code  of  relative  duty  ? — How  are 
these  great  principles  of  justice  combined  in  the  actual  arrange- 
ments of  civil  communities  ? — What  is  said  of  their  operations 
under  different  circumstances  ?    . 

How  is  the  word  justice  used  in  these  observations  ? — In  what 
other  sense  is  the  term  employed? — In  which  sense  does  it 
form  a  branch  of  the  philosophy  of  the  moral  feelings  ? 

In  what,  therefore,  does  the  sense  of  justice  consist? — To 
what  heads  does  this  seem  referable  ? — What  has  a  man  as  a 
guide  for  his  conduct  in  particular  instances  ? 

Under  the  first  head— to  what  is  justice  dua?— In  this  case 
what  does  it  constitute  ? — What  does  it  imply  ? — What,  in  this 
last  respect,  does  it  allow  us  ? — Where  is  the  great  rule  for  our 
guidance  in  such  cases  found,  and  what  is  the  test  of  our  con- 
duct in  individual  instances  f. 

What,  secondly,  does  justice  require  of  us  ? — What  does  this 
constitute? — What  takes  place  in  civil  communities? — What 
else  may  the  principles  of  justice  recognise? — To  what,  how- 
ever, are  these  principles  directly  opposed? 

What,  thirdly,  does  justice  enjoin  ? — In  what  does  this  con- 
sist ? — To  what  else  does  it  extend  ? — How  does  it  require  us  to 
conduct  towards  rivals  ? — To  what  modification  is  the  former  of 
these  rules  liable  ?— How  far  will  the  rules  of  justice  prompt  a 
man  to  go  in  such  cases,  and  of  what  will  he  at  all  times 
beware  ? 

What  is  the  fourth  dictate  of  justice  ? — In  what  does  this  con- 
sist?— What  does  justice  require  when  an  action  is  capable  of 
being  referred  to  different  motives  ? — When  is  the  exercise  of 
such  justice  peculiarly  requisite  ? — Why  ? — Viewing  conduct  iji 
this  manner,  what  may  we  often  perceive  ? 

When,  fifthly,  is  justice  especially  to  be  exercised? — What 
does  this  constitute  ? — In  what  does  it  consist?— To  what  is  it 
opposed  ? — Of  what  therefore  is  candour  compounded,  and  to 
what  does  it  lead  ?— What  is  its  operation?— What  has  been  re- 
marked in  reference  to  it  ? 

T 


318  QUESTIONS. 

To  what,  sixthly,  is  justice  due  ? — To  what  does  this  apply  T 
— Jn  what  way,  besides  in  their  interest  and  reputation,  may 
persons  be  injured? — What  minds  are  peculiarly  susceptible  to 
this  kind  of  injury,  and  how  will  a  person  of  correct  feelings 
accordingly  demean  himself? — Of  what  are  persons  of  honest 
and  upright  minds  sometimes  guilty? — In  what  may  this  be 
shown? — To  what  do  the  lower  and  the  higher  degrees  of  this 
principle  respectively  pertain? — What  else  may  be  referred  to 
this  head,  and  to  what  is  it  opposed  ? — How  is  flattery  to  be  con- 
sidered? 

What  other  class  of  injuries  will  the  conscientious  mind 
avoid  with  peculiar  anxiety? — What  is  said  of  this  class  of 
offences  ? — To  whom  does  a  peculiarly  deep  guilt  attach  ? — Of 
whom  is  equal  or  greater  maligfiity  affirmed  ? — How  does  the 
career  of  such  persons  often  differ  from  that  of  inferior  offend- 
ers?— What  else  may  be  assigned  to  the  same  head? — To 
whom  does  this  kind  of  power  belong  ? — What  is  a  source  of 
peculiar  regret  to  the  friend  of  virtue  ? — What  considerations 
ought  to  weigh  with  such  ? 

II.   COMPASSION   AND   BENEVOLENCE, 

Page  65. 

In  what  respects  is  the  condition  of  men  diversified  in  the 
present  life  ? — How  are  such  diversities  to  be  viewed  ? — What 
may  we  safely  reckon  as  holding  a  prominent  place  among  these 
purposes  ? — What  is  the  natural  effect  of  the  due  exercise  of 
these  affections  ? — What  effect  does  it  produce  on  our  feelings 
towards  others  ? — From  what  power  do  these  affections  tend  to 
withdraw  us? — How  is  their  due  cultivation  therefore  to  be 
considered  ? — Upon  whom  does  their  chief  benefit  terminate  ? 
— What  the  consequence  of  neglecting  them?— By  what  is 
the  diligent  exercise  of  them  accompanied  ? 

What  more  do  the  benevolent  affections  often  require  of  us 
than  is  demanded  by  the  principle  of  justice  ? — What  is  to  be 
borne  in  mind  on  the  other  hand? — How  illustrated? 

Towards  whom,  in  the  first  place,  are  compassion  and  bene- 
volent exertion  due  ?— What  does  this  exercise  of  them  often 
call  for  ?— How  do  we  feel  our  way  to  the  proper  measure  of 
these  sacrifices  ? — What  is  the  most  easy  form  in  which  benevo- 
lence can  be  gratified ''—How  may  the  same  affection  be  exer 
cised  in  a  higher  degree  ?— How  may  the  two  modes  be  charac 
terized  ? — What  are  the  properties  of  this  high  and  pure  benevo 
lence  ? 

Towards  what,  secondly,  is  benevolence  to  be  exercised  ? — 
what  does  this  consist  ?— What  belongs  therefore  to  this 
rtment  ? 


QUESTIONS.  219 

What  is  the  third  field  of  its  operation  ? — In  what  does  this 
consist  ? — To  what  does  it  lead  ? — To  what  else  does  it  extend  ? 

Towards  what,  in  the  fourth  place,  is  benevolence  to  be  exer- 
cised ? — To  what  situations  does  this  apply  ? — What  does  it 
include'' — What  is  its  more  appropriate  name? — What  does  it 
imply  ?— What  is  apt  to  be  forgotten  ? 

Jn  regard  to  what,  fifthly,  is  benevolence  to  be  exercised  ? — 
From  what  does  this  prevent  us  ? — What  does  it  also  imply  ? — 
What  therefore  is  its  ultimate  aim  ? 


III.   VERACITY. 

Page  70. 

What  is  founded  on  confidence  in  the  veracity  of  mankind  ? 
— To  what  does  it  relate  ? — What,  for  example? — How  is  it  in 
respect  to  the  most  common  events  of  every  day  ? — What  natu- 
ral tendencies  are  mentioned  as  existing  in  all  men  ?— What  is 
the  consequence  of  this  in  regard  to  children  and  inexperienced 
persons  ?— How  many  are  the  elements  essential  to  veracity  ? 

What  is  the  first  ? — To  what  is  this  essential  ? — What  does  it 
require  of  us  ? — Against  what  does  it  consequently  guard  us  ? — 
From  what  does  the  sound  exercise  of  judgment,  connected 
with  the  love  of  truth,  differ  ? — To  what  else  is  the  same  prin- 
ciple applicable  ? — To  what  is  it  thus  opposed  ? — In  what  de- 
partments, therefore,  is  the  love  of  truth  equally  important,  and 
what  does  it  include  ? — Where  and  how  do  we  acquire  a  degree 
of  caution  ? — To  what  does  this  sometimes  lead  in  minds  of  a 
certain  description  ? — To  what  does  the  want  of  caution  lead  ? 
— What  is  the  part  of  a  well-regulated  mind? 

What  is  closely  connected  with  the  love  of  truth  in  receiving 
facts  ? — In  what  does  this  consist  ? — To  what  is  it  consequently 
opposed  ? 

In  what  may  direct  fallacy  consist?— How  else  may  true 
statements  convey  an  erroneous  impression  ?— By  what  example 
may  these  sources  of  fallacy  be  illustrated  ? — From  what  sources 
does  the  false  impression  in  this  case  arise  ? — In  what  other  cases 
may  the  same  effect  be  produced? — To  what  does  a  certain 
common  saying  refer  ? 

What  rule  is  to  be  referred  to  veracity  under  this  department? 
— What  is  this  ? — To  what  is  it  opposed  ? — On  what  is  such  a 
character  founded  ? — What  moreover  does  it  imply? — To  what 
else  is  sincerity  opposed  ? — To  what  further  is  it  repugnant  ? 

What  is  the  third  element  of  veracity?— To  what  is  this 
opposed  ? — What  impression  is  given  bv  this  straight-forward 
integrity  of  purpose  ?— Wt»Ht  fimher  ? 


220  QUESTIONS. 


IV    FRIENDSHIP,   LOVE,  AND   GRATITUDE. 

Page  76. 

What  is  said  of  the  relation  of  these  affections  to  each  other  ? 
— In  what  do  they  consist? — With  what  do  the  feehngs  and  con- 
duct to  which  they  lead  correspond  ? — How  are  the  exertions 
arising  out  of  them  dijected  ? — How  is  this  last  consideration 
reckoned  ? — How  is  its  operation  sometimes  impeded  ? — How 
does  the  exercise  of  gratitude  differ  from  that  of  love  and 
friendship  ? 

V.    PATRIOTISM. 

Page  77. 

How  is  patriotism  to  be  considered  ? — To  what  does  it  lead  ? 
—What  devolves  upon  every  member  of  the  community? — 
What  is  it  in  the  power  of  every  one  to  do  ?  How  may  he  finally 
exert  himself? 

VI.   THE   DOMESTIC   AFFECTIONS. 

Page  78. 

What  is  included  in  this  extensive  and  interesting  class  ? — 
What  do  these  call  forth  ? — To  what  do  they  lead  in  the  con- 
jugal relation? — To  what  in  the  parental?— To  what  in  the 
filial? 

How  ought  the  father  to  consider  the  son  ? — What  should  he 
do  in  the  prosecution  of  this  great  purpose  ? — What  will  be  the 
effect  of  this  upon  the  son? — How  do  the  same  principles  ope- 
rate in  the  relation  between  the  mother  and  the  daughter? — ■ 
Why? — By  what  means  are  the  best  feelings  of  our  nature 
cultivated  in  the  domestic  circle  ? — What  is  said  of  a  domestic 
society  bound  together  by  these  principles  ? 

THE  DEFENSIVE  AFFECTIONS. 

Page  81. 

What  feelings  are  mentioned  as  constituting  a  part  nf  oiir 
moral  constitution,  and  what  is  necessary  in  order  to  their  ar- 
swering  important  ends  ? — What  is  their  proper  object,  and  to 
what  do  they  lead  us  ? — How  does  it  operate  in  regard  to  cp- 


QUESTIONS.  221 

pressors  and  the  oppressed  ^— What  is  a  still  more  refined  exer- 
cise of  this  class  of  feelings  ? 

To  what  does  resentment  naturally  lead  ?— How  ought  this 
to  be  done  ?— Why  may  not  this  properly  be  left  in  the  hands  of 
the  person  injured  ? — Who  are  least  inclined  to  make  allowances 
for  others  ?— What  is  the  natural  result  of  this  ?— When  are  the 
defensive  affections  exercised  in  an  unwarranted  manner  ? — To 
what  is  the  sound  exercise  of  them  opposed  ? 

What  three  points  in  relation  to  the  affections  remain  to  be 
considered  ? 

In  what  does  the  exercise  of  attention  consist  ? — To  what 
does  it  lead  ?— To  what  particular  case  does  this  especially 
apply  ? — How  is  this  evmced  ? — What  goes  to  compose  sympa- 
thy ? — What,  however,  is  to  be  kept  in  mind  in  relation  to  the 
principle  of  self-love  ? — To  what  source  have  some  referred  our 
ideas  of  benevolence  ?— How  are  such  discussions  to  be  re- 
garded?—How  is  the  application  of  self-love  in  such  cases 
chiefly  useful  ?— Upon  what  does  the  rule  of  conduct  rest  ?— 
How  are  they  aided  in  their  practical  application  ? 

What  is  said  of  the  man  who  acts  habitually  under  the  influ- 
ence of  these  rales  ? — How  is  he  described  as  governing  his 
conduct  ? — What  are  the  good  effects  resulting  from  this  whole  • 
some  state  of  mental  discipline  ? — What  the  reason  of  this  ? 

What  other  view  is  to  be  taken  of  the  advantages  derived 
from  this  source  ?— How  is  this  exemplified  ? — To  whom  is  a 
similar  impulse  given,  and  under  what  circumstances  ? — What 
will  this  refined  species  of  philanthropy  chiefly  seek  ? — To  what 
else  will  it  lead  ? 

What  is  to  be  noticed  next  to  the  power  of  attention  ? — Upon 
what  is  this  founded  ? — What  is  the  tendency  of  all  emotions? 
— What  that  of  actions  ?— Of  what  does  an  affection  consist, 
and  what  is  the  natural  progress  of  the  mind  ?— How  exempli- 
fied?— How  is  this  apt  to  be  considered,  and  what  is  the  true 
account  of  it  ? — What  is  requisite  that  this  may  take  place  in 
the  sound  and  healthy  manner?— What  the  consequences  of 
neglecting  this  ? 

What  is  the  first  of  the  two  conclusions  arising  from  this  sub- 
ject ? — What  is  the  evil  in  this  case,  and  what  the  consequence  ? 
— What  is  the  second? — What  suggestion  is  made  grounded 
upon  this  consideration  ?— What  may  be  the  effect  of  suspicions 
of  this  kind  ? 

What  consideration  of  great  moment  connected  with  pauper- 
ism is  here  thrown  out  ? — When  does  political  science  pass  its 
proper  boundary  ? — What,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  to  be  denied  1 

What  is  the  third  point  which  remains  to  be  mentioned  ? — 

How  illustrated  in  the  case  of  the  mother  ? — From  what  motive 

does  she  act  ? — To  what  else  does  the  same  principle  apply,  and 

what  is  their  character? — Analogous  to  what  is  the  purpose 

T2 


222  QUESTIONS. 

which  they  serve  in  our  moral  economy  ? — How  exemplified  ? — 
Apply  the  comparison. — What  effect  has  the  violation  of  these 
feelings,  and  what  the  performance  of  them  ? — What  is  said  of 
the  man  who  lives  habitually  in  the  exercise  of  a  cold  and  barren 
selfishness  ? — What  more  than  this  attaches  to  such  a  character  ? 
— What  contrary  inference  however  will  not  hold  good,  and 
why  ? — What  is  possible  in  regard  to  the  culture  of  the  affec- 
tions?— On  what  condition  are  we  entitled  to  acknowledge  the 
operation  of  that  great  principle  ? — With  what  does  this  cor- 
respond ? 

What  else  is  to  be  observed  on  this  branch  of  the  subject  ? — 
How  shown  ? — How  are  the  more  strictly  benevolent  affections 
influenced  ? — What  beautiful  principle  is  thus  perceived  in  the 
moral  system,  and  how  is  it  illustrated  ? — What  is  to  be  borne 
in  mind  on  the  other  hand  ? 

What  are  we  further  to  remember  in  regard  to  the  affections 
and  desires  ? — How  is  this  mental  tranquillity  represented  to  us  ? 
— What  is  mentioned  as  a  constant  source  of  pure  enjoyment  ? 
— What  is  the  effect  of  such  a  disposition  ? — What  is  to  be  said 
of  the  reverse  ? — What  else  can  we  not  fail  to  perceive  ? — ^What 
do  we  see  in  all  this  ? — From  what  does  much  of  the  actual 
misery  in  the  world  arise  ? — Wliat  do  we  find  also  by  innumera- 
ble examples  ? — What  is  further  to  be  remarked? 

What  does  the  author  remark  in  conclusion  ? — How  is  this 
quality  there  represented  ? — What  also  do  we  there  find  exposed  ? 
—  What  is  the  substance  of  the  quotation  with  which  the  sub- 
ject is  concluded  ? 

SECTION  m. 

SELF-LOVE. — Page  96. 

What  dispute  has  there  been  in  respect  to  the  term  Self-love? 
— What  fact  is  stated  respecting  which  there  can  be  no  doubt  ? 
— How  is  the  principle  to  be  considered  ? — What  is  necessary  to 
its  answering  important  purposes  ? — When  thus  regulated,  what 
does  it  constitute,  and  what  when  it  becomes  morbid  in  its 
exercise  ? 

What  should  be  the  tendency  and  effect  of  a  sound  and  ra- 
tional self-love? — Why? — To  what  should  it  therefore  lead? — 
What  does  it  include  ? — Viewed  in  this  manner,  how  does  self- 
love  appear? — What  the  impression  on  which  its  influence 
rests  ? — What  is  to  be  reckoned  among  these  sources  of  satis- 
faction ? — What  is  to  be  kept  in  mind  on  the  other  hand  ? — What 
is  the  remark  of  Butler  ? — What  that  of  the  Eiuthor  ? — What  else 
accords  with  the  observation  of  any  man  ? — What  follows  the 
neglect  of  a  due  exercise  of  the  affections,  and  what  effiect  has 


QUESTJONS.  223 

it  ?— What  is  further  evident  ?— Why  ?— WTiat  has  Bishop  Butler 
shown,  and  how  does  self-love  operate  when  it  prevails  over 
appetite  ? — How  does  it  do  this  ? — From  what  is  it  quite  dis- 
tinct, and  how  ? — Why  is  this  distinction  of  importance  ? 

To  what  then  does  self-love  lead? — To  what  do  the  affections 
lead  ? — What  is  essential  to  a  healthy  state  of  the  moral  being  ? 
— What  is  the  comparative  danger  in  regard  to  the  affections 
and  to  self-love  ? — How  is  this  to  be  prevented  ? — What  do  we 
find  accordingly? — How  illustrated ? — What  else  is  to  be  ac- 
counted for  in  the  same  manner  ? — What  do  we  thus  perceive  in 
respect  to  the  moral  principle  or  sense  of  duty  ? 

What  is  the  consequence  of  self-love  becoming  deranged  in 
its  exercise  and  objects  ? — How  may  one  do  this  ? — What  deeds 
may  be  performed  on  this  principle  ? — How  evinced  T^To  what 
do  we  hence  attach  a  peculiar  value  ? — W^here  is  our  highest 
conception  of  such  a  character  realized  ? 


PART  II. 

OF  THE  WILL. 
Page  103. 

What  is  will,  or  simple  volition  ? — State  the  process. — From 
what  do  the  actions  thus  produced  arise? — Describe  more  fully 
the  mental  process. — What  f6llows? — Describe  it. — ^What  is 
the  final  result  ? 

What  class  of  agents  is  brought  into  the  chain  of  mental  ope- 
rations, and  what  are  they  called  ? — What  was  attempted  to  be 
shown  in  another  treatise  ? — What  is  required  for  the  due  opera- 
tion of  moral  causes  ? — In  regard  to  what  particularly  does '  this 
necessity  exist  ? — Upon  what  do  we  proceed  in  our  intercourse 
with  mankind? — What  can  we  foretel,  for  example? — With 
how  much  confidence  do  we  rely  upon  the  integrity  and  veracity 
of  some  persons  ? — What  do  we  gradually  thus  acquire,  and 
how  ? — How  exemplified  ? — What  do  we  learn  in  our  endeavours 
to  exert  influence  upon  others  ?— How  do  we  proceed  when  in 
certain  cases  certain  motives  or  truths  fail  of  effect  ? — From  what 
conviction  do  we  do  this  ? 

What  do  we  recognise  therefore'  in  all  such  cases  ? — Why  is 
it  no  objection  to  this  that  men  act  in  very  different  ways  with 
the  same  motives  before  them  ? 

Supposing  a  man  to  deliberate  in  regard  to  a  particular  line  of 
conduct,  what  are  the  circumstances  calculated  to  act  on  his 
volition  ?— What  is  the  conduct  of  different  men  in  deciding  on 
their  actions  in  particular  cases  ?— Suppose  the  case  refers  to 


224  QUESTIONS. 

one  of  the  desires  having  no  immediate  relation  to  the  interests 
of  other  men  ? 

What  three  characters  have  thus  been  presented  to  view  ? — 
What  is  said  of  the  first  ? — Why  do  we  depend  upon  his  conduct 
with  so  much  confidence  ? — What  is  said  of  the  third,  and  what 
do  we  require  to  know  in  order  to  predict  his  conduct  ? — What 
IS  said  of  the  second,  and  why  ? — What  do  they  involve  ? 

What  inquiry  of  intense  interest  is  connected  with  this  sub- 
ject ? — To  how  many  heads  are  these  referable  ? 

What  is  the  first? — What  does  the  highest  class  of  these 
comprehend  ? — What  is  required  for  this  purpose  ? — How  do  the 
sacred  writers  speak  of  voluntary  ignorance? — To  whom  will 
this  be  obvious  ? — To  what  does  this  equally  apply  ? — Of  what 
do  the  important  truths  of  natural  religion  consist  ? — What  is 
the  first  great  truth  which  is  taught  by  it,  and  from  what  sources 
is  the  evidence  derived  ? — In  regard  to  what  else  besides  his 
being  are  we  assured,  and  how  ? — What  may  be  derived  from 
these  two  sources,  and  what  is  said  of  him  who  fails  to  attend 
to  them  ? — What  says  an  eminent  writer  ? 

To  what  else  do  similar  observations  apply  ? — How  are  these 
supported,  and  how  transmitted  to  us  ? — How  are  they  further 
confirmed  ? — in  what  character  are  we  addressed,  and  what 
duty  devolves  upon  every  individual  ? — For  what  is  every  man 
in  the  highest  degree  responsible  ? — For  what  is  he  further  re 
sponsible  ? 

What  is  mentioned  among  the  sophistries  by  which  men  shut 
their  minds  against  serious  inquiries  ? — In  what  particular  is  this 
illustrated  ? 

What  is  required  in  this  matter  next  to  the  acquisition  of 
knowledge  ? — What  will  he  perceive  who  honestly  attends  to 
what  is  passing  within  ? — WTiat  power  has  he  when  a  particular 
desire  is  present  to  his  mind? — Putting  aside  all  metaphysical 
subtleties,  what  does  this  constitute  man  ? — What  is  the  first 
mental  state  in  this  important  process  ? — What  term  is  used  as 
including  both  ? — What  is  the  second  state  ? — If  these  be  found 
to  harmonize  with  the  inclination,  what  ensues  ? — Suppose  the 
inclination  is  condemned  by  these,  what  then  ? — What  may 
happen,  however,  and  what  may  the  consequence  be  ? 

What  third  condition  may  take  place  ? — What  is  the  conse- 
quence in  this  case  though  the  actual  deed  be  prevented  ? — In 
what  does  purity  of  heart  consist  ? — What  is  the  effect  of  the 
inclination  being  thus  cherished  ? — What  expression  is  some- 
times applied  to  this,  and  why  ? — V\^iat  is  the  character  of  the 
mental  movements  in  the  whole  of  this  course  ? — From  the  first 
step  of  departure  in  what  does  the  process  consist  ? — What 
question  occurs  in  viewing  such  a  process  philosophically? — 
What  is  said  of  the  derangement  of  the  harmony  of  the  moral 
^elings  ? — In  what  may  it  consist  and  how  does  it  proceed  ?— 


QUESTIONS.  225 

What  effect  has  the  cherishing  of  the  desire  ? — What  follows 
according  to  tbe  mental  economy  ? 

What  other  mental  condition  is  to  be  mentioned  in  this  con 
nexion  ? — How  does  this  bear  upon  the  individual,  though  the 
deed  may  be  prevented  ? — How  does  he  also  stand  in  the  eye  of 
Omniscience  ? — What  may  happen  in  this  manner  I — What  is  the 
character  of  this  conduct  ? 

What  gradually  results  from  the  state  of  mind  now  described  ? 
— ^What  is  the  nature  of  this  habit  ? — What  takes  place  on  the 
other  hand 't — How  was  this  principle  formerly  illustrated,  and 
in  what  respects  does  the  comparison  hold  ? — What  is  the  final 
effect  of  habits  of  vice  upon  the  power  of  conscience  and  upon 
the  judgment  ? — What  knowledge  may  a  man  in  this  situation 
retain,  and  yet  what  does  it  amount  to  ? — How  does  he  now 
view  moral  relations  ? — What  does  he  know  not  ? — What  may 
still  consist  with  this  state  of  moral  destitution  ? — ^What  is  the 
purport  of  the  allusion  to  Byron,  and  what  the  author's 
remark  ? 

What  is  to  be  said  therefore  of  the  principle  of  habit,  and  to 
what  does  it  apply '( — What  is  said  as  to  the  continuance  of  good 
habits  ? — How  did  they  arise,  and  what  is  founded  on  this  ? — 
What  is  the  case  in  regard  to  habits  of  vice  ? — How  illustrated  ? 
— What  is  the  striking  fact  in  this  case  ? 

What  important  truth  therefore  is  deserving  of  the  deepest 
attention  ? — What  inference  of  moment  in  regard  to  practical 
life  arises  from  this  ? — Why  ? — What  do  we  see  in  the  whole 
history  of  habits  ? — How  is  this  result  brought  about  ? 

What  practical  tendency  of  great  interest  have  these  consider- 
ations ? — What  is  requisite  when  the  judgment  is  convinced  of 
the  injurious  nature  of  a  particular  habit? — Describe  the  process 
by  which  its  tendency  will  be  counteracted. — ^What  is  neces- 
sary in  order  that  this  result  may  take  place  ? — What  if  this  be 
not  attended  to  ? — What  fact  is  to  be  explained  on  this  prin- 
ciple ? — What  particular  case  is  mentioned  ? — How  explained  ? 

WTiat  may  be  said  of  these  principles  ? — What  is  the  fij-st  of 
the  important  conclusions  resulting  from  them  ? — Has  this  fact 
been  long  recognised,  and  when  is  it  distinctly  stated  ? — What 
is  the  philosopher's  in  the  cases  mentioned  ? — What  alternative 
follows  in  regard  to  such  a  state  of  mind  ? — To  what  perception 
are  we  thus  led  ? — What  do  we  necessarily  believe  respecting 
the  power  of  the  Creator? — What  reason,  moreover,  have  we 
for  supposing  that  he  will  exert  this  power  ? — What  idea  accord- 
ingly do  we  form  of  the  system  disclosing  such  communication  ? 
— To  what  then  does  this  subject  lead  our  attention  ? — What 
does  sound  philosophy  teach  us  on  this  head  ? — How  much  more 
does  Christianity  teach  us  on  this  point  than  philosophy? — 
What  inference  ought  we  to  draw  from  this  accordance  of 
science  and  revelation  ? — If  none  can  be  found  who  need  not 


226  QUESTIONS. 

such  a  moral  transformation,  wliat  great  truth  are  we  forced  to 
acknowledge  ? 

What  do  we  learn  from  the  whole  inquiry  ? — To  whom  are 
these  considerations  of  the  highest  practical  interest  ? — What 
momentous  point  is  there  in  this  downward  career  ? — What  is 
the  character  and  consequence  of  the  peace  then  cherished  ? — 
What  may  occur  in  the  progress  towards  this  fearful  issue  ? — 
What  is  to  be  inferred  while  these  indications  of  life  continue? 
—What  is  suspended  on  each  moment  ? — What  is  the  path  of 
duty  under  such  circumstances  ? — What  caution  is  necessary  at 
this  point,  and  how  is  he  to  view  his  situation  ? — How  may  his 
progress  still  be,  and  why  ? — What  is,  however,  the  effect  of 
each  advantage  gained? — What  is  each  step  in  all  this  contest? 
— In  what  does  it  consist '( — What  does  the  man  feel  in  this 
course  ? — What  is  the  character  of  this  impression  ? 

What  reasons  have  we  for  thmking  that  the  pure  and  holy 
One  will  thus  hold  intercourse  with  his  moral  creature? — What 
do  we  find  it  impossible  to  believe  ? 

What  other  principle  is  there  of  great  ethcacy  in  this  matter, 
independent  of  the  conviction  of  an  actual  communication  from 
the  Deity  ? — How  may  it  be  illustrated  ? — How  is  this  applied  to 
God  ? — Who  is  the  man  that  lives  by  faith  ? — What  is  such  a 
man  taught  to  expect  ?— What  is  this?— W^hat  assertion  is  again 
advanced  with  confidence  ? 


PART   III. 

OF  THE   MORAL    PRINCIPLE,    OR   CONSCIENCE. 

Page  129. 

Respecting  what  has  there  been  much  dispute  ?— What  has 
been  the  fate  of  this  controversy  ? — What  point  does  the  author 
waive,  and  for  what  fact  does  he  contend  ? — What  is  said  of  it 
as  an  element  of  our  moral  nature  ?— Where  is  the  evidence  of 
the  existence  and  nature  of  this  principle  ? — To  what  and  for 
what  purpose  do  we  make  an  appeal  on  this  subject  ?— How 
does  its  office  differ  from  that  of  the  judgment  ? — What  do  we 
find  upon  referring  to  the  sacred  writings  ? — By  what  quotation 
is  this  remark  sustained  ? — What  else  do  we  there  find  in  regard 
to  the  decisions  of  conscience? 

What  then  is  the  province  of  conscience  ? — How  does  it  do 
this? — How  does  it  rank  among  the  moral  powers? — What  ap- 
pears in  viewing  it  in  this  relation  ? 

How  does  reason  act  upon  our  intellectual  acquisitions  ?— To 


(QUESTIONS.  227 

what  does  this  particularly  apply  ?— What  is  the  effect  of  rea- 
son's being  suspended  ? — Describe  it  at  full. 

In  all  this  process  to  what  is  there  a  striking  analogy  ? — How 
is  man  led  by  self-love,  by  the  desires,  and  by  the  affections  ?— 
What  is  the  regulating  power  in  this  process,  and  what  effects 
does  it  produce  ? — How  does  it  do  this? — How  does  it  regulate 
his  desires  and  pursuits ?— "What  does  he  thus  learn? — How 
therefore  is  conscience  to  be  characterized  ? — How  much  further 
does  the  analogy  extend  ? — What  is  the  effect  of  derangement 
on  the  harmony  of  the  moral  feelings  ? — What  is  the  state  of 
the  judgment  in  this  violation  of  moral  harmony  ?— With  what 
may  the  utmost  degree  of  human  depravity  consist  ? — In  what 
lies  the  derangement  ? — What  is  such  a  condition  of  mind  in 
reference  to  the  moral  feelings  ? — Trace  out  the  leading  points 
of  the  analogy. 

To  what  has  allusion  thus  far  chiefly  been  had  ? — What  other 
important  purpose  is  answered  by  this  faculty  ? — What  ought  we 
to  say  in  strict  philosophical  language  ( — How  does  the  process 
however,  appear? — How  do  we  acquire  the  knowledge  of  a 
First  Cause  ? — How  is  this  conclusion  peculiarly  impressed  upon 
us  ?• — What  is  the  result  of  tracing  backwards  a  series  of  finite 
yet  hitelligent  beings? — What  conclusions  in  this  case  are  inad- 
missible ? — What  is  the  only  rational  conclusion  at  which  we 
can  arrive  ? — How  do  we  learn  the  goodness  and  benevolence 
of  the  Deity  ? — How  does  it  appear  that  this  part  of  the  argu- 
ment is  clearly  insisted  upon  in  the  sacred  writings  ? 

How  do  we  necessarily  conceive  such  a  being  to  exist  ? — By 
what  other  process  equally  obvious  do  we  arrive  at  a  knowledge 
of  these  '( — What  is  the  chain  of  reasoning  by  which  we  come 
to  this  conclusion  ? — In  what  respects  do  we  conceive  of  the 
existence  of  these  quahties  in  the  Almighty  different  from  their 
existence  in  men  ? — From  what  impediments  are  they  exempted 
in  him? — What  do  we  therefore  conclude? — What  is  this 
termed  ? — From  what  conviction  cannot  even  the  vicious  man 
get  free  ? 

What  appears  the  character  of  such  a  being  when  viewed 
apart  from  any  inferior  creature  ? — What  results  when  viewed  in 
relation  to  man  in  a  state  of  moral  discipline  ? — Describe  the 
nature  of  this  difficulty. — How  does  the  exercise  of  forgiveness 
in  a  moral  governor  differ  from  that  in  an  individual  ? — How  is 
it  in  the  case  of  a  moral  governor  of  infinite  perfection  ? — In 
what  point  do  the  highest  efforts  of  human  science  fail  ? — How 
is  the  demand  met  ? — What  grand  truths  do  we  learn  from  that 
source? — What  conviction  do  we  arrive  at  by  a  fair  process  of 
mental  reasoning  ? 

How  is  the  truth  of  these  considerations  impressed  upon  us? 
— Under  what  aspects  is  man  to  be  contemplated  in  order  to 
behold  in  him  a  fabric  worthy  of  his  Maker  ?— What  conviction 


228  QUESTIONS. 

is  forced  upon  us  when  we  view  the  actual  state  of  man  ?— * 
What  is  to  be  said  of  the  manner  in  which  this  condition  arose, 
or  of  the  origin  of  moral  evil  ? — With  what  are  we  chiefly  con- 
cerned in  this  matter,  and  what  does  philosophy  compel  us  to 
believe  ? 

With  what  besides  the  inductions  of  moral  science  do  we 
contrast  the  actual  state  of  man?— What  conclusion  do  we 
come  to  in  contemplating  his  character  purely  as  a  matter  of 
historical  truth  i 

What  do  we  arrive  at  in  endeavouring  to  trace  the  manner  in 
which  mankind  have  departed  so  widely  from  this  high  pattern  ? 
— What  is  an  inquiry  of  much  gi  eater  importance  ? — Than  what 
can  there  not  be  a  more  interesting  inquiry  ? — In  what  light  alone 
are  we  obliged  to  view  it  ? — What  is  to  be  said  of  the  facts 
before  us  ? — What  fact  is  chiefly  alluded  to  ? — What  is  the  result 
of  the  cultivation  of  a  due  harmony  between  these  ? — What  of 
a  violation  of  it? — How  has  this  formerly  been  illustrated? 

What  similar  chain  of  sequences  is  to  be  observed  ? — What 
may  be  taken  for  an  example  ? — What  would  be  the  consequence 
of  a  proper  direction  of  the  mind  to  the  truths  conveyed  to  us 
respecting  the  Deity? — What  are  these  emotions? — What  close 
relation  ought  to  be  preserved,  and  what  depends  upon  it  ?— 
With  what  mental  process  is  the  preservation  of  this  harmony 
connected  ? — What  if  the  first  step  in  this  process  be  neglected  ? 
— When  will  this  be  the  case  in  a  still  higher  degree? — What 
tendency  has  then  commenced  in  the  mental  economy  ? — How 
are  the  truths  connected  with  the  divine  perfections  then  re- 
garded ? — Of  whom  does  such  appear  to  be  the  moral  history  ? 
>  What  other  bad  effect  arises  when  the  moral  harmony  of  the 
mind  has  been  impaired  to  this  extent? — Why  is  this?— By 
what  is  this  followed  ? — What  do  the  inventions  of  the  mind 
thus  become,  and  what  is  the  final  result  ? 

How  are  these  great  prmciples  of  ethical  science  laid  down  in 
the  sacred  writings? — How  are  the  various  steps  in  this  course 
of  moral  degradation  represented  ? — With  what  is  this  view  of 
the  subject  notwithstanding  consistent? — How  does  this  ap- 
pear ? 

What*other  point  is  to  be  referred  to  the  principles  now  stated  ? 
— ^What  impressions  have  superficial  observers  deduced  from 
the  fact  ? — Is  this  inference  warranted,  and  what  principle  ought 
to  be  often  repeated  ? — What  depends  on  this  ? — What  else  ? — 
Why? 

What  other  point  deserves  consideration  in  connexion  with 
this  subject  ? — In  what  does  this  important  process  consist  ? — 
By  what  should  it  be  accompanied  ? — What  is  its  character,  and 
what  depend  upon  this  degree  of  its  exercise? — What  has  there 
been  repeated  occasion  to  mention? — By  what  is  this  condition 
influenced  ?— In  what  does  it  originate  ? — What  is  the  primary 


QUESTIONS.  229 

effect  of  this  loss  of  mental  harmony  ? — What  is  there  reason 
to  believe  apart  from  this  condition  of  the  mind  ? — What  is  the 
opinion  of  Butler  ? — What  consequence  flows  from  the  want  of 
this  simple  exercise  of  the  attention? — What  is  the  first  step  in 
the  backslider's  return  to  virtue  ? — What  is  it  more  primarily  ? 

What  two  points  remain  to  be  noticed  before  leaving  the  sub 
ject  of  the  moral  principle? 


^  I.  OP   THE   ORIGIN  AND   IMMUTABILITY  OP   MORAL  DISTINC- 
TIONS,  AND   THEORIES   OF   MORALS. 

Page  149. 

What  has  been  considered  in  previously  treating  the  moral 
powers? — What  objection  may  possibly  be  urged  against  this 
mode  of  viewing  the  subject  ? — What  is  the  author's  reply  ?— 
How  do  we  find  man  endowed  in  his  physical  relations  ? — What 
might  he  plausibly  maintain  in  regard  to  them  ? — Though  this 
be  true,  still  what  remark  is  made  of  it? — How  is  this  appUed? 
*— When  we  have  done  this,  what  may  we  conclude  ?— What  is 
the  boundary  of  our  knowledge  in  this  matter  ? 

What  will  probably  be  admitted  ? — Wha  may  be  reckoned 
among  these? — In  what  do  these  doctrines  agree?— What  do 
these  profess  ? 

What  do  we  perceive  in  contemplating  the  conduct  of  men  as 
placed  in  certain  relations  to  each  other  ? — To  what  do  we  refer 
m  forming  this  opinion  of  them? — On  what  condition  do  we 
view  him  with  approbation,  or  the  reverse  ? — ^What  conviction 
have  we  relative  to  this  matter  ? — What  is  the  next  question?— 
State  the  point  in  dispute  still  more  fully. — What  is  contended 
on  the  one  hand  ? — What  is  maintained  on  the  other  ? — What 
have  those  who  adopt  the  latter  hypothesis  next  to  explain  ?— ' 
To  what  have  the  various  modes  of  explaining  this  led  ? 

Give  the  outlines  of  the  system  of  Mandeville. — By  another 
modification  of  this  system,  whence  are  our  impressions  of 
virtue  and  vice  said  to  be  derived  ? — ^What  is  to  be  said  of  this 
system  ? 

What  is  Mr.  Hume's  system  tenned?— State  its  leading  char- 
acteristics.— How  does  Professor  Mills  define  morality  ? 

What  is  the  fundamental  principle  of  the  selfish  system  of 
morals  ?— Give  an  account  of  this  theory  particularly  as  held  by 
Hobbes. — On  what  fallacy  is  this  system  founded  ? — How  does 
this  appear  ? — How  does  the  hypothesis  appear  in  the  hght  of 
facts  ? 

What  peculiar  modification  of  this  system  maybe  mentioned, 
tuid  with  what  design  adopted  ?— What  is  to  be  said  of  this'' 

u 


230  QUESTIONS. 

What  is  the  theory  of  Paley?— What  two  consideration* 
may  be  urged  against  this  doctrine  as  appUed  to  practical  pur- 


If  these  observations  are  well  founded,  to  what  conclusion  are 
we  necessarily  brought  ? — To  what  else  does  the  same  objection 
apply  ? — What  is  the  consequence  of  departing  from  this  great 
principle  ? — What  further  may  be  confidently  stated  as  a  matter 
of  fact  ?— What  does  he  simply  ask  himself,  and  how  does  he 
decide  ? 

What  seems  then  to  be  the  foundation  of  all  these  theories  ? 
— What  other  modification  is  there  of  these  theories  ?— What  do 
we  mean  by  the  immutability  of  moral  distinctions  as  opposed 
to  all  these  theories? — By  what  is  an  absolute  conviction  of  this 
forced  upon  us  ? — What  is  disclosed  by  the  system  which  gives 
so  much  authority  to  conscience  ? — What  has  already  been  shown 
respecting  this,  and  what  more  may  be  said  of  it  ? — How  does 
this  appear  ? — What  effect  has  this  reciprocity  of  moral  feeling- 
upon  human  conduct? — To  answer  this  purpose  what  is  re- 
quired ? — What  else  is  equally  clear,  and  what  does  it  indicate  ? 
— What  further  may  be  said  respecting  this  uniformity  ?— What 
is  Butler's  remark  concerning  conscience  ? 

What  other  system  remains  to  be  noticed,  and  what  is  it 
called? — State  the  system  minutely.— What  defect  is  there 
about  this  system  ? 

In  regard  to  the  whole  of  this  subject  what  important  distinc- 
tion is  to  be  made? — What  few  observations  are  here  to  be 
added? — What  appears  to  be  the  office  of  reason?— Has  it  any 
bearing  upon  the  affections  ? — How  ilhistrated  ? 

In  what  other  cases  is  an  exercise  of  reason  necessary  ? — 
How  shown? — What  is  the  office  of  reason  and  conscience 
respectively  in  such  cases  ? — Do  they  always  harmonize  ?— How 
illustrated  ?— How  do  we  feel  and  speak  in  such  cases  ?— How 
do  we  expect  such  a  man  to  acquire  wisdom? — In  what  other 
circumstances  does  reason  act  in  regard  to  moral  decisions  ? — In 
what  respects  do  we  perceive  a  difference  in  the  habits  of  judg- 
ing of  different  individuals  ?  .  .         * 

What  else  is  reason  concerned  in  ? — How  may  this  be  illus- 
trated?— What  other  office  is  frequently  assigned  to  reason  in 
moral  decisions  ? — How  is  this  explained  ? 

How  may  this  important  distinction  be  recapitulated  T 


QUESTIONS.  231 

?'^  II.  OF   THE   HARMONY  OP  THE   MORAL  FEELINGS. 

Page  167. 

On  whatever  system  we  consider  the  moral  feelings,  what  do 
we  perceive? — To  what  do  these  different  classes  of  them  re- 
late?— What  other  interesting  inquiry  is  connected  with  this 
subject  ? — ^What  is  one  of  the  objects  to  be  answered  by  the 
moral  principle  ? 

Viewing  man  as  an  immortal  being,  what  is  his  highest  con- 
sideration ? — What  stands  in  immediate  connexion  with  this  first 
of  all  concerns  ? — What  duties  follow  ? — What  is  said  of  the 
last  ?— What,  however,  is  the  important  consideration  ? 

What  is  obvious  to  every  person  of  reflection  respecting  him 
whose  life  is  devoted  to  recreation  ? — ^What  must  be  admitted 
also  respecting  a  life  of  business  ? — What  is  said  of  the  engage- 
ments of  benevolence  and  public  usefulness? — When  do  they 
do  so  ? — What  is  finally  ever  to  be  kept  in  mind? — What  is  the 
consequence  of  want  of  due  attention  to  this  consideration  ? 

What  is  it  scarcely  necessary  to  add  ? — ^When  only  do  some 
of  these  objects  of  attention  usurp  the  place  of  others  ? — With 
what  is  actmg  from  the  desire  of  notoriety  at  the  same  time  con- 
sistent ? — How  is  it  with  the  ascetic,  on  the  other  hand? — What 
is  said  of 'this  ?— What  else  is  worthy  of  remark  ? — Who  will 
have  the  justest  sense  of  the  various  duties  of  life,  and  pay  the 
most  adequate  attention  to  them? — In  what  departments  of 
action  will  this  appear  conspicuous  ? 

What  does  this  high  consistency  of  character  tend  to  promote  ? 
— How  does  it  do  this? — In  what  other  way  ? — To  what  does  it 
accordingly  tend  ? 

To  what  is  such  uniformity  of  feeling  equally  opposed  ? — 
What  may  this  be  called,  and  how  does  it  show  itself? — What 
will  be  the  necessary  influence  of  a  sincere  religious  belief? — 
What  does  the  want  of  this  influence  imply  ?— What  is  the  con- 
sequence 01  such  inconsistency  ? 

What  warning  arises  from  their  mutual  error  ? — How  is  this 
illustiated? — What  is  the  fair  induction  in  both  cases? — How 
does  this  appear  ? — What  caution  is  to  be  administered  to  those 
who  have  detected  the  deception  ? 

What  counsel  is  given  to  those  who  profess  to  be  influenced 
by  the  highest  of  all  motives  ? — What  things  are  easily  acquired  ? 
— What,  after  all,  is  their  value  ? — What  is  the  seat  and  what  the 
mfluence  of  true  religion  ? — What  is  its  effect  when  thus  ex- 
hibited r 


232  QUESTIONS. 


PART   IV. 

OP  THE    MORAL   RELATION   OF  MAN  TOWARDS  THE  DEITT. 

Page  175. 

To  what  heads  is  the  healthy  state  of  a  moral  being  referred 
in  the  sacred  writings  ? — To  what  do  the  two  former  of  these 
topics  lead  ? — To  what  the  latter  ? — To  whom  are  we  responsi- 
ble for  the  duties  of  the  former  class  ? — What  do  those  of  the 
latter  respect  ? — To  what  have  human  systems  of  ethics  chiefly 
attended  ? — What  is  the  fact  in  the  Scriptures  ? — What  is  pointed 
out  as  qualifying  man  for  intercourse  with  the  Deity  ? — By  what 
passages  is  this  confirmed  ? 

What  is  the  character  of  such  declarations  ? — What  do  we 
infer  from  our  relation  to  God  as  moral  Governor  and  Creator  ? 
—What  other  solemn  truth  is  it  equally  impossible  to  repel  ? 

What  inquiry  is  there  therefore  of  intense  interest  connected 
with  this  subject  ? 

What  is  the  first  head  to  which  it  may  be  referred? — 
What  does  it  imply,  therefore,  and  to  what  is  it  opposed  ? — To 
what  must  this  be  extended? — What  state  of  mind  formerly 
referred  to  is  here  described? — To  what  else  may  the  same 
remark  be  applied  ? — What  is  said  of  these  mental  conditions  ? 
—Upon  what  besides  the  mind  which  cherishes  these  evils  does 
the  Deity  look  with  disapprobation  ?— What  may  be  said  of  the 
pursuits  of  such  a  man? — Of  what  are  we  ordinarily  in  danger? 
—How  do  these  considerations  appear  to  the  Most  High  ? 

What  two  classes  of  characters  are  clearly  pointed  out  in  the 
Scriptures? — To  how  many  laws  is  this  fact  to  be  referred? — 
Describe  the  first  at  length. — State  the  second. 

Under  what  relations  may  the  state  of  mind  governed  by  an 
habitual  sense  of  the  Divine  presence  be  considered? — What 
does  the  former  include  ? — To  what  does  it  lead  the  attention  ? 
—What  does  the  second  division  include  ? — What  kind  of  char- 
acter springs  from  these  two  mental  conditions? — What  does 
such  a  man  feel  ? — What  further  does  he  feel  ? 

What  is  the  second  head  ? — What  is  said  of  the  man  who 
bears  upon  his  mind  this  sublime  impression  ? — Wkat  does  he 
perceive  in  reference  to  that  place  ? — Specify. — What  does  such 
a  submission  of  soul  at  the  same  time  allow  ? — Suppose  these 
sources  of  distress  are  not  removed,  what  then  ? — How  will  the 
ills  of  life  appear  when  viewed  under  that  aspect  ? 

What  is  the  third  head  ? — In  whom  will  this  be  a  prominent 


QUESTIONS.  233 

ieeling  ? — To  what  does  it  naturally  lead  ? — How  is  the  gospel 
dispensation  of  peace  represented? — What  disposition  is  fre- 
quently referred  to  as  peculiarly  acceptable  to  the  Deity  ? — What 
extracts  confirm  this  ?— What  is  naturally  associated  with  this 
state  of  mind  ? 

What  is  the  fourth  point  specified  ? — To  what  will  these  feel- 
ings have  a  special  reference  ? — What  has  been  considered  in 
respect  to  this  divine  Person  ? 

What  arises  from  the  whole  mental  condition  thus  delineated  ? 
— What  does  this  imply  ? — What  more  ? — What  does  it  compre- 
hend?—With  what  does  this  character  seem  to  correspond  ? — 
What  is  said  of  its  elements,  and  how  are  we  to  estimate  its 
sublimity  and  its  truth  ? — What  will  be  the  feeling  entertained 
towards  them  all  ? — What  is  said  of  that  great  system  of  ethical 
purity  ? — What  only  is  requisite  to  yielding  an  absolute  consent 
to  its  supreme  authority  ? 

Where  are  we  to  seek  for  that  which  is  of  all  conceivable 
things  of  the  highest  moment? — What  says  an  inspired  writer? 
— What  is  said  of  the  happy  lot  of  the  man  who  cultivates  the 
habitual  impression  of  the  Divine  presence  ? — What  does  he  find 
in  the  works,  ways,  and  perfections  of  the  Eternal  One  ? — What 
is  the  tendency  of  this  exercise  ? — From  what  and  to  what  does 
it  raise  us? — What  effect  has  it  by  leading  us  to  compare  our- 
selves with  the  supreme  excellence? — What  says  an  eloquent 
writer  ? — How  is  this  disposition  related  to  the  acquirements  of 
philosophy  ? — What  results  from  his  advances  in  the  wonders  of 
nature? — For  what  does  such  a  one  inquire ?^ What  does  he 
learn,  and  in  what  conviction  does  he  rest  ? — What  is  affirmed 
respecting  these  views  and  convictions? 

What  is  said  of  the  points  which  have  been  stated  ? — What  is 
to  be  said  of  him  who  calls  in  question  this  sublime  truth? — To 
what  must  we  leave  him  ? 

What  does  the  author  next  proceed  to  investigate? — How 
many  views  may  be  taken  of  this  point,  and  how  are  they  to  be 
considered  ? 

To  what  are  we  taught  in  the  sacred  vmtings  to  refer  man's 
restoration  from  ruin  ? — What  have  we  already  seen  ? — What, 
however,  is  the  immediate  object  of  our  attention? — What  is 
the  character  of  this  operation,  and  how  may  it  be  analyzed  ? — 
What  are  the  offices  of  reason,  attention,  and  conception  respect- 
ively in  this  process? — What  is  effected  by  these  means? — 
What  is  this  mental  operation,  and  what  is  essential  to  its  sound 
exercise  ? — State  the  mode  of  its  reception  and  operation. 

What  can  we  discover  by  attention  to  these  considerations  ? — 
How  does  faith  differ  from  enthusiasm  ? — What  is  the  first  great 
inquiry  to  those  who  would  preserve  themselves  from  the  influ- 
ence of  false  notions  ? — ^What  error  is  to  be  avoided  on  the  other 
hand  ? — To  what  source  may  these  two  modifications  of  character 
U2 


234  QUESTIONS. 

be  traced  ?— In  what  does  the  misapplication  of  the  reasoning 
powers  in  both  consist  ? 

What  is  the  second  office  of  faith  ?— What  does  this  amount 
to  ? — What  operation  is  involved  in  it  ?— Of  what  do  we  speak 
in  common  language  ?— Of  what  does  the  alleged  belief  of  such 
a  man  probably  consist  ? — Whence  may  he  have  acquired  these 
points/and  how  may  he  endeavour  to  support  them? — What 
similar  case  may  be  adduced  ? — What  is  the  character  of  both  ? 
— What  other  character  may  we  suppose  ? — From  what  does 
this  arise? — What  is  the  consequence  ? 

What  is  intimately  connected  with  this  subject  ? — Between 
what  does  a  close  connexion  exist  ? — What  is  said  of  our  pos- 
session of  power  ? — How  does  this  appear  ? — What  is  said  of 
the  due  exercise  of  this  power  ? 

In  what  does  the  sound  exercise  of  that  mental  condition 
which  we  call  Faith  consist? — What  do  the  sacred  writers  say 
of  it,  and  to  what  do  they  ascribe  consequences  so  important? — 
By  what  simple  narrative  is  this  principle  illustrated  ? — How  is 
the  woman  represented  in  this  simple  occurrence  ? — What  was 
the  object  of  her  faith  ?— What  the  ground  of  her  faith  ?— What 
did  she  do  under  the  influence  of  this  conviction  ? — How  did 
her  faith  save  her  ? — What  more  than  simple  belief  was  requisite 
to  her  salvation  ? — To  what  therefore  are  the  important  results 
of  faith  really  ascribed? — Of  what  may  we  speak  in  the  same 
manner? — In  so  doing,  to  what  do  we  ascribe  such  results? — To 
what  does  the  inspired  writer  refer  when  he  says  that  without 
faith  it  is  impossible  to  please  God  ? 

From  wh:\t  has  much  misconception  arisen  on  this  subject  ? 
— What  is  to  be  said  of  us  as  physical  and  intellectual  beings  ? 
— What  as  moral  beings  ? — What  are  chiefly  the  objects  of  faith  ? 
— State  this  more  particularly. — How  is  this  distinction  alluded 
to  by  the  sacred  writers  ? — What  are  the  objects  of  sight  here 
intended  to  express  ? — What  remark  is  to  be  made  of  them  ? — 
In  what  way  is  the  attention  to  be  withdrawn  from  them? — 
What  is  the  special  province  of  faith  ? — What  therefore  is  the 
next  great  point  in  our  inquiry  ? 

When  entering  upon  this  field,  what  is  the  first  great  object 
that  meets  our  view  ? — From  what  do  we  trace  his  operation, 
and  what  do  we  infer  ? — Where  has  he  fixed  the  impress  of  his 
moral  attributes,  and  what  do  we,  by  the  joint  operation  of  con- 
Bcience  and  reason,  perceive  him  to  be  ? — What  is  said  of  our 
knowledge  of  these  attributes  ? — How  do  they  force  themselves 
upon  our  conviction  ? 

What  insuperable  conviction  arises  from  our  conception  of 
Buch  a  being  ?— What  do  we  feel  in  respect  to  this  life  ? — What 
gives  a  still  deeper  interest  to  this  consideration  ? — How  is  this 
truth  powerfully  expressed  by  the  sacred  writer? 

What  is  affirmed  with  respect  to  these  truths  ?— When  do 


QUESTIONS.  235 

they  especially  force  themselves  upon  our  conviction? — How 
are  they  detailed  and  impressed  upon  us  in  the  sacred  writings  ? 
— With  what  impression  in  our  moral  constitution  do  these  prin- 
ciples meet? — What  is  the  office  of  faith  in  regard  to  these? — 
Who  is  the  man  who  lives  by  faith  ? 

In  what  circumstances  will  a  new  train  of  feeling  arise  in  a 
man's  mind  ? — How  does  he  feel  concerning  his  daily  conduct  ? 
— What  is  his  conviction  as  to  the  time  past  of  his  life?— - 
What  inward  conviction  has  he  along  with  this  impression  ?— 
Under  what  circumstances  will  this  be  fixed  still  more  deeply  in 
the  soul  ? — With  these  truths  upon  his  mind,  what  event  will 
be  contemplated  with  the  deepest  interest? — Of  what  is  the 
man  assured  who  acts  habitually  under  the  influence  of  these 
truths  ? 

What  constitutes  a  peculiarly  solemn  hour  to  any  man^ — 
What  holds  true  of  every  man  who,  after  serious  inquiry,  appeals 
to  his  own  heart  ? — If  one's  heart  condemns  him  in  this  review, 
what  must  he^  feel  ? — Why  cannot  we  fly  to  the  mercy  of  the 
Deity  for  refuge,  in  this  extremity  ? — To  what  extent  can  we  not  go 
in  this  matter''?ArWhy  ? — What  follows  if  we  find  each  individ- 
ual fixing  a  different  standard,  and  extending  it  so  as  to  favour 
his  own  condition  ? — What  must  he  perceive  ? — What  can  he 
not  but  acknowledge  ? — What  decision  will  he  necessarily 
arrive  at  ? 

By  what  are  we  led  to  this  conclusion  ? — What  is  said  of  oui 
efforts  to  find  a  refuge  ? — By  what  are  we  here  met,  and  to  what 
does  it  call  us? — How  does  it  come  supported? — What  does  it 
disclose  ? — What  necessities  does  it  meet  ? — How  is  it  adapted 
to  each  ? — What  does  it  thus  form  ? 

How  is  a  participation  in  the  benefits  of  this  revelation  re- 
ceived ? — To  what  has  this  expression  given  rise  ? — State  some 
of  the  different  views  which  have  been  entertained  on  the  sub- 
ject ? — What  is  to  be  gathered,  however,  from  its  holding  so 
prominent  a  place  in  the  scheme  of  Christian  truth? — In  what 
other  relation  does  it  hold  an  important  place,  and  for  what  rea- 
son ? — What  does  any  one  feel  with  regard  to  it  ? 

How  many  are  the  objects  of  faith  ? — What  have  we  before 
seen  the  operation  of  faith  to  be  ? — Who  is  the  man  who  receives 
such  truths  in  faith  ? — What  have  we  next  to  do  in  regard  to 
faith,  and  how  may  that  best  be  done  ? 

State  the  illustration  employed? — Suppose  the  man  rejects 
the  remedy,  what  reflection  does  he  thereby  cast  upon  the  char- 
acter of  the  individual? 

How  does  this  apply  to  the  office  of  faith  in  the  matter  of 
salvation  ? — From  what  has  much  of  the  confusion  in  which  this 
subject  has  been  involved  arisen  ? — What  do  they  form  ?— Who 
is  the  man  that  will  not  seek  the  remedy  ? — Suppose  he  contents 
himself  with  merely  admitting  the  facts? — In  what  are  the 


236  QUESTIONS. 

grounds  contained  on  which  these  truths  are  addressed  to  us 
— From  what  do  we  derive  the  sincerity  of  the  offer  ? — What  is 
he  said  to  do  who  beheves  ? — What  is  meant  by  this  ? — What 
does  he  do  who  beheves  not  ? — What  therefore  is  required  in 
him  who  comes  to  God  with  the  hope  of  acceptance? — What  is 
to  be  said  of  him  who  hath  not  this  assurance  ? 

What  were  it  vain  to  undertake  ? — What  are  the  two  systems 
mentioned  by  which  this  doctrine  has  been  misrepresented  and 
perverted  ? 

What  is  to  be  remarked  in  regard  to  the  former  ? — For  what 
and  how  does  Christianity  provide? — What  does  it  proclaim? — 
What  does  it  exhibit  ? — What  else  is  said  on  this  head  ? 

What  is  the  other  equally  erroneous  opinion? — What  is  ob- 
vious in  regard  to  this  ? — How  does  this  appear  ? — What  then  is 
a  mere  logical  fallacy  ? — How  does  this  apply  to  the  subject 
before  us  ? — To  what  does  this  doctrine  therefore  amount  ? 

What  is  the  true  character  of  the  Christian  system  as  opposed 
to  all  such  hypotheses  ? — What  does  it  reveal  ? — How  is  it  sup- 
ported?— What  further  does  it  reveal? — What  is  the  test  and 
evidence  of  the  reality  of  faith? — Where  is  a  man  to  seek  for 
proofs  of  his  acceptance  ? — In  what  particularly  is  he  to  look  for 
It  ? — How  are  these  acquirements  to  be  looked  upon  ? — What  are 
besides  proofs  of  the  reality  of  the  principle  ? — What  causes  a 
system  to  be  founded  on  delusion  and  falsehood  ? — What  is  said 
of  the  making  of  such  attainment  ? — What  is  the  effect  of  each 
step  that  a  man  gains  in  this  progress  ? — To  what  is  he  led  by 
the  enlargement  of  his  knowledge  ? — What  does  it  thus  produce  ? 
— What  further  does  he  know  ? — In  what  circumstances  does 
his  moral  improvement  go  forward  ? — To  what  is  it  in  conclusion 
compared  ? 


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THE  HISTORY  OF  IRELAND.   By  W.  C. 

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LIFE   OF  MARY  QUEEN   OF  SCOTS. 

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VALUABLE  WORKS. 

PALESTINE,   OR  THE   HOLY   LAND. 

From  the  earliest  Period  to  the  present  Time.  By  the 
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*'  This  work  is  the  most  desirable  record  of  Palestine  we  have  ever 
Been." — American  Traveller. 

MEMOIRS    OF   THE   EMPRESS   JOSE- 

RHINE.     By  John  S.  Memes,  LL.D.     With  Portraits. 

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THE    COURT   AND   CAMP   OF  BONA- 

PARTE.     With  a  Portrait  of  Talleyrand. 

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LIVES    AND    VOYAGES    OF    DRAKE, 

CAVENDISH,  AND  DAMPIER  ;  including  an  intro- 
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LIFE  OF  ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT. 

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NATURAL    HISTORY    OF    INSECTS. 

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"The  information  is  minute,  well  arranged, and  clearly  imparted,  ane^ 
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*'  It  seems  to  us  that  it  will  prove  at  once  agreeable  and  instructive  to 
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LIFE  OF  LORD  BYRON.    By  John  Galt, 

Esq.     18mo. 

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LIFE   OF  MOHAMMED,  Founder  of  the 

Religion  of  Islam  and  of  the  Empire  of  the  Saracens. 
By  the  Rev.  George  Bush,  M.A.    With  a  plate.    ISmo. 

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Life   of  Nelson.      By 

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Life    of    Lord   Byron. 

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Life    of    Mohammed. 

By  the  Rev.  G.  Bush,  A.M. 
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Letters  on  Demonology 

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History  of  the   Bible. 

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Life  of  Mary  Queen  of 

Scots.  By  H.  G.  Bkll.  In  9 
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History  of  Egypt.     By 

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History  of  Poland.     By 

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Life  "of  Sir  Isaac  New- 
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VALUABLE    WORKS. 

ANCIENT  AND  MODERN  EGYPT.    By 

the  Rev.  M.  Russell,  LL.D.     With  a  Map  and  En- 
gravings.    18mo. 

*  All  that  is  known  of  Egypt  is  condensed  into  this  history ;  and  the 
readers  of  it  will  find  themselves  well  repaid  for  their  labour  and  money  " 
— New-Haven  Advertiser. 

"  The  information  respecting  the  present  state  of  this  interesting  coun- 
try will  be  found  peculiarly  valuable."— lYeu;- Fori-  Mirror. 

"  The  work  is  written  in  a  very  happy  style,  and  presents  a  mass  of 
knowledge  of  the  most  useful  and  instructive  character,  collected  together 
by  great  industry  and  research." — Baltimore  Republican. 

HISTORY  OF  POLAND,  from  the   earli- 

est  Period  to  the  present  Time.     By  James  Fletcher, 
Esq.     With  a  Portrait  of  Kosciusko.     18mo. 

*'This  work  recommends  itself  to  public  notice  by  its  clear,  concise, 
tnd  impartial  history  of  a  country  and  a  people  for  whom  the  feelings  of 
<very  lover  of  freedom  are  deeply  interested." — N.  Y.  Atlas. 

"  Of  the  writer's  fairness  and  research  we  have  a  very  good  opinion ; 
and  his  book  is  just  the  thing  that  is  wanted  at  the  present  moment." — 
N-  Y.  American. 

"  No  work  has  for  a  long  period  been  published  here  so  deserving  of 
praise  and  so  replete  with  interest." — American  Traveller. 

FESTIVALS,    GAMES,    AND    AMUSE- 

MENTS,  Ancient  and  Modem.     By  Horatio  Smith, 
■   Esq,     With  Additions.     By  Samuel  Woodworth,  Esq., 
of  New- York.     With  Engravings.     18mo. 

*'  The  book  contains  a  mine  of  information  on  the  subjects  embraced 
in  its  title,  and  should  be  placed  in  every  family."— lY.  Y.  Standard. 

"  We  can  commend  the  book  as  both  attractive  and  useful." — N.  Y. 
American^ 

"The  book  is  higlily  amusing  and  interesting,  as  well  as  instructive." 
—Pennsylvania  Inquirer. 

"  The  present  work  is  characterized  by  great  research  and  learning 
employed  in  illustrating  a  subject  of  much  general  interest."— JSa/fmore 
Republican. 

LIFE   OF   SIR  ISAAC    NEWTON.      By 

David  Brewster,  LL.D.  F.R.S.     With  a  Portrait  and 
Woodcuts.     18mo. 

**  The  i)resent  publication  cannot  fail  to  prove  acceptable  and  useftil." 
—N.  Y.  Standard. 

"  The  biography  of  the  greatest  astronomer  that  ever  lived  cannot  be 
fraught  with  else  than  interest." — N.  Y.  Mercantile  Advertiser. 

"  This  is  the  most  complete  and  authentic  biography  of  this  illustrious 
man  that  has  yet  appeared."— iY.  Y.  Evening  Journal. 

**An  excellent  biography,  beautifully  written,  and  comprising  a  lar^e 
ajnount  of  useful  information."— iVeu^ifaven  Chronicle. 


Works  Puhhshed  dij  Harper  4-  Brothers, 


Scenes  in  Our  Parish. 

12mo. 

The  Right  Moral  In- 
fluence and  Use  of  Liberal 
Studies.  By  G.  C.  Ver- 
PLAHCK.    12mo. 

Xenophon.   Translated 

by  Spelmaw  and  CoopfiR.  In 
2  vols.  18mo. 

Demosthenes.    ByLE- 

LAND.     Portrait.     In  2  vols. 

Caesar's  Commentaries. 

By  Duncan.    Portrait.    18mo. 

Cicero.      By   Duncan 

and  CocKMAN.  In  3  vols.  18mo. 

Rose's  Sallust.     18mo. 
Virgil.      By  Dryden, 

&c.    ISmo. 

Lives  of  the  Apostles 

and  Early  Martyrs  of  the 
Church.    ISrno. 

Massinger's  Plays.  De- 
signed for  family  u«e.  In  3 
vols.  ISmo.    Portrait. 

Ford's  Plays.     2  vols. 
The     Swiss      Family 

Robinson  ;  or,  Adventures  of  a 
Father  and  Mother  and  Four 
Sons  on  a  Desert  Island.  In  2 
vols.    ISmo.    Engravings. 

Sunday  Evenings  ;  or, 

an  easy  Introduction  to  the 
Reading  of  the  Bible.  In  3 
vols.  ISmo.    Engravings. 

The  Son  of  a  Genius. 

By  Mrs.  Hofland.  18mo. 
With  Engravings. 

Natural    History ;    or, 

Uncle  Philip's  Conversations 
with  the  Children  about  Tools 
and  Trades  among  the  Tnferior 
Animals.     With  Engravimss. 


IndiiE^  Traits.     By  the 

Author  of  "  Indian  Biogra-, 
phy."  In  2  vols.  ISmo.  With 
Engravings. 

Caroline     Westerley ; 

or,  The  Young  Travell«r  from 
Ohio.    With  Engravings. 

Sketches  of  the  Lives 

of  Distinguished  Females.  By 
an  American  Lady.  18mo. 
With  Engravings. 

The  Clergyman's  Or- 
phan; and  other  Tales.  18mo. 
With  Plates. 

Perils  of  the  Sea ;  con- 
taining a  Narrative  of  the  Loss 
of  the  Kent  East  Indiaman,  of 
the  Empress,  &c.  «kc.  18mo. 
With  Engravings. 

The  Ornaments  Dis- 
covered. By  Mary  Hughs. 
18mo.    Engravings. 

Uncle  Philip's  Conver- 
sations about  the  Eridences 
of  Christianity.     Engravings. 

Uncle  Philip's  Conver- 
sations about  the  Trees  of 
America.    Engravings, 

Life    of   Wiclif.      By 

C.  W.  Lk  Bas,  a.m.  18mo 
Portrait. 

The     Consistency    of 

Revelation  with  Itself  and  with 
Human  Reason.  By  P.  N. 
Shuttliworth.     18mo. 

Luther   and    Lutheran 

Reformation.  By  J.  Scott. 
In  2  vols.    Portraits. 

Lebas'    Life  of  Cran- 

mer.    In  2  vols.    18mo. 

History  of  the  Re- 
formed Religion  in  France. 
By  Edward  S.medley.      In  2 


Works  Published  ly  Harder  4*  Brothers, 


Three  Years  in  North 

America.  By  J.  Stuart,  Esq. 
In  2  vols.  12mo. 

Lieut.    E.    T.    Coke's 

Travels  in  the  United  States 
and  Canada.    In  2  vols.  12mo. 

Sir  Edward  Seaward's 

Narrative  of  his  Shipwreck, 
&;c.  Edited  by  Miss  Jank 
Porter.    In  3  vols.  12mo. 

Imprisonment  of  Sylvio 

Pellico  da  Saluzzo.    12mo. 

Letters  of  the  British 

Spy.  By  Wm.  Wirt,  Esq. 
With  a  P-iography  of  the 
Author.    12mo. 

Smart's  Horace.     In  2 

vols.  18mo. 

Lives  and  Voyages  of 

Drake,  Cavendish,  and  Dam- 
pier,  including  an  Introductory 
View  ofthe  Earlier  Discoveries 
in  the  South  Sea,  and  the  His- 
tory of  the  Bucaniers.    18mo. 

Four  Voyages   in  the 

Chinese  Sea,  Atlantic,  Pacific, 
Indian,  and  Antarctic  Oceans. 
Together  with  a  Biographical 
Sketch  of  the  Author.  By 
Capt.  Benj.  MoRRELii,  Jun. 
8vo.    With  a  Portrait. 

Narrative  of  a  Voyage 

to  the  Ethiopic  and  South  At- 
lantic Oceans,  Indian  Ocean, 
Chinese  Sea,  and  North  and 
South  Pacific  Ocean.  By 
Abby  Jane  MoRRELL.  12mo. 
With  a  Portrait. 

Owen's  Voyages  round 

Africa,  Arabia,  and  Madagas- 
car.   In  2  vols.  12mo. 

Sketches    of    Turkey 

in  1831  and  1832.  By  an 
American.  8vo.  With  En- 
gravings. 


History  of  the  Amen- 

can  Theatre.  By  Wm.  Duk* 
LAP,  Esq.    8vo. 

Domestic  Manners  of 

the  Americans.  By  Mra. 
Trollope.    8vo.    Plates. 

Observations  on  Profes- 
sions, Literature,  and  Emigra- 
tion in  the  United  States  and 
Canada.  By  Rev.  I.  Fidler. 
12mo. 

England  and  the  Eng- 
lish. By  E.  L.  Bulwer,  M.P 
In  2  vols.  12mo. 

Annals  of  Tryon  Coun 

ty.  By  W.W.Campbell.  Svo 

French  Revolution  of 

1830. 

Miller's  Greece.  12mo. 
Verplanck's  Historical 

and  Literary  Discourses.  12mo. 

The  Percy  Anecdotes. 

Revised  Edition.  To  which  is 
added  a  Valuable  Collection  of 
American  Anecdotes,  original 
and  selected.    Svo.    Portraits. 

Wild    Sports    of    the 

West.  By  the  Author  of  "  Sto* 
ries  of  W'aterloo."  In  2  vols 
12mo. 

Lady  Morgan's  Dra- 
matic Scenes.    12mo. 

Tales  and  Novels.    By 

Maria  Edgkworth.  To  bd 
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VALUABLE    WORKS. 

DEMONOLOGY    AND    WITCHCRAFT 

By  Walter  Scott,  Bart.     With  a  Plate.     18mo. 

"The  work  is  curious,  interesting,  and  instructive." — Inquirer 

"  This  volume  is  most  interesting,  and  will  be  read  with  great  plea- 
BUre  by  almost  every  class  of  readers."—  U.  S.  Gazette. 

"  It  would  be  difflcalt  to  select  a  more  interesting  subject  for  the  pen 
of  a  ijnan  of  genius  than  that  of  popular  superstitions.  To  say  that  Scott 
has  made  more  of  it  than  any  other  man  could  have  done,  is  only  to  add 
another  tribute  to  his  acknowledged  pre-eminence."— iJosioTi  Statesman 

"  The  subject  is  most  alluring,  and  the  manner  in  wliich  it  is  handl«l 
is  magical." — AtkencBum. 

HISTORY  OF  THE  BIBLE.     By  Rev.  G. 

R.  Gletg.     With  a  Map.     In  2  vols.  18mo. 

"  The  style  of  it  is  surpassed  by  no  work  with  which  we  are  ao 
quainted.  Historical  and  biographical  facts  are  well  stated ;  the  promi 
nent  difficulties  that  present  themselves  to  the  mind  of  an  intelligent  or 
skeptical  reader  of  the  Bible  are  boldly  exhibited  and  ably  explained ;  the 
most  plausible  objections  advanced  by  modern  infidels  are  answered  in 
a  very  philosophical,  learned,  and  conclusive  manner.  The  author  haa 
imbodied  in  it  a  vast  deal  of  learning  and  research ;  has  discovered  supe- 
rior ingenuity  and  force  of  intellect,  and  furnished,  withal,  a  specimen 
of  fine  writing,  which  must  secure  a  most  favourable  reception,  as  well 
among  persons  of  taste  as  those  who  are  fond  of  Biblical  studies." — 
Albany  Telegraph  and  Register. 

POLAR  SEAS  AND  REGIONS.    By  Pro- 

fessors  Leslie  and  Jameson,  and  Hugh  Murray,  Esq. 
With  Maps  and  Engravings.     18mo. 

"A  work  from  such  hands  on  such  a  subject  cannot  fail  to  be  both 
interesting  and  valuable."— iV.  Y.  Evening  Post. 

"The  three  Eminent  men  who  have  produced  this  compilation  have 
rendered  a  great  service  to  the  cause  of  philosophy  and  knowledge," — 
N.  Y.  Commercial  Advertiser. 

"  The  writers  are  gentlemen  of  first-rate  standing  in  the  sci*»ntifio 
world,  and  the  subject  is  one  to  which  every  curious  mind  is  attBCbed 
by  a  sort  of  involuntary  impulse."— iV.  Y.  Journal  of  Commerce, 

LIFE   AND   TIMES    OF   GEORGE   IV. 

With  Anecdotes  of  Distinguished  Persons.     By  the  Rot 
George  Croly.     With  a  Portrait.     ISmo. 

"Mr.  Croly  has  acquitted  himself  very  handsomely.  His  subject  is 
one  of  much  interest,  and  he  has  treated  it  with  unusual  impartiality 
The  author's  style  is  chaste,  classical,  and  beautiful,  and  it  may  be  taken 
*s  a  model  Of  fine  writing.  It  is  worthy  of  his  genius  and  his  educa- 
tion."— Mercantile  Advertiser. 

"  Mr.  Croly  is  not  merely  a  fine  writer,  but  a  very  powerful  one.  Hi« 
ratline  is  as  bold  and  broad  as  his  colours  are  glowing.    He  writes  lit* 

>fMQ  well  ac(iuaimTjd  with  his  -iubject."— £ciecfic  JR^iew. 


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Kos.l.S  2.  Miimsi^^  Historj         I  37.  Abercmmbie  on  the  Jntei^ 
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